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Abstract 
In chapter I, we model monopolistic competition in the spirit of Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987) and we study the implications of this market structure for the 
existence of dynamically inefficient equilibria. We show that, with free entry, the 
presence of some pure profit does not rule out dynamic inefficiency, while the 
assumption of blockaded entry makes dynamic inefficiency impossible, since 
every firm grows at the aggregate growth rate and all future profits are capitalised 
in advance. 
Chapter II is devoted to the analysis of some recent development of the theory 
of long-run endogenous growth. We build a model where technology is non rival 
but partially specific to each firm, and monopolistic competition is modelled 
assuming that output is produced by means of a fixed measure of intermediate 
goods. The main result obtained in this chapter is that the growth rate, with infinite 
lives, is independent from the degree of monopolistic power; with finite lives this 
relation becomes more complex. 
The purpose of chapter III is to show that a negative relationship between 
capital accumulation and money growth is not incompatible with the common 
practice of inserting money into the utility function in the fashion of Sidrauski 
(1967). Adopting an instantaneous utility function allowing for a non-unit 
elasticity of substitution between real money balances and consumption, we find 
that the occurrence of the Tobin effect depends on the values of the parameters. 
In chapter IV we consider the effect of technological uncertainty on welfare 
in an endogenous, growth model based on positive spillovers. We encompass the 
presence of non traded labour income by means of contingent claim analysis and 
we find that a reduction of risk may be welfare damaging in presence of (Hicks- 
neutral) technological shocks. We consider also the effects of an additional 
distributive disturbance and we show that a positive correlation of the capital 
income share with the technological shock reduces the parameters set where the 
perverse effect occurs. 
In chapter V we devote again our attention to the analysis of a Sidrauski-type 
model, adopting a. stochastic framework. We consider the role of monetary 
uncertainty in the Blanchard perpetual youth framework and we show that, with 
C. R. R. A. preferences, both the monetary disturbance and its covariance with the 
real process affect consumption and therefore growth. Hence we highlight a strong 
"monetary randomness relevance" result. 
Contents 
Introduction 
Chapter I 
p. 1 
Agent Heterogeneity, Monopolistic Competition and Dynamic Inefficiency 
1. Introducfion P. II 
2. Aggregate consumption and asset accumulation p. 14 
2.1 Individual consumption p. 15 
2.2 Population dynamics and aggregation p. 16 
3. A monopolistic competition framework p. 20 
4. The role of the asset market p. 24 
(a) Entry is free but it entails a fixed cost, constant over time p. 25 
(b) Entry is free but it entails a fixed cost proportional to per capita 
output 
(c) Entry is free but it entails a fixed cost proportional to population 
(d) Entry is blockaded 
5. Concluding remarks 
References 
p. 29 
P. 31 
P. 32 
P. 34 
P. 36 
Chapter H 
Endogenous Growth and Overlapping Generations in a Model of 
Monopolistic Competition with Blockaded Entry. 
1. Introduction p. 38 
2. Leading models of imperfect competition and growth P. 39 
3. Monopolistic competition with blockaded entry P. 41 
3.1 The demand for a single intermediate good P. 43 
3.2 Firm's intertemporal optimisation P. 44 
4. Consumer behaviour and optimal growth with infinite lives P. 53 
4.1 Intertemporal behaviour of the representative agent P. 53 
4.2 Determination of the growth rate P. 54 
4.3 The command optimum P. 56 
5. Consumer behaviour and optimal growth with finite lives P. 58 
5.1 The consumer problem: a restricted version P. 59 
5.2 A steady state solution for the model P. 60 
5.3 Two non-neutrality results P. 64 
6. Policy intervention and static efficiency P. 68 
7. Concluding remarks P. 70 
References P. 72 
Chapter 1H 
Growth Models with Money in the Utility Function: a General Treatment of 
the Transitional Behaviour 
1. Introduction p. 74 
2. Superneutrality in traditional growth models: a generalization p. 76 
3. Analytical results p. 83 
4. Numerical results p. 92 
5. Endogenous growth, linear-in-capital technology and superneutrality p. 97 
6. A specification with a non-linear production function p. 100 
7. Concluding comments p 105 
Appendix 1: Extension of the non-transition result p 107 
Appendix 2: Numerical routines p III 
References P. 113 
Chapter IV 
On the Optimality of Risk-Sharing in a Stochastic Endogenous Growth 
Model 
1. Introduction p. 116 
2. A second-best result p. 118 
3. An infinite-horizon representative agent model P. 119 
3.1 The basic set-up P. 119 
3.2 Human wealth evaluation P. 123 
3.3 Solution of the model P. 126 
3.4 Uncertainty and welfare P. 129 
4. Distributional shocks P. 133 
5. Concluding remarks P. 142 
Appendix: Details of the solution in the presence of a distributive shock P. 144 
References P. 147 
Chapter V 
Monetary Uncertainty Relevance and Perpetual Youth in a Stochastic 
Endogenous Growth Model 
I. Introduction p. 149 
2. The model P. 151 
2.1 The basic set-up 
2.2 Individual choice problem 
2.3 The role of aggregate variables 
2.4 Individual portfolio composition 
2.5 Wealth shares and the Tobin effect 
3. Policy implications and conclusion 
Appendix: Characterisation of the individual wealth process 
References 
p. 151 
p. 153 
P. 158 
P. 163 
P. 166 
P. 172 
P. 176 
P. 178 
Introduction 
During the last decade, growth theory has become one of the central issues in 
macroeconomics. The sudden reawakening of this research field is related to 
Romer's (1986) seminal paper, which fostered the outbreak of contributions 
describing models characterised by sustained economic growth. However, the 
theoretical and empirical concern with endogenous growth has had an impact also 
on the traditional neoclassical theory. This variety of interests characterises my 
research as well: the present Dissertation mainly addresses to a set of issues, such 
as monopolistic competition, overlapping generations, monetary growth and 
uncertainty in theoretical endogenous growth models; however it also appraises 
some aspects of those topics in more traditional frameworks. 
The first chapter actually is, from a logical standpoint, antecedent to the 
attempt to endogenise the growth rate of an economic system. Its aim is the 
reappraisal of the possibility of dynamically inefficient equilibria in an 
overlapping generations model characterised by imperfectly competitive markets. 
Our starting point is the observation that any deviation from perfect competition 
implies the presence of pure profits (of rents in Tirole's (1985) terminology) and 
hence of an asset market. Tirole's analysis establishes that, if rents per period 
increase at the (asymptotic) rate of economic growth and they can be capitalised 
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before their creation, a perfect foresight equilibrium must be efficient. If it were 
not, the rent per period would grow at a rate exceeding the rate of interest and its 
market value would be infinite. 
In this chapter we model a monopolistic competition framework in the spirit 
of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), who in turn build on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
This approach is convenient, since it preserves a remarkable degree of 
aggregation, while allowing for the presence of many firms, each of which enjoys 
some market power. We introduce several alternative assumptions concerning the 
entry possibilities for new firms. It turns out that each of these hypotheses involves 
different implications for the existence of dynamically inefficient equilibria. In 
particular, we show that, with free entry, the presence of some pure profit does not 
rule out dynamic inefficiency. In those cases, the growth rate of each firm is lower 
than the aggregate one; hence the discount rate adopted by individual firms is not 
high enough to exclude the possibility of inefficient equilibria. On the contrary, 
the assumption of blockaded entry makes dynamic inefficiency impossible, since 
every firm grows at the aggregate growth rate and all future profits are capitalised 
in advance. 
We think that these results are interesting for two different aspects. First, if 
the market structure excludes dynamic inefficiency, the possibility of running a 
rational Ponzi game is precluded as well. Hence, the market structure becomes a 
key characteristic in assessing the role of public debt. Second, our result may be 
referred to the empirical evidence that the US economy is dynamically efficient. 
In chapter II, our interest in the role of imperfectly competitive market 
structures is closely related to the recent development of the theory of 
long-run 
endogenous, growth. 
In order to understand the role of monopolistic competition in endogenous, 
growth models, we attempt to classify the existing literature according to the 
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reasons provided to justify the use of a productive structure which allows for a 
sufficiently high and non decreasing marginal product of accumulable factors. We 
may identify three broad groups. The first one, including Romer (1986), Jones and 
Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991), assumes constant or increasing returns to the 
accurnulable inputs in (at least) one sector of the economic system, often 
advocating Marshallian externalities to justify this hypothesis. The second group, 
following Lucas (1988), makes explicit the possibility of accumulation of human 
capital. Finally, the third one relies on the effects of an increasing stock of 
knowledge. In contributions such as Romer (1990), Helpman and Grossman 
(1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), the role of imperfect competition comes 
into play. Recent research has attempted to incorporate industrial innovations into 
growth theory starting from the "schumpeterian" idea that entrepreneurs invest 
resources in the hope of discovering something of commercial value. Hence, 
potential innovators expect to be able to get a profit from their research: firms 
must be able to sell their products at a price exceeding unit cost. 
Chapter II is motivated by some scepticism about the positive link between 
the degree of monopolistic rents and the growth rate, via the amount of resources 
devoted to research, which characterises many leading models of innovation and 
growth. Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 4) consider national product as the 
output of a competitive industry which uses several different intermediate inputs. 
Each input has its own "quality ladder", that is a boundless sequence of quality 
improvements. Potential innovators invest in research to "step up the ladder" for 
one of the intermediate goods and enjoy a rent determined by the difference 
between their good and the second best one. In the model there is free entry, in the 
sense that every firm can undertake the research required to obtain a better variety 
of any good. Hence, higher profits change into higher R&D expenditure and 
eventually into faster growth. 
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Romer (1990) and Helpman and Grossman (1991, ch. 3) take the alternative 
route of building a model of increasing product variety, which regards again 
national product as a homogeneous "final" good, obtained in a competitive setting, 
via a number of intermediate goods, which are imperfect substitutes. Therefore, 
the producers of these goods enjoy some pure profit. However, production of 
every intermediate good entails the purchase of a blueprint; the cost for that 
equals, due to free entry, the discounted stream of subsequent profits. Again, the 
effect of imperfect competition on growth is positive: the higher the monopolistic 
profits for the intermediate good producer, the higher the amount of investment in 
research. 
To challenge this view about the link between the growth rate and the degree 
of monopoly, we build a model where technology is non rival but partially specific 
to each firm, and monopolistic competition is modelled assuming that output is 
produced by means of a fixed measure of intermediate goods. In our model, entry 
is blockaded, since we assume that the acquisition of the "specific knowledge" is 
costly while Bertrand competition prevails within the market for every 
intermediate input. The amount of resources devoted to research is the outcome of 
an optimal intertemporal program. 
The main result obtained in this chapter is that the growth rate, with infinite 
lives, is independent from the degree of monopolistic power; however, with finite 
lives this relation becomes more complex. It is interesting to remark that, while the 
positive link between monopolistic competition and growth is cut off, the degree 
of monopolistic power does not turn out to be hindering for growth because of the 
implied reduction in the interest rate. 
In chapters III to V we abandon the monopolistic competition framework, 
modelling growth without describing the process of technological 
improvement. 
Hence, we often invoke the presence of a Marshallian externality to be able to 
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work in an environment with sustained economic growth. We pay this price in 
order to be able to investigate a set of issues which can hardly be fitted in a fully 
specified model of growth with accumulation of knowledge. 
The starting point of chapter III is the perception that many empirical studies 
do not support the Tobin view of a positive relationship between capital 
accumulation and nominal money growth. The purpose of our contribution is to 
show that a negative relationship between capital accumulation and money growth 
is not incompatible with the common practice of inserting money into the utility 
function in the fashion of Sidrauski (1967). 
We first consider a traditional growth model which departs from Fischer's 
(1979) analysis only insofar as the instantaneous utility function allows for a non- 
unit elasticity of substitution between real money balances and consumption. This 
relaxation is justified on the ground that, within Sidrauski's approach, the degree 
of substitution between the arguments of the utility function should depend on the 
characteristics of the transaction technology. We study the transitional dynamics 
of the model and we show that there are situations, depending on parameters 
values, where the Tobin effect is reversed. This analysis is performed partly 
analytically and partly by means of numerical techniques. 
Since linear-in-capital models have been recently considered a useful 
simplification to study various issues in a growth framework, we also analyse a 
model of this type, highlighting its lack of transitional dynamics. The immediate 
jump of the system to its steady growth rate configuration entails the 
superneutrality of money, whose growth rate, in an infinitely lived agents 
fi-amework, may have real effects only during the transition. Therefore, we resort 
again to numerical techniques to study a model where the production 
function is 
such that the marginal productivity of capital is only asymptotically constant, as 
in 
Jones and Manuelli (1990). Again, we will be able to highlight situations where 
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the Tobin effect prevails and cases where capital accumulation is reduced by an 
increase in monetary growth. Interestingly, we will show that the stock of capital 
is pe anently altered by temporary variations in the money growth rate. Hence, 
we provide an example of the hysteresis effect which characterises endogenous 
growth models. 
Chapters IV and V simplify the production side of the models to linear-in- 
capital technologies. This further restriction is made in order to be able to 
indroduce uncertainty by means of geometric brownian motions, without 
abandoning closed form solutions for the models. However, we do not push this 
strategy to the point of excluding labour from the production function. Rather, our 
aggregate models rely on externalities. 
This choice is particularly important in chapter IV, where we consider the 
effect of technological uncertainty on welfare. In an endogenous growth model 
based on positive spillovers, this effect turns out to be non trivial, since 
precautionary savings affect not only the level of income but also its growth rate. 
Hence, a reduction in uncertainty may slow growth and it can therefore be welfare 
damaging whenever growth is suboptimal, as it is in spillover models. However, 
insofar as we deal with risk averse individuals, a reduction of the growth rate 
caused by a decrease in uncertainty does not necessarily imply harmful 
consequences. 
In chapter IV we analyse this point, which is similar to the one made by 
Devereux and Smith (1994), modelling technological uncertainty by means of 
geometric brownian motions. The presence of non traded labour income is 
encompassed by means of contingent claim analysis, since the asset entitling the 
holder to future labour income has been assumed to be non-traded, due to a moral 
haza d problem. In this setting a reduction of risk may be welfare damaging in 
presence of (Hicks-neutral) technological risk; this result, which contrasts to 
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Devereux and Smith's one, is our main finding. This striking difference is to be 
ascribed to the chosen stochastic structure: the impact of the standard deviation of 
the technological process on the expected growth rate is much higher in our 
model, due to Ito's lemma, which implies first order effects for standard 
deviations. 
We consider also the effects of an additional distributive shock and we show 
that a positive correlation of the capital income share with the technological 
disturbance reduces the parameters set where the perverse effect occurs. Hence, a 
distributive shock proves important in re-establishing the traditional welfare- 
augmenting effect of a reduction in risk. 
In chapter V we devote again our attention to the analysis of a Sidrauski-type 
model, adopting a stochastic framework, whose production side is similar to the 
one studied in chapter IV. It seems natural, at this stage, to extend the analysis to 
consider the role of monetary uncertainty. Since none of the existing contributions 
encompasses the case of a finite horizon, we investigate the role of "ongoing" 
monetary policy volatility in the Blanchard (1985) perpetual youth framework. 
This approach parallels the many existing works which study the role of monetary 
policy in nonstochastic frameworks, establishing the Tobin effect (e. g. Marini and 
van der Ploeg, (1988), and van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis, (1994)). In this 
context we use the traditional restrictions concerning preferences, discussed in 
chapter III. 
In chapter V we extend the existing literature by abandoning, within the 
intertemporal C. R. R. A. utility function class, the hypothesis of a unitary degree of 
relative risk aversion. We are able to solve the model guessing that the maximum 
value function is age dependent even if the portfolio shares turn out to depend on 
the level of individual wealth and hence on age. Our analysis allows us to show 
that the nominal interest rate is affected not only by the money growth rate and by 
8 
the standard deviation of the monetary disturbance but also by the elasticity of 
intertemporal. substitution and by the covariance between the technological 
disturbance and the nominal money process. Since the nominal interest rate affects 
consumption, through the same channels highlighted by the literature about non- 
stochastic models, we obtain a strong "monetary randomness relevance" result. In 
fact, both the monetary disturbance and its covariance with the real process affect 
consumption and therefore growth. 
9 
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Chapter I 
Agents Heterogeneity, Monopolistic 
Competition and Dynamic Inefficiency 
1. Introduction 
Since Diamond (1965) seminal contribution, the robustness of the possibility of 
dynamic inefficient equilibria in overlapping generations models has been 
analysed in various alternative frameworks. 
In this chapter, we address the issue of the implications of real rents 
(dividends), including the existence of an asset market. Hence, our work is deeply 
related to Tirole's (1985) contribution, which studies, in an otherwise standard 
version of Diamond's model, not only the possibility of bubbles but also the 
implications of an asset that brings a real rent. It that paper, it is shown that, if 
rents per period increase at the (asymptotic) rate of -economic growth, a perfect 
foresight equilibrium must be efficient. Were this not true, the rent per period 
II 
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would grow at a rate exceeding the rate of interest. Hence, its market value would 
be infinite. Tirole (1985, p. 1074) provides several examples of assets bringing a 
real rent, such as natural resources, land, decreasing return to scale technologies 
and paintings and jewels for their consumption value. 
However, most of his analysis is performed assuming that the aggregate 
quantity of rent is exogenously fixed in terms of output. Hence, dynamic 
efficiency remains possible and so does also the presence of asset bubbles. 
Moreover, Tirole remarks that, since rents are created over time, often they cannot 
be capitalised before their creation. In his own words (1985, p. 1080): "For 
example a painting to be created by a 21st century master cannot be sold by the 
painter's forebears. " In such cases, bubbles (and dynamic inefficiency) need not be 
inconsistent with rents per period growing at the same rate of the economic 
system, since the flow of rents stemming from a single asset does not grow and 
must be capitalised using the interest rate. 
In contrast to this analysis, McCallum (1987) and Homburg (1991), assign to 
land an explicit role in production of aggregate output and rule out inefficient 
equilibria. In fact, in their models, the marginal product of land (the rent) grows at 
the asymptotical growth rate of output'. Clearly, this result depends on the 
characteristics of the aggregate production function; it does not hold, as suggested 
by O'Connel and Zeldes (1988, pp. 441-2, f1h. 19), whenever the land income share 
vanishes in the long run. Homburg (1991) and Rhee (1991) provide two different 
formalisations for this point. Moreover, Rhee notes that the decline in the US land 
income share, during the post-war period, has not been quick enough to be 
conclusive. 
IA similar point has been made by Muller and Woodford (1988, p. 962) while considering 
a model where finitely and infinitely lived agents coexist. 
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The case of a decreasing return to scale technology has been analysed by 
Dechert and Yamamoto (1992) in an overlapping generations model with no 
population growth2. In their setting, rents are distributed to shareholders in the 
form of dividends and these agents, who are old, sell (non bubbly) stocks to the 
young. Since the equities values would approach infinity as the interest rate gets 
closer and closer to naught, Dechert and Yamamoto conclude that "the stock 
market serves the same purpose as the transversality condition in an infinite- 
horizon growth model (1992, p. 399). " 
This model suffers ftom two drawbacks: the number of firms is not 
determined and, in case of population growth, the share of rents on output would 
continuously grow over time, an implication which seem rather counterfaCtUal3. 
In this paper, we take a route that is similar to, but different from, the one 
followed by Dechert and Yamamoto. We study a monopolistic competition 
framework, built in the spirit of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Kiyotaki 
(1988), where the presence of rents is associated to the deviation from competitive 
behaviour4. We introduce several alternative assumptions concerning the entry 
possibilities for new firms. It turns out that each of these hypotheses bears 
That model is stochastic, but their point concerning dynamic efficiency can be easily 
recasted in a detenninistic frmnework. 
If we assume that each agent runs his own firm due to some indivisibility in labour, 
thereby tying the number of firm to the number of young people, we avoid such an implication 
but we are no longer able to exclude dynamic inefficient equilibria, since we are back to Tirole's 
case of rents which cannot be capitalised in advance. 
These deviations seem empirically relevant. For example, Hall (1988) estimated, for the 
U. S. economy, the ratio of the difference between price and marginal cost to price in various 
sectors and found it significantly different from zero. 
14 
different implications for the existence of dynamic inefficient equilibria. In 
particular, we show that, with ftee entry, the presence of some pure profit does not 
rule out dynamic inefficiency; on the contrary, if entrance is blockaded, the 
economic system must be efficient. This is interesting in at least two respects. 
First, if the market structure excludes dynamic inefficiency, also the possibility of 
running a rational Ponzi game is precluded. Hence, the role of public debt can be 
influenced by the market structure. Moreover, our result may be referred to the 
empirical evidence that the US economy is dynamically efficient: the difference 
between gross profit and investment, reported by Abel et. al. (1989), could be 
partly related to the presence of monopolistic distortions. 
In what follows, we start surnmarising the "consumers' side", adopting 
Buiter's (1988) framework, which allows both for a positive probability of death at 
the individual level and for agents disconnectedness in the sense of Weil (1989)5. 
In section 3 we present our monopolistic competition ftamework, we then discuss 
the role of the asset market under various assumptions concerning the structure of 
sunk costs and the entry possibility for firms (section 4). We assume away, 
throughout this chapter, government debt, public expenditure and hence taxation. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Aggregate consumption and asset accumulation 
Following Blanchard (1985), we assume that each individual agent faces a 
constant instantaneous probability of death, A, which also represents, due to the 
law of large numbers, the fraction of each cohort that dies at each instant. This 
hypothesis, coupled with the one of a constant birth rateAas in Buiter (1988), has 
5 The works by Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989) imply the possibility of dynamic 
inefficiency when production is competitive. 
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the relevant merit of allowing for aggregation. 
2.1 Individual consumption 
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we adopt, at the single agent's level, a 
logarithmic specification for the time separable utility function. Thus, the 
representative individual born at time s maximises, at time t: 
00 
U(t, s) = fln [c (rs)] e- (O+A) (r- 0 dr 
t 
0 S. t. a (t, s) = [r (t) + A] a (t, s) +w (t, s) -c (t, s) 
where c(ts) is consumption, afts) the stock of assets and w(ts) labour income, all 
considered at time t for the individuals born at time s; 0 and r(t) are, respectively, 
the intertemporal time preference rate and the interest rate. Notice that the usual 
Blanchard-Yaari actuarially fair insurance mechanism is at work. The following 
"no-Ponzi game" condition holds: 
T 
lim afts) exp -f [r(z)+Ajdz lr--ýOo 
t 
We assume, as in Blanchard, ((1985), p. 235), that the effect of retirement can 
be stylised letting the labour income decline with age at a constant rate p. With 
logarithmic preferences, a necessary condition for dynamic inefficiency in 
Blanchard's model is a sufficiently high p, namely, p>O, an hypothesis that we 
maintain6. 
With C. I. E. S. preferences, the necessary condition becomes (I-S); L+p>Sjq, where S is the 
16 
Following usual methods, it is possible to show that the consumption 
behaviour, at the individual level, is described by the following equation: 
(0 + A. ) [a (t, s) 
where h(ts), human wealth, is defined as: 
00 
(0 T 
h (t, s) w(, rs) exp -f [r(z)+Ä]dz dr 
sý t 
t 
2.2 Population dynamics and aggregation 
Given our assumptions concerning death and birth rates, the population at time t 
is: 
N(t) =N(O) ent: (1) 
we set N(O)=l with no loss of generality; n=P-X is the constant population growth 
rate. 
The population aggregate corresponding to any individual stock or flow 
variable x(ts), is indicated with X(t) and defined as: 
t 
X(t)= fx(ts)PePse-kds 
-00 
(2) 
A possible explanation for the aggregation rule (2) starts from the definition 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Hence, the lower S, the less tight becomes this condition. 
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of the share of people born at s who survive at time r 
t 
S(t, s)-IN(s) I- XfCA(T-S)dr =PN(s)e-A(t-S) 
S 
Existing population at time t can obviously be expressed as the integral sum 
of surviving people: 
t 
N(t)= fflN(s)CA(t-S)ds 
-00 
Differentiation of the last equation gives: 
t 
0 N(t) = PN(t) -A 
fpN(s)e-A(t-s)ds = (P-X)N(t) 
- Oo 
therefore, solving this differential equation for N(t), we verify the correctness of 
equation (1) and we notice that n=p-, k, as claimed. 
Substitution of (1) into (3) gives: 
S(t, s)=PN(O)ePse-ýt 
which clarifies equation (2). 
While the aggregation of consumption and assets is simple, we need to 
elaborate more on human wealth, due to the evolution of labour income. At the 
individual level it can be expressed as: 
t w(t, s) W(t)1X(t)e-P(-S) (4) 
where 0 is a constant to be determined by means of the aggregate constraint: 
18 
t 
W(t) f w(ts) PePse-At ds 
-00 
Substituting equation (4) into the last one we get: 
t 
_p(t t -s ßeßs -At 
W(t) =f 
ýýds W(t) f e-P(t 
) ßeß(S N(t) -s -t ds 
- 
00 
-00 
Therefore 
P+P, 
we may now rewrite the individual-s human wealth as 0 
follows: 
00 
h (t, s) 
W(r 
exp [r(z)+X+pjdz exp[-p(t-s)jdr N(r) 
t 
t 
Hence, aggregate human wealth is given by: 
00 
H(t) = fh(ts) Peflse-Atds 
t 
t 
00 
P+p -, P N(, r) exp _f 
[r(z)+X+pjdz drpePse-, Ite-P(t-s) 
I 
ds 
tt mm 
-00 
Talcing all the terms independent from s out of the first integral gives: 
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00 
W(T) Tt 
H(t) exp [r(z)+A+pjdz dr (A+p)e-(, A+P)t fe(P+P)3ds N(r) 
to t -00 
t 
00 
W(r) exp [r(z)+P+pjdz dr 
t 
t 
where the second expression is obtained solving the integral in ds and then 
simplifying. 
In differenfial equafion form we have: 
0 
H= (r+P+p)H- W (5) 
The presence of the PH term in equation (5) reflects the fact that all the 
agents, even the newborn, have the same life expectancy (Buiter,. (1988), p. 283). Cý 
Notice that, from equation (5) on, we take as understood the time index t 
whenever not confusing. 
The dynamic equation for A can be obtained, from the individuals' budget 
constraints, using standard techniques: 
0 
A =rA + W-C (6) 
where the absence of the AA term is due to the insurance companies' activity, 
which transfer resources from those who die to those who survive: clearly, this 
process is not affected by the birth rate. 
Finally, we provide the formulation for aggregate consumption: 
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(0 +; L) (A + H) (7) 
Differentiating with respect to time equation (7) and exploiting equations (5) 
and (6), we get a law of motion for consumption: 
0 
(r+n +p- 8) C- (0 + Ä) (ß+p)A (8) 
It is useful to compare this equation with the corresponding one in the 
Ramsey model with population growth (see e. g. Blanchard and Fisher, (1989)). In 
that framework, the second addendum on the right hand side is missing and per 
capita consumption is multiplied by (r-0). The presence of the n term in our 
equation reflects the fact that existing agents are not concerned about the unbom 
people7. 
Equations (6) and (8) summarise the aggregate behaviour of our continuum of 
disconnected families. 
3. A monopolistic competition framework 
In what follows, the economy is composed of v(t) firms, each producing an 
intermediate good, xi(t), which is an imperfect substitute for the others. National 
income, Y(t), is regarded as a flow of output obtained by means of the specific 
goods; we impose, at any time, an equal and constant elasticity of substitution 
between any pair of the intermediate products, so that each firm has some 
monopolistic power: 
(V (t) I /ju 
y(t)=v(t)(A-I)1P fx(t)il'di O<A<l 
ýo 
Notice that, at the per capita level, consumption is not affected by population growth. 
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The constant outside the big round brackets is a normalization implying that 
an increase in the number of varieties does not affect the aggregate marginal 
productivity of primary inputs (for a similar approach, see Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki, (1987), p. 649 and Kiyotaki, (1988), p. 697). 1 We could also have 
introduced monopolistic competition assuming a time separable utility function 
characterised by a sub-utility similar to the one proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977). However, to accept this approach, the investment demand functions for 
intermediate goods must be forced, for tractability, to have the same elasticity of 
consumption demands (see Kiyotaki, (1988), p. 700); the production side of the 
economic system must be accordingly constrained. Similar problems are implied 
by the presence of government expenditure. 
Considering then (9) as a "production function", we determine the demand of 
every single intermediate good solving a time-separable cost minimisation 
problem: 
v (t) 
min f pi(t)xi(t) di 
(xi) 
0 
where (9) is the static constraint; pi(t) is the price of the i-th specific good. 
Using standard techniques (for a recent example, see Grossman and Helpman, 
Without this nonnatization, the model could tum out to be an endogenous growth one. 
This class of models, insofar we are concerned with dynamic inefficiency, has very different 
jinplications, in which we do not wish to be involved. For reference on this specific point, see 
Kohn and Marion (1993) and especially King and Ferguson (1993). A normalisation allowing for 
a positive relationship between the productivity of primary inputs and the number of varieties 
would make interesting the problem of determining the optimal number of intermediate inputs, 
an issue which we completely ignore. 
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(1991), pp. 4547), we obtain the following system of demand functions: 
(LI )1 I(A- 1) 
where 
v 
vfpi 
ý0 
is both a price index and the aggregate price level. 9 In a symmetric equilibrium, all 
the firms produce the same amount of output and charge the same price, hence, 
from (9) and (11) respectively, Y=vx and P=pi. 
We now consider the problem of the representative firm, which, acting in a 
deterministic environment, maximises the discounted stream of its cash flows. 
Therefore, the firm solves, at time t, the problem: 
00 
max Qi(t) = maxf[pi(, r)xi(, r) - w(T)Li(T)j exp -f r(z)dz dr 
(t 
t 
where Li is labour used by the i-th firm, and w is the nominal wage. Notice that we 
allow the supply of labour to be different from population; this is consistent with 
the downward sloping profile for individual labour income, if the decline is due to 
a reduction of individual supply, in efficiency terms, related to age. However, we 
let the aggregate labour supply to increase at the population growth rate. We have 
V 
Notice that f Pili di = PYifx i is given by (3). 
0 
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assumed away capital since this hypothesis allows for relevant simplification 
without altering our basic results. 
The firm faces two static constraints, the first of which is a production 
function: 
xi-= yLie9t (13) 
which displays constant returns to scale in labour. Notice that we allow for the 
possibility of an exogenous rate of productivity growth, g. The firms must also 
take account of the inverse demand function for xi, equation (10). 
Since there are no dynamic constraints, problem (12) can be reduced to a 
sequence of static optimizations: 
max 
V(, r)p-lp 
00) 
W-T)d Y(, r). U-l 
for which the first order conditions are: 
gyeg Tv(r)g- 1 P(, r)x(, r) ig-1 W(T) =O, TE A oo) 
Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium, w(, r)/P(, r) = A'Yeg'r 
We may now set, with no loss of generality, pi=P=1, iE [0, v] (which is 
consistent with our analysis of the consumer's problem). In a symmetric 
equilibrium Li=Llvg hence, by use of the normalization above and of our 
expression for wages, we transform (12) into: 
coo 
L 
yý'-. feg'r exp r(z)dz dr Qi 
fv 
(T) 
which, in differential form, is: 
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0L 
Qj (I-p&ýWt + rQi v 
Hence, we have found an arbitrage equation which prices our assets, requiring 
that capital gains plus rents equate what could be obtained investing the value of 
the firm on the bond market. From (14) it is clear that the interest rate cannot be 
negative, as in Dechert and Yamamoto (1992); however this is no longer a 
sufficient condition to rule out dynamic inefficiency. 
Notice that the value of each firm depends only on future profits; hence, in a 
symmetric equilibrium, it is equal for every firm, regardless to the diversity in the 
dates at which they entered into the market. 
4. The role of the asset market 
We now tie together the analysis of sections 2 and 3, studing the implications of 
the firm pricing equation (14) on the aggregate behaviour. 
Maintaining our assumption, according to which there is no government debt, 
the outstanding stock of assets is given by: 
A=vQi 
Differentiation of this equation with respect to time gives: 
000 
A =vQi + vQi 
Substitution of equation (6) for the left-hand side and of equation (14) in the 
right hand side yields: 
rvQi + AyL e9t -C= vQi + rvQj - (I-A)yL e9t 0 
Therefore, we obtain a differential equation for the number of firms: 
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0 
vQi= YL e9t- C 
As for consumption, it is useful to reformulate our differential equation in 
terms of per worker "efficiency" units. Define c= CI(Legt) to get: 
0 
ý) (p v C= r+p-&g)c - (0+ L +P) 
ýý 
(16) 
The third equation of the model is simply (14). Since we have four unknowns 
(consumption, interest rate, number of varieties and value of a firm), we need a 
further relation to close the model. An hypothesis concerning the possibility, for 
new firms, of entering into the market provides the missing equation. In what 
follows, we examine several alternative assumptions. 
(a) Entry isftee but it entails afixed cost, constant over time 
At the level of stylised facts, a cost with these characteristics could be entailed by 
the need, for the entrant firms, of purchasing an estate, a plant and/or some 
machinery. In this case, the ratio between the fixed cost F and aggregate output is 
decreasing over time'O. 
10 The hypothesis of an Infinitely lived" entry cost may be unappealing but it is not crucial 
to establish the possibility of dynamic inefficiency with free entry. For example, assume that 
every firm must bear an initial one-off cost and then an outlay equal to a given share of the fixed 
sunk cost in every period. In this case, given p, P, 4 0, g, the minimum values foru compatible 
with dynamic inefficiency is reduced; hence the parameters set allowing for inefficient equilibria 
is increased. A similar result can be obtained assuming a (fixed) probability of exit from the 
market for the single firm, a hypothesis that could be introduced to stylise the possibility of a 
technology or taste shock. The implications of these assumptions are similar to those of capital 
depreciation in the standard overlapping generations model. 
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The free entry assumption implies that the value of every firm must be equal 
to the fixed cost, Qi=F. Therefore, the differential equation (14) reduces to the 
following ordinary one: 
rvF = (1-ji), yLe9t (17) 
Equation (15), using our definition for c, becomes: 
0 
vF = yL e9t -cL e9t 
It is now convenient to introduce an auxiliary variable, u, which is defined as 
the number of varieties in per worker efficiency terms: u= vl(Legt). 
Differentiation with respect to time gives 
0 
0v 
U= Ze9t - (n+g)u 
Hence, using (18) 
0 rc 
U=F- (n+g)u 
Exploiting our definition of u, we get, from equation (16) and (17), 
respectively: 
0 (20) c= (r+p-&g)c - (e+, ý)(P+p)Fu 
(I 
Fu 
The simplicitY Of sYstem (19-21) allows the explicit calculation of the 
long- 
run interest rate, which is: 
27 
+ (1-ji)(g+n) + 
2 
In a dynamically inefficient situation, the interest rate is lower that the growth 
rate, which happens if. (I-p)(X+i9)(fl+p) < p(g+n)(n+p-0). Therefore, we notice 
that dynamic inefficiency is compatible with the market structure generated by a 
fixed entry cost. However, the higher the degree of monopoly (the lower A), the 
less significant is the set of values for p, n and g, entailing an inefficient 
situation. 
The economic intuition for the possibility of dynamic inefficiency is simple: 
the structure of the entry cost implies that, in the steady state, the growth rate of 
the number of firms is equal to the one for output, hence the existing firms do not 
grow over time; accordingly, in discounting future profits, firms do not modify the 
interest rate with the growth rate. The fact that, in a perfect foresight framework, 
rational agents could capitalise in advance the value of still non existing (or simply 
non producing) firms is not relevant, since, in our framework, the value of these 
firms, before they sunk the cost, is naught. Hence, the economic system behaves as 
if it could not capitalise in advance future rents, as in Tirole's example of 
paintings. 
To get some more information about the characteristics of the steady state, we 
now substitute r out of equations (19-20), obtaining a system composed of two 
differential equations: 
0-g) c- (O+A) (P+p)Fu FF+P- 
Y-Lc- (n +g) u F 
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Figure I depicts their qualitative behaviour, suggesting that the equilibrium is 
unique with a saddlepoint structure. 
Figure 1. Saddlepath stability in the consumption-per worker varieties space 
It is immediate to note that the interest rate, in steady state, is higher than 
max(O, O+g-pl. From equation (21), it cannot be negative, an implication of the 
fact that it is used by firms to discount their future cash flow; equation (20) 
establishes that, if consumption in per worker efficiency units is positive in steady 
state, then r> O+g-P. 
Following Blanchard (1985, pp. 237-38) we show that the long-run interest 
rate is lower than fl4ft. This can be proved by contradiction. If r 2ý P+ft, it 
follows that (r+p-0-g)c -2: (P+p)c, hence, from (20), (P+p)c :5 (O+A. )(P+p)Fu, or 
c :5 (0+), )Fu. However, from equation (19), we obtain that, in steady state, 
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c= y-(g+n) Fu. (This can also be derived from the aggregate constraint (9) via 
the production function (13)). Therefore (O+X)Fu ý: r(g+n)Fu or y: 5 Fu (P+O+g: 5 
: 5- rFu. Recall from equation (17) that rFu = hence we derived the 
contradiction. In economic terms, our chain of inequalities implies that output, in 
per capita efficiency units, is lower that per period dividends, a clear impossibility. 
(b) Ent? y isftee but it entails afixed cost proportional toper capita output 
Imagine now an environment, similar to those discussed by Grossman and 
Helpman (e. g. (1991), chs. 3 and 5), where entrance requires the development of a 
new "blueprint", which must be achieved by the work of some scientists. If their 
productivity is constant, their wage increase with output (i. e. with average wages) 
and the entry cost involves the postulated features. 
The free entry assumption implies again that the value of every firm must be 
equal to the fixed cost, Qj(t)=F(t)=aye9t. In this case, the differential equation 
(14) becomes: 
ag =- (1-g)L + ra v 
(17') 
As before, we introduce an auxiliary variable, ul, which is now defined as the 
number of varieties per worker: ul = v1L. Differentiation of ul with respect to time 
gives 
a 
0 
Ul 
Hence, using the appropriate version of (18), we get: 
0= 7-C 
- nul ul ar 
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Exploiting our definition of ul, we obtain, from equation (16) and (I T), 
respectively: 
0 
(r+p- A-g) c- (0+ X) (ß+P) a yu , (20') 
g+ 
(1-9) 
(2 l') aul 
In the present case, calculations show that the interest rate is smaller that the 
growth rate if (I-p)(A+Q)(P+p) < pn(n+p-e). Hence, dynamic inefficiency is 
possible, since Ar= (0,1) and p> e, if n>O. In this case, the entry cost increases at the 
exogenous productivity growth rate and the existing firms grow over time at the 
same speed. Therefore, they take account of productivity growth, but not of the 
increase in population, when they discount their profits (equation (17')). Hence, 
this market structure prevents the existence of dynamic inefficient equilibria only 
if population does not grow. 
As for the characteristics of the steady state, one can easily see that it is 
unique and saddlepath stable; the interest rate, in steady state, is higher than g. 
This comes from equations (20') and (21'), for the same reasons spelled out in the 
previous section, and ftom the fact that O<p. We demonstrate, again by 
contradiction, that the long-run interest rate is lower than P+ft. If r 2: P+O+g, it 
follows that (r+p-0-g)c ý: (P+p)c, hence, from (20'), (P+p) c: 5 (9+A)(P+p)ayuj, or 
c: 5 (0+A)ayuI. From equation (19'), we obtain that, in steady state, c= y-nayul, 
which is the expenditure required to set up the new brands. Therefore 
y: 5 ayul(p+e) :5 (r-g)ayul. From equation (IT) we see that the last chain of 
(weak) inequalities implies a contradiction. The economic intuition is the same we 
provided before. 
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(c) Ent? y isftee but it entails afixed cost proportional to population 
A possible justification for this hypothesis is the need, for the new entrants, of 
setting up an advertising campaign. 
As in the previous cases, the value of every firm is equal to the fixed cost: 
Qi(t) =F(t) = SN(t) =Se nt. The differential equation (14) becomes: 
Enent (1-ýL)y: 
Le9t 
+ ree nt v 
(1711) 
The most convenient definition for an auxiliary variable is now the number of 
= vlegt. Differentiation Of U2 with respect to time varieties per efficiency units: U2 
gives 
0 
0v 
U2 - egt - 9U2 
Hence, using the appropriate version of (18), we get: 
0 rc 
U2 6 9U2 (19 
11) 
Exploiting our definition Of u2, we obtain as before, from equation (16) and 
(17"), respectively: 
0 (2011) (r+P-0-9)c - (e+A)(P+P), EU2 
n+ 
(I-A)y 
, EU2 
In this case, calculations show that the interest rate is smaller that the growth 
rate if (I-A)(X+O)(P+P) `ý jig(n+p-Q). Hence, dynamic inefficiency 
is possible, 
since ge (0,1) and p> 0, if and only if the exogenous productivity growth rate 
is 
positive. This case is symmetric to the previous one: the entry cost 
increases at the 
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population growth rate and the existing firms raise production over time at the 
same speed. Therefore, in discounting future profits, firms take account of 
population growth, but not of the increase in productivity. Hence, this market 
structure rules out dynamic inefficiency if productivity does not grow. 
The characteristics of the steady state are the same we discussed before; the 
long-run interest rate is higher than maxin, O+g-pl, but it is lower than P+ft. If 
r ý: P+ft, it follows that (r+p-0-g)c ý: (P+p)c, hence, from (20"), (P+p)c < 
:5 (e+Wfl+P)-0u2) or c: 5 (O+X), EU2. From equation (19"), we obtain that, in steady 
state, c: -_')L98U2, which is, again, the expenditure required to set up the new brands. 
Therefore 7 :5 8u2(0+A+g) :5 (r-n), EU2. From equation (17") we see that 
(r-n), Eu2=(1-A)Y we find the desired contradiction. 
Entry is blockaded 
The fixed number of firms is justified assuming that the varieties are given and 
accepting Bertrand competition within the market of each differentiated good. In 
this case, any type of lump-sum entry cost, however small, is sufficient to lock the 
number of firms. 
We, assume, for simplicity, that v is equal to 1; from the aggregate constraint 
(9) and the production function (13) we have that c=y. 
As before, it is convenient to introduce an auxiliary variable, U3, which is the 
value of a firms in per worker efficiency units, i. e. u3 = Qil(Legt). Differentiation 0 
with respect to time gives 
0 (n+g)u3; using equation (14) we obtain: u3 - Le9t - 
0+ 
(r- n- 9)U3 (22) U3 
from which it is apparent that the steady state is dynamically efficient, since u3 
may not be negative. In this case, each firm increases its production at the 
economic system growth rate. Hence, the discount of the flow of future profits is 
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performed using the interest rate reduced by the aggregate rate of economic 
growth: dynamic inefficiency becomes impossible. Since all the future rents are 
capitalised, the presence of the stock market plays the same role as the 
transversality condition in an infinite-horizon growth model, as it happens in 
Dechert and Yamamoto model. 
Equation (16) and our definition for u3 imply that (r+p-&g)c = (O+X)(, 16+P)u3 
a relation that may be used to explicit the interest rate: 
u3 '11849- P) y 
Introducing this expression into (22) we obtain the differential equation 
describing the solution of the system: 
0 
-,,: 
(O+X) 2 U3 (n+p - e)u3 +7 u3 
The phase diagram for this equation implies that there is a unique meaningful 
steady state, which is unstable. Since U3 is not predetermined, we notice the 
absence of the transitional dynamics: the system immediately jumps to its perfect 
foresight equilibrium. 
The long-run interest rate is higher than n+g, but it is lower than P+ft. If 
r ý: ft+O+gý it follows that (r+p-0-g)c ý: (P+p)c. Hence, (P+P)C: 5 (O+X)(, B+P)u3, or 
43. From equation (22) and from our assumption about the long run level C: 5 (e+A 
of the interest rate, we obtain that, in steady state,, u3 - 
(I-A)y (I-A)y 
(r-n-g) (e+, ý)* 
Therefore c=y < (1-1i)y, a contradiction implying that dividends are higher than 
output. 
34 
Figure 2. Saddlepath stability of equation (22). 
5. Concluding remarks 
In the present chapter, we emphasise the importance of the market structure to 
determine whether dynamic inefficiency is possible in a closed economy with no 
outstanding public debt. If the deviation ftom perfect competition implies the 
existence of some pure profit, the value of each firm is given by the stream of its 
discounted future cash flow, which adds a forward looking differential equation to 
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the model. The level of the discount rate adopted by individual firms plays a key 
role in our model. If it takes account of the aggregate growth rate, dynamic 
inefficiency is ruled out; on the other hand, if the growth rate of each firm is lower 
than the aggregate one the possibility of inefficient equilibria is restored. 
We have analysed market structures characterised by monopolistic 
competition. We have considered the case of free entry, determining the number 
of existing firms through the introduction of a fixed cost to be paid at the time of 
entrance into the market. The importance of the assumptions concerning the form 
of such cost is remarkable. For example, if the sunk cost is constant over time, 
existing firms do not grow in the steady state; accordingly, they do not modify the 
interest rate with the growth rate to discount their future profits. Hence dynamic 
inefficiency is possible with either population or exogenous productivity growth. 
Alternatively, if the entry cost increases at the exogenous productivity growth rate, 
being related for example to wages, existing firms grow, in the long run, at the 
same speed. Therefore, in discounting future profits, firms take account of 
productivity growth, but not of the increase in population: this structure for sunk 
costs prevents the existence of dynamic inefficient equilibria only if population is 
stationary. A cost increasing with population establishes the symmetric result. 
The assumption of blockaded entry makes dynamic inefficiency impossible, 
since every firm grows at the aggregate growth rate. In this case, all the future 
rents are capitalised and the presence of the stock market serves the same purpose 
as the transversality condition in an infinite-horizon growth model. 
Notice that, to establish efficiency, it is not necessary that every firm grows at 
the aggregate rate, but it is sufficient that some firm expands at the aggregate 
speed. Hence, in a more widely specified model, it should be possible to rule out 
dynamic inefficiency whenever a sector of the economy grows at the aggregate 
rate (or faster) and does not allow for new entries. 
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Chapter 11 
Endogenous Growth and Overlapping Generations 
in a Model of Monopolistic Competition 
with Blockaded Entry. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years a considerable number of contributions have endeavoured to relate 
the rate of growth of an economic system to its "fundamentals": preferences, 
technology and market structures. 
Within this burgeoning literature, research-based growth models are 
particularly appealing: in contrast to frameworks which account for growth 
assuming constant or increasing returns to the accumulable inputs in (at least) one 
sector of the economic system, they provide a detailed microfoundation for the 
process of technology improvement, which is at the basis of economic growth. In 
these models, some elements of imperfect competition are important: in a highly 
competitive environment the whole firm's revenue has to be used to reward 
productive factors and no room for research funds is left. For example, Grossman 
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and Helpman, in various contributions, ascribe a monopolistic power to each 
producer; their models are then characterised by the assumption of free entry in the 
industrial sector, so that the profits accrued to producers exactly balance the outlays 
in research that they have to bear in order to enter into the market. In these 
frameworks, a higher monopolistic power resolves into larger research expenditures 
and, hence, into faster growth. In what follows, we drop the hypothesis of free 
entry, considering an environment of fixed product variety. A first result consists in 
the fact that the growth rate becomes independent of the degree of monopolistic 
competition if the economic system is populated by infinitely lived representative 
agents. This contrasts with the existing literature and it is due to a "macroeconomic 
externality". In a Blanchard-Yaari framework, it turns out that the relation between 
the growth rate and the competition level of the system may even be reversed. As 
wealth is enhanced by the stream of future profits, agents decrease their saving and 
this may reduce the growth rate. It will also be shown that the ricardian debt- 
neutrality proposition does not hold in the sense that an increase in the debt/output 
ratio reduces the growth rate, as already suggested by various contributions, which 
used endogenous growth models based on linear-in-capital technologies. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised into six sections. 
Existing models of monopolistic competition and growth are quickly surveyed 
in section 2; we then introduce imperfect competition with blockaded entry (section 
3) and we find the solution for the case of an infinitely lived representative 
individual (section 4); Blanchard-Yaari overlapping generati ons are then fitted into 
this framework. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Leading models of imperfect competition and growth 
The links between growth and increasing product variety have been explored by 
Romer (1987), (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1989), (1991a, chs. 3 and 5) and 
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Insofar as the determinants of the growth rate are concerned, the results of the 
Grossman and Helpman model of increasing product quality (1991a, chs. 4 and 5), 
(1991b) are identical to those which emerge from the increasing variety model. 
Also Aghion and Howitt (1992) build a model where an increase in the degree of 
market power increases the stationary amount of research. In these settings the 
number of goods is given, but every firm may improve any existing product, 
obtaining a profit that is proportional to the increase in quality. This profit lasts 
until some other producer steps up in the "quality ladder". Notice that the leader of 
each industry, in equilibrium, undertakes no research, since the reward from 
gaining an additional advantage on the followers does not justify the research cost. 
Hence, any innovation is obtained from outsiders. Free entry in the product market 
plays again an important role: at the system level, the volume of profits equals the 
investment in research. Therefore, the monopoly power, which in this model is 
acquired via the introduction of innovations, has beneficial effects on growth. 
The Schumpeterian taste of these models is perceptible: firms devote resources 
to research and development in order to secure a stream of monopoly profits; the 
free entry assumptions imply that this stream just covers the outlays in research. 
3. Monopolistic competition with blockaded entry 
In what follows, national product is regarded as a homogeneous final good, 
obtained in a competitive setting, via a production function imposing constant 
elasticity of substitution between every pair of intermediate goods. The hypothesis 
about the variety of the differentiated goods, which is taken as given, is the same as 
(where L(t) is labour used for the final good production) In this model the same parameter, a 
determines both the monopoly level and labour productivity, and the two effects cannot be 
disentangled. 
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in Grossman and Helpman (1991a), (1991b) but we assume that the access to the 
market of each intermediate is blockaded. As each producer enjoys a partial 
monopolistic power, he obtains some pure profit, and he determines which share of 
it invest in research according to an (intertemporally) optimal plan. The result of 
this effort is a (continuous) stream of process innovations. Hence, this model avoids 
the unappealing implication according to which technological improvements are 
obtained by the new entrants. Each firm manages its own research, so that the 
problem of splitting profits between producers and researchers is avoided. 
Hindrance to new competition may be due to the possibility, for each single 
firm, of appropriating of some "product specific information". Hence, a share of 
firm's technological know-how remains private, while research provides a "general 
knowledge" effect. This distinction can be based on the possibility of obtaining 
patents, as in the models by Grossman and Helpman and by Romer. 3Notice that, if 
we introduce the hypothesis of Bertrand competition within each market, a lump 
sum cost to be paid starting to produce any good is enough to justify the assumed 
market structure. Such initial outlay could actually be necessary to set up a research 
laboratory and to let it reach the current "standard of knowledge". 
According to the assumptions above, national product is regarded as a flow of 
output produced, in a competitive setting, by means of a fixed measure of 
"intermediate" goods. We impose an equal and constant elasticity of substitution 
between every pair of these goods at any time: 
3A more sophisticated reasoning could rely on the distinction between research and 
imitation (as in Rustichini and Schmitz, (199 1)): one could argue that to obtain all the informations 
about product specific technologies can be very costly. A precise formalization of this point would 
make the model much more complex. 
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(I ]/A 
Y(t) = C(t) +I(t) +G (t) fx (t) I, 
" di O<A<l 
ýo 
I 
For simplicity, we normalise to unity the product variety. Hence, we do not 
need to discuss whether the number of varieties affects the aggregate marginal 
productivity of primary inputs, as it happens in models of increasing product 
variety. As noted in the previous chapter, although we could have introduced 
monopolistic competition assuming a time separable utility function, this approach 
would have required to force, for tractability, the investment demand fimctions for 
intermediate goods to have the same elasticity of consumption ones (see Kiyotaki, 
(1988), p. 700). Similar problems are implied by the presence of government 
expenditure. 
3.1 The demand for a single intermediate good 
Accepting the interpretation according to which (1) is a production function, final 
goods producers solve the (time-separable) cost minimisation problem: 
1 
min f pixi di 
0 
f xi*u di 
ýo 
Using standard techniques, (See, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 
(1991a, pp. 45-47)) we obtain the following system of conditional demand 
functions: 
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= 1A'& 
1/(L-1) 
i 1tP) 
where 
PAP-1) di fp 
ýo 
is both an index of intermediate inputs prices and the aggregate price level. 
3.2 Firm's intertemporal optimisation 
(2) 
The intermediate goods sector of the model is composed of a continuum of firms, 
which are modelled as lying, equally spaced from one another, on a circle of unit 
length; they are indexed by their position ic= [0,1] on the circle. We assume that the 
technologies used to produce the intermediate goods can be characterised by a 
degree of "similarity". The firms (and hence the goods) are positioned on the circle 
depending on their technological characteristics: the closer their positions, the more 
similar their production processes. 
The representative firm, managing research, faces an explicit intertemporal 
problem. Acting in a deterministic environment, it maximises the discounted stream 
of its cash flows, i. e. it solves, at time t, the problem: 
00 
(I T 
max [pixi - w(Lil + Li2) - PII exP -f r(z)dz 
&ý t 
t 
1 
Notice that f pixi di = PY if xi is given by (2) 
0 
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where xi is output of firm i; Li, and Li2 are the labour quantities employed to 
produce goods and in the research activity, respectively, w is the wage paid to them, 
I is investment and r is the interest rate, all considered at time ; so that the time 
suffix can be suppressed. 
It is necessary to specify two dynamic constraints; the first one is provided by 
the technology of acquisition for new knowledge. The simple specification chosen 
by Lucas for human capital (1988, pp. 18-19), is used here at the single firm level: 
0 
Si = Ic Sri Li2 
where Si is the stock of knowledge available for the representative firm at time r, 
Sri is the stock of knowledge relevant for it and Pc is the exogenous, productivity 
parameter in research laboratories. A dot over a variable denotes, as usual, its 
derivative with respect to time. 
Sr, can be defined as the integral sum of the publicly available results obtained 
by all the firms, weighted by a function taking account of the similarities between 
the technology of firm i and those of the other firms. This function, 8(ij), depends 
negatively on the distance, measured on the unit circle, between firm i and the 
generic firrnj. As the measure of each firm is zero, we can write: 
i+112 
Sri= 2 rýý 3 (ij) di 
where StPj is the share of the knowledge obtained by firm j that is publicly 
available. 
To get a more tractable formulation, we need several further assumptions. 
We 
introduce, first, the hypothesis that the publicly available fraction of knowledge is 
exogenous and equal for every firm, i. e. that 
ej=aj! ý ox(0,1]. (Were a)--O, there 
would not be an externality problem) Therefore, also the possibility that 
firms try to 
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prevent actively the diffusion of their private knowledge is ruled out5. Moreover, 
we need to specify an "inverse distance" function. Defining A=j-i, a simple 
example is: if WA<I, Lýij)=O otherwise6. With yt<2, we get: 
112 
Sri= 2 foEj(]-VA)dA 
0 
then, using firms symmetry and the unit-measure hypothesis for firms we obtain: 
Sri= oEj(l-y114). 
Hence, define O=K41-W/4) to get: 
0 
Si = OSjLi2 (3) 
The accumulation of knowledge, therefore, depends positively on the 
productivity in research and on the share of results which cannot be prevented from 
becoming public; it depends negatively on the technological diversities among 
firms. 7 
Notice that equation (3) does not necessarily imply that the single enterprise 
has at its disposal the entire stock of scientific knowledge; notice, moreover, that 
the hypothesis of barriers to entry caused by firm specific knowledge can coexist 
with that of a positive externality induced by research. 
5 However, since each firm has zero measure, it perceives that its research activity has 
negligible effects on the other agents' stock of knowledge; therefore the rapresentative firm has no 
incentive in using resources to avoid the diffusion of its private scientific results. 
6 As long as the "inverse distance" function does not depend on S, more complex V 
formulations, such as a quadratic one, do not alter our main results. 
7, Me parameter Vf can reflect also the communication infiwtructure of the economic system 
as in Schmitz, (1989). 
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As in Lucas' formulation, constant returns to the accumulation of knowledge 
are crucial to get an equilibrium with steady per capita growth; with diminishing 
returns the rate of increase of knowledge would converge to zero, no matter which 
share of labour is devoted to research8. 
The second dynamic constraint, in absence of adjustment costs, is simply: 
0 
Ki= Ii 
where Ki is capital. 
The firm faces the following production function: 
i Xi= Ka Lil 
'-a Sfi (4) 
which is assumed to display constant returns to scale in the "rival" factors, capital 
and labour, as in Romer (1990)9. The Cobb-Douglas specification is crucial to get 
an easy formulation for the economy's common growth rate. 
The last constraint that must be taken into account is the inverse demand 
function for xi: 
pi= xig-ly, -p P 
To simplify the problem, we can normalise total labour supply to unity'O; as 
Non constant returns to labour can, on the contrary, be fitted into the model. In this case, 
the rate of growth of the economic system would depend on the number of existing firms. Hence, 
the assumption of free entry would become important for the determination of the growth rate 
through its effect on the allocation of resources for research. 
The hypothesis of increasing returns to scale is not crucial for the model, in the sense that it 
is possible to obtain steady growth with a production function linear in all the productive factors. 
10 This conceals the dependence of the growth rate on the size of population, which 
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the total measure of firms is also unity, by imposing equilibrium on the labour 
market, we get the following current-value hamiltonian for the typical intermediate 
goods producer: 
a -a H-7 Pyl--4(Ki Lill Sý)'O- w- Mi + ýLl OSj(]-Lil) + A2I 
where A, and A2 are the costate variables. Using the final goods as numeraire, 
therefore normalizing P to unity, we can get some slight finiher simplifications, 
obtaining: 
a -a H-7 Yl--4(Ki Lill- S? )14- w- Ii + AIOSj(]-Lil) + A2I 
The first-order (necessary) conditions are: 
HLil A(]-a) Yl-'A Kiluct LjjA(1-00-lSýl' - ; Ljo Sj =0 (5) 
HIi A2 ýI 
-, ua-'Lilll('-a) SýA 0 H -ýK (6) 1 : -- -x Ki Pa 
YI 2+ rX2 
HSj, 4p Y'--AKjiuO Lilu('--O) SýA-l (7) + 
The transversality conditions are: lim XI(r)Si(, r)exp f r(z)dz 0 and lim T-+00 
t 
Ki(r)exp -f r(z)dz = 0. 
In a symmetric equilibrium, given the hypothesis concerning the total measure 
of firms, aggregate output of final goods is equal to the production of a single 
chamterizes Romer (1987) and Grossmw Helpman (199 1 a) models. 
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intermediate firm. Hence, one may verify, using (4), that the set of necessary 
conditions can be expressed as: 
A(, -a) YlLli - Alo Si =0 
paYlKi = 
0 
Apylsi Al + rXI 
It is also possible to show that each firm, at any point of time, acts so as to 
equate the fraction, 4 of the marginal productivity of labour to the market wage rate. 
The set of necessary conditions can be used to work out the proportional 
growth solution. Equation (5) can be expressed as: 
, vl-t'Ki, 
ua LiA(l-a) SjO4-1 = AO-a) 
hence, substituting it into (7), we get: 
Sil_a X, 0 Lil + rXi. 
Thus, 
A] 
- r- : ýo A, ]-a si I 
Differentiation with respect to time of equation (5) gives: 
00000 
AIIAI + Slý- = (1-ji) Y1Y + pa KIKi + AP SISi (9) 
0 (as LIILI =0 in the long run). 
From equation (4) we get: 
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000 
xi1xi =a KilKi + ASilSi (10) 
0 
Hence, defining Sj1Sj as gsi, we can obtain, gi, the rate of growth common to 
output and capital in the i-th sector: 
gi-i-agsi (11) 
In a symmetric equilibrium gi=g and gsi=gs, iE [0ý I], therefore equation (9) 
becomes: 
00000 
Al/Al - (I-p) Y1Y +p (a KIKi +P Sl-ýd - SISj 
= [I-g(]-a)jg -(go-])gs 
Hence, using (11), we obtain that, in a symmetric equilibrium, 
0 
Equating this expression to (8) and using (3) to substitute out Lb, we get: 
)g=r- 
Hence, substituting out gs and solving for g: 
1a 1-a 
The growth rate is a positive function of 0, the exogenous parameter which 
characterises the research sector, and is negatively related with the interest rate. 
It is interesting to note that the partial solution for the growth rate, in contrast 
with the existing literature, is not affected by the degree of monopolistic 
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competition. 
To understand this result, we can reformulate equation (12) by use of (10): 
0000 
XI/Al = (]-A) Y/Y +A Xi/Xi - si/si 
The impact of the growth rate of firm Ps output on the growth rate of the 
marginal value of knowledge is reduced by monopolistic competition (since, 4<1). 
However, this market structure implies a relation between X, and aggregate output 
that is not present when markets are perfectly competitive (the case y--l). in the 
symmetric setting this "macroeconomic externality" exactly offsets the former 
negative effect. 
Another distinctive feature of this model consists in the fact that the 
representative firm, in general, does not invest all the profits that it gains by 
exploiting its (partial) monopolistic power. We compute the value of the firm in a 
steady state equilibrium, under the simplifying assumption that it borrows the 
whole of physical capital from families, and we check the existence of pure profit. 
The hypothesis concerning its financial structure of the firm does not affect its 
value, since, in a deterministic environment, it is immaterial whether investment is 
financed from borrowing or from issuing equities. Therefore, the value of the 
representative firm is the sum of discounted pure profits and of the capital used in 
production, and it turns out to be: 
00 
(0 T 
V max [xj(r)-w(r)-r(r)Kj(T)jexp -f r(z)dz dr + Ki(t) i 
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(" 
t 
t 
Using the first order conditions (6') and the fact that the wage is a fraction u of 
the labour marginal productivity, we get: 
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00 
L r) exp 
fr (z) dz r+ r(t) 
ft 
t 
In a steady growth equilibrium this expression becomes notably simpler: the 
interest and the growth rate are constant; the labour share used to produce goods is 
also constant and equal to (O-g)10, hence integrating we get: 
O-gs - ap )tr-19-t 
+r (14) 
The first addendum in (14) represents the discounted stream of pure profits; it 
is immediate to see that, in a steady growth equilibrium, it will disappear only if. 
0) 
ý9-s i= pa 
i. e. i f. - 
A* 0- ags 
Hence, with p<p* we expect the emergence of pure profit in the long run. It is 
possible to show that this condition must hold whenever the first order conditions 
are sufficient for a maximum, i. e. whenever the transversality conditions are 
fulfilled and the Hamiltonian for the representative firm is concave". (The 
converse is not true. ) Hence, with p>g* the model collapses: we may consider A* 
the maximum level of competition compatible with a decentralised economy and 
II See, e. g. Beavis and Dobbs, (1990). 
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with the growth rate g. 
4. Consumer behaviour and optimal growth with infinite lives 
4.1 Intertemporal behaviour of the representative agent 
We now introduce the standard hypothesis of a time-separable utility function 
characterised by a constant elasticity of substitution. Therefore, the household's 
maximisation. problem can be written as follows: 
00 
max f[c(T)'-R I(]-R)l exp[-O(, r-t)jdr 
t 
la =r (t) a (t) +w (t) -I (t) -c (t) 
where a(t) is the non human wealth at time t, w(t) the labour income, 1(t) is the 
lump-sum tax and R is the reciprocal of the constant elasticity of intertemporal. 
substitution. To avoid an explosive accumulation of debt, the representative 
consumer is required to take account also of the "no-Ponzi game" condition: 
r 
lim a(r) exp fr(z)dz T >00 
t 
The necessary conditions for this problem are: 
CO-R .T 
0 
rA3 )OA + OA3 
where A3 is the costate variable associated with individual assets. 
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The first order conditions can be summarised by: 
0 
c(, r)= (IIR)(r-19)c(, r) 
Equation (15) implies that consumption can grow at a steady rate only if 
r=19+Rg. 
4.2 Determination of the growth rate 
Solving the system composed of equations (13) and (16) we get the steady state 
growth rate for the economy: 
20_ p(, _a) 0 
(]-a) (]-cc + RP) (17) 
The growth rate exhibits the usual negative dependence on the intertemporal 
preference and on the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution: the 
higher these parameters are, the less willing is the representative consumer to 
substitute present for future consumption. The positive relation of the growth rate to 
the exogenous parameter characterising research is quite obvious as well. Using the 
technique developed in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) it is possible to show 
that the balanced growth path is determined. 
More interestingly, equation (17) does not show any relation between the 
growth rate and the degree of competition. Intuitively, such a relation should exist, 
since the presence of monopoly reduces, ceteris paribus, the interest rate, and this 
affects both consumers and firms behaviour. 
Formally, this "neutrality" result is due to the fact that the competition 
parameter and the marginal productivity of capital do not enter separately into 
equations (13) and (16), which therefore determine only the interest rate; if p 
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varies, the capital stock, in the long run, adjusts to keep the interest rate unchanged. 
Hence, the fact that p does not explicitly appear into (13) has deep consequences. 
Moreover, let Yr be the pure profit to output ratio and recall, from (14), that, in 
a steady state equilibrium, 7r = 1- 0-9 - ag Hence, by use of (17) we can 
compute: 
dr (I-a)p ( 
g 0 
d9v ) (1-09 O-a) 00 
ao s (0-gs) 2 ao (O-gs)2 (]-a+ RO) 
and 
d7r (I-CO110 2' 0- (X) 
-d (O-g)2 (O-g)2 (]-a + RP) e 
g, u 
Therefore, we conclude that the model unambiguously predicts that the share 
of pure profit is negatively affected by an increase in the growth rate due to a 
variation in 0 or 0. 
If we set the expression for the growth rate can be simplified to: 
o-e 
I+R 
(I T) 
In this case, the growth rate becomes independent from the factors' marginal 
productivities; therefore the growth rate gains independence also from income 
distribution. The special case of the above equation (IT) also allows the growth rate 
of knowledge to be equal to the one for physical quantities, simplifying the analysis 
of steady growth. 
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4.3 The command optimum 
Suppose that a planner aims at maximising welfare at time t facing a representative 
consumer, he has to solve the following problem: 
00 
max f[c(, r)]-RI(I-R)j exp[-O(, r-t)jdr 
t 
subject to: 
0 
K(r) = K(, r)'Oc LI(, r) 1 --Oý Si (, r) P- c (r) 
and 
0 
Si Si (r) (I -L 
(where, for aggregate output, we use again the hypothesis of unit measure for firms) 
After some simplification, and dropping the time indexes, the set of necessary 
conditions can be expressed as: 
C-R = 41 
(IIR) ( aYIK - 0) c 
y (ý2) 
Of) - Fý 
1) 
0 Si Ll I 
y 
fts-i 
where 42 is the costate variable associated with the stock of knowledge and 
ý, is the 
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one associated with that of capital. If we define 4 as the ratio between the two 
00 
costate variables12, using the fact that the system can be 
simplified further to get: 
(IIR)(aYIK- 0) c 
O-a) YILI - 90 si =0 
Y=4 lsi 
or, as C-R = 419 
0 
ßY1Si =-4+4 [0 + (7 co Ic - O(I-LI)] 
Following the same procedure used above, we can work out the optimal steady 
state growth rate, which is: 
*= ßçb-(1-a)t9 
g (1-c4R 
(= 
if P= (I - 
The externality problem embedded in the model, which is apparent in the 
addendum - ýO(I-Lj) in equation (18), causes the "command" optimum growth 
rate, g*, to be higher than the market one. (Compare with equation (17)) 
Consider, now, the system composed of the two sets of first order conditions, 
derived from the "decentralised" maximisation pursued by families and firms, 
acting atomistically. After some simplification, it can be expressed as: 
0 (IIR)(; iaYIK - 0) c 
12 g Can be interpreted as the ratio between the marginal values, at time T, of capital and 
Imowledge. 
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g(l-ot) YILI - Alo Si =0 
0 
gpYlSi Al + paYlK X, 
Inspection of the two sets of conditions shows that, to reach the optimum, 
factors' marginal productivities must be equalised to their marginal valuations. 
Thus, a planner wishing to decentralise decisions has to offset the static distortion 
caused by monopolistic competition; this can be obtained subsidising production of 
every commodity at the rate More interestingly, it can be shown that a 
subsidy to investment can increase to the optimum the amount of capital and it can 
augment the stock of knowledge as well. It turns out that this more feasible policy 
measure can eliminate the static distortion. This is due to the fact that, in this 
model, there is not an explicit price for Sj; rather, its valuation can be affected 
manipulating the level of capital and correcting the distortion due to the presence of 
the externality in research. As to this point, the planner must reduce the private 
marginal value of knowledge, A,, to ý. This can be implemented via a subsidy to 
"research and development" expenditure, for example transferring to firms a share 
of the wage bill for research staff. 
5. Consumer behaviour and optimal growth with finite lives 
As we have already pointed out, the market structure considered in this chapter 
entails, in general, the presence of pure profit. Within the infinite lives case, it is 
not relevant to consider the way in which such income is distributed to the 
households, insofar as this distribution is egalitarian. In the Ramsey case, 
consumption evolution depends only on the difference between the market interest 
rate and the subjective time preference, so that, to keep everything as simple as 
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possible, one can consider pure profit as a lump-sum transfer from firms to the 
representative agents. Similarly, in various papers on endogenous growth and 
overlapping generations it is assumed that profits, arising as a consequence of 
externalises, are handed over to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. (See e. 
Alogoskoufis and Van der Ploeg, (1990, p. 6)) 
In Blanchar&s framework, which is used in this section, people have a 
potentially infinite horizon, but face, at each instant of time, a constant probability 
of death. As shown by Blanchard (1985, pp. 227-9 in particular), this limited 
uncertainty affects the relation between consumption and wealth. Therefore the way 
in which income is distributed becomes relevant, as it may influence the assets' total 
value. For this reason, a modification of the consumer budget constraint seems 
necessary: we introduce the hypothesis that profits are distributed to shareholders 
and hence we assume that the private sector's overall assets are equal to the firms' 
total value. 
5.1 The consumer problem: a restricted version 
To simplify the analysis, we use a logarithmic specification for the time separable 
utility function. Thus, the representative individual born at time s maximises, at 
time t, the functional: 
coo 
max (C(TS)) 
fln[c(, rs)] exp[-O(, r-t)jdr If2t 
t 
0 
s. t. a (t, s) [r (t) +pj a (t, s) +wc (t, s) 
where f2t is the information set at time t-, a "no-Ponzi" game condition also applies. 
Following usual methods, it is possible to show that the aggregate behaviour 
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can be sumirnansed by the system: 
0 
O)C -p (p + 0)(V+D) 
0 
K=Y-C-G (20) 
where p is the instant probability of death; the substitution of V for K comes from 
our hypothesis concerning the distribution of profits; D and G are the stock of debt 
and the government expenditure, respectively. As usual, the time index has been 
suppressed. As equation (19) and (20) are non autonomous, they must now be 
"deflated" by using income, so that the system can be rewritten as: 
0 
z+ gz = (r - e)z - p(p + e) (v+d) 
0 
x+ gx 
where z, x, d and f are the ratio of consumption, capital, public debt and 
government expenditure to income, respectively; v is the ratio between total value 
of the firm and income. 
5.2 A steady state solution for the model 
We now focus again our attention to the proportional growth solution for the 
system. We introduce also a further limitation: we consider only the case P=]-(x, 
which allows for a briefer parametrization. In a steady state equilibrium, we can 
substituteoUt V13; then, recalling from (13) that, in this simplified, case r=o-g, we 
13 Dividing (18) by Y(t) one gets the long run equilibrium value for v, i. e.: 
(1-a)Ao 
_ all) 
I+ Aa 
' Og r-g r 
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get: 
ga (1 - g) 0- (1 - pa) g g) Z -P(P+e) 4---g + (0 - g) (0 - 2g) 
+ d) (21) 
0 
-Z-pa 0-g 
(22) 
To obtain the possible steady state solutions for the model, we set to zero X0 and 
0 
z in the previous equations (21) and (22) and we combine the resulting expressions, 
obtaining: 
(0 -0- 2g)(1 -f - li Za-g p+ 0) 
11 - ýI (1 - a)1 0- (1 +4a) g+d (23) 
g)=p6 (0 - g) (0 - 2g) 
We should now solve equation (23) for the growth rate. To help in looking for 
solutions, we define: 
A(g) 0-2g) f- A 
`ý 
9 
(I 
- ýo 9 
which is the left hand side of (23), and 
B(g) = Ap + 0) 
(1 -A (I - cx)) 0 -, (] + pa) g 
(o - g) (o - 2g) 
which is the right hand side of (23), and we study separately these two main 
addenda. 
We now summarise the relevant properties of A(g). It exhibits a vertical 
asymptote at g= 0; at a zero growth rate it assumes the value: A 
(0) = (I -J) (0- 0) > 0; 
when g approaches r (so that g=012, since r+g=o), the corresponding value 
is: 
I 
A( 
)=0 
(ap +f - 1), which is less than zero 
if- 
2 
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f<1-ap. 
This condition has an economic meaning: 
(24) 
it requires that the 
consumption/output ratio is positive even when g reaches 012 (see equation (22)). 
Moreover, setting A (g) = 0, we get: 91= 2 which corresponds to the 
"Ramsey" solution (see equation (17')), and: 92-ý 
00 -J) -. A(g) is positive for I -f + ag 
g<g, and g>g2. 
If condition (24) holds, it is possible to show that g2>012, and hence also that 
g, <g2. Notice also that, for g>g2, the consumption/income ratio is negative; in this 
interval no sensible long run solution is therefore possible. 
Consider now the first derivative of A (g), 
dA 2j(I -f + ap) - 40g (I -f + ap) +0 (ap (0 - 0) - 20 (f - 1, 
(0 )2 d9 _g 
and notice that it is positive between &, j, and gmAx, where: 
ago (0 + 0) 12 
and gm 
+ 0) 12 
9min 2(ali +I AX ý2(cqi +I 
(1--0) Finally, notice that 9min is bigger than (0 - 0)12 iff <I- all ý0- +) and that 
this condition is encompassed by (24). 
Focusing our attention on B(g), we notice that it is just a multiple of the ratio 
between total assets and income. As p(p+O) can never be negative, in the interval 
where A(g) is negative, i. e. for ge (gpg2), no sensible long run equilibrium is 
possible, since B(g)<O is not acceptable. Thus, it is sufficient to study B(g) in the 
interval [0,0/2). The value for B(g) at a zero growth rate is: 
B(O) = p(p+e) -4 
(1 a) +d 
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Figure 1. As g approaches 0/2, the ratio of N(g) to D(g) increases. 
At 0/2, B(g) has an asymptote because the growth rate approaches the interest 
rate, causing the explosion of the firm value. The limit for g approaching OQ 
depends on the value of the firm: if it is always positive, as previously required, the 
limit must approach plus infinity. 
As the properties of the derivative of B(g) are the same of those of the 
derivative of the firm's steady state value, consider: 
= 
(I - yo--a)) 0- (I + pa) (g) ( (o - g) (o - 2g) D (g) 
The numerator of this expression, N(g), is positive if g<, u*, while its 
denominator, D(g), is always positive, except for the interval [0/2,0]. To establish 
the behaviour of the derivative of v(g) for gE [0,0/2), consider figure 1. N(g) can be 
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expressed as btg(q)) and D(g) as btg(ij). Define g0 such that N(g 0) =0; if g" is higher 
than ý/2 when g increases, tg(q) increases, while tg(TI) decreases; therefore the ratio 
D(g)IN(g) is always increasing and the derivative of v(g) is positive. Calculations 
show that g* is higher than ý/2 if: 
p< 11(2-(x) (25) 
One can show that that condition (25) implies both apositive value for the firm 
and a positive derivative of this value with respect to the growth rate14. 
It is now possible to draw figure 2, which depicts A (g) and B(g) in the interval 
[0,0/2); this is helpful also to recognise that, to have a unique non negative solution 
for g, a third condition is required. In fact, we need: 
>P(P+O) +d 
This condition implies that the growth process can not take off if the 
probability of death or the asset/income ratio are too high, because the steady state 
saving is too low. For the same reason, the higher is the ratio between government 
consinnpfion and national product, the lower will be the growth rate. 
5.3 Two non-neutrality results 
The effect on the growth rate of an increase of the debt/income ratio, which is 
considered as a policy instrument, can be seen analysing equation (23). A(g) is 
clearly unaffected, while B(g) is shifted upwards. Therefore, with a positive 
probability of death, an increase in d unambiguously reduces the growth rate. In 
14 Notice that: (dN(012)1dg)1,12=-O and that (dD(012)1dg)1, a=-(l+. ua); therefore, even if 
A=11(2-a), the derivative of v(g) is strictly positive. 
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fact, such a policy action, raising consumption, increases the interest rates; hence it 
makes research more costly and it lowers the equilibrium capital/output ratio. 
I 
16 
JAI61 
Figure 2. The steady state equilibrium E. 
The debt non neutrality has already been pointed out in endogenous growth 
models where the capital/output ratio is exogenous and the "engine for growth" is 
provided by externalities only, without any need for research. (Alogoskoufis and 
Van der Ploeg (1990), Buiter (1991), Saint Paul (1992)) As intuition suggests, a 
more complex formulation for the production side of the economic system does not 
affect this result. 
In the infinite lives case the growth rate was independent also of the degree of 
competition. This does not hold true any longer: p influences both equations (21) 
and (22). More precisely, an (exogenous) increase in p shifts downwards A(g) in 
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the interval [0, (0-0)/2) and B(g) in the interval [0,0/2): 
dA 
-- 
(0 -8- 2g) ag < 0, for g< 
0-0 
dm 0-g 2' 
dB 
- 
p(p + 0) (0 (a - 1)- a 9) < 0, forg <0 d, 4 (0 - 2g) (0 - g) 2 
(see figure 
I 
Figure 3. An increase in the degree of competitiveness y. 
The effect on A (g) is due to the fact that an increase in p raises the equilibrium 
capital/output ratio, reducing the growtb rate for a given volume of savings. B(g) is 
shifted downwards because the firm value decreases with A and this, in a finite 
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lives framework, reduces consumption. We can try to determine the sign of this 
effect on a comparative static basis, studying the equation: 
dA i3A dB dB 
- dg + dii dg + dii 0ý9 dA d9 du 
or: 
dg dBldp - dAldg 
dp dAldg - dBldg 
While, if condition (25) is fulfilled, the sign of the denominator is negative, the 
one of the numerator turns out to be ambiguous. Some algebra shows that, for the 
interval we are interested in, this sign is positive only if- 
C(g) = 4ag3+ ag2(2tý1-40) + ag[-p(p+0)+o2- 001 +p(p+0)0(a- 1) >O 
Hence dgldp<O if C(g) >0. Unfortunately, the study of such a function does not 
lead to any brief condition. However, notice that it has a local minimum when:. 
9=+ 
[02-00+02+3p(p+q)]112 
which is always larger than the "Ramsey" 66 
solution, (0-0)/2. The value for C[(O-i9)12] is [p(p+Q)(a(0+Q)-20)112<0- 
Since C(g) is independent off and d, we can calculate a combination of these 
policy parameters such that the growth rate is naught and condition (24) is fulfilled. 
As C(O) is less than 0, in such a situation an increase in p would unambiguously 
increase the steady state growth rate. 
Therefore, the possibility that the growth rate, in contrast to what happens in 
the Grossman and Helpman model, is positively related with the competition level 
can not be rejected. However, the mere presence of this relation contrasts with the 
infinite lives case and can have some implication for the policy analysis. 
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6. Policy intervention and static efficiency 
Considering the "command" solution for the infinitely-lived case, we argued that a 
subsidy s to investment can offset the static distortion. The same policy measure is 
now examined within the perpetual youth framework. Under the hypothesis that the 
representative firm is affected only by this policy measure, its intertemporal 
opfimisafion problem becomes: 
H. - Yl--ý4(Kjoljjl-'aSý)-u- w- (1-s)I + AIOS(I-Lil) + X2I 
Some algebra and the hypothesis of symmetric equilibrium lead to the 
following set of first order conditions: 
HLil p(I-a) YlLil - Alo Sj =0 
HK paYlKi = 
HSj ppYlSi + r. ý, 
It is possible to show, applying the same procedure carried over in section 3, 
that the partial solution for the growth rate (equation 17) is unchanged. 
By use of the first order conditions, in a steady state equilibrium, the value of 
the subsidised firm tums out to be: 
,, 
)0 
A- A(]-ix 
- Aa 
t+ vi (t) 
(1 
0-9 
)ir-19, 
(I -s) r 
Correspondingly, the new value/output ratio is: 
+ Aa 0-9 - Ila) r-g (1-s)r 
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As s>O, v^>v. If we imagine that it is possible to set up a system of lump sum 
taxes, levied on consumers, such that equation (19) is not affected, the new solution 
for the finite-lived cases is to be looked for studying the following system: 
A *(g) 19 - 2g) I -f- 
A ag 
I-S 0- g) 
and 
B*(g) =p(p + 0) 1- -pa -L+ + df 0-9 
)r-9 
I 
Figure 4. Steady state effects of an investment subsidy. 
A *(g) is shifted downwards, with respect to A (g), because of the increase in the 
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A 
capital/output ratio; B*(g) is shifted upwards, because of a raised V. Therefore, as 
shown in figure 4, the long run equilibrium growth rate unambiguously decreases 
(from E to E). Therefore, with finite lives, it is not longer possible to cope with the 
static distortion problem without affecting the growth rate. 
Notice, also, that lump sum taxes levied on firms would have a beneficial 
A 
effect for growth, because they reduce V. Clearly, to decide which kind of 
instrument should be adopted, a social welfare function has to be used. With such a 
tool, one can address jointly the removal of static and dynamic distortions. It seems 
that the planner's felicity function proposed by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) for 
continuous time overlapping generation models could play an important role for 
further developments on this point. 
7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have developed a model of endogenous, growth with imperfect 
competition and blockaded entry. In our framework, each producer enjoys a partial 
monopolistic power, obtaining some pure profit, and he determines which share of 
it to invest in research according to an (intertemporally) optimal plan. The result of 
this effort is a (continuous) stream of process innovations. A certain minimum 
degree of monopolistic power has proved to be a necessary condition for growth, 
because research is funded out of profits; however, provided that this condition is 
fulfilled, in the infinitely lived case no relation has emerged between the degree of 
monopolistic power and the rate of growth. This result, which contrasts with the 
existing literature, has been ascribed to the symmetry among firms and to the 
presence of a "macroeconomic externality" that characterises the model. 
At the policy level, our framework implies that a benevolent social planner 
cannot simply subsidise research, but he has to correct the 
distortion entailed by 
monopolistic competition. 
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With finite-lives agents, our neutrality result does not hold and policy actions 
aimed at removing the static inefficiencies caused by imperfect competition affect 
also the growth rate. Therefore, even for these relatively simple choices, a social 
welfare function proves to be necessary. 
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Chapter III 
Growth Models with Money in the Utility Function: 
a General Treatment of the Transitional Behaviour 
1. Introduction 
Tobin, in his 1965 seminal contribution, proposed a model where the long run 
equilibrium level for capital is positively related to the money growth rate. Since 
then, this result has been obtained in several aggregate fi-ameworks, such as the 
ones by Sidrauski (1967a), Lucas (1975), Fischer (1979a) and Begg (1980); more 
recently the role for money has been studied also in non microfounded 
endogenous growth models (Stadler, (1990)). 
In contrast to this stream of literature, one can explicitly derive the 
macroequations from the optimising behaviour of a representative agent, whose 
utility function includes real money balances among its arguments. This approach 
leads to the absence of the 7obin effect" in the long run (SidrausId, (I 967b)). The 
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potential importance of the connection between capital accumulation and 
monetary growth for economic policy helps explain the notable number of 
theoretical attempts which aim at establishing the Tobin effect in microfounded 
frameworks, either in the long run or during the transition path. Orphanides and 
Solow (1990) provide a simple survey of this literature. 
However, many empirical works do not support this view about the long run 
effect of monetary policy, rather suggesting a negative relation between capital 
accumulation and money growth. For example, Fischer (1993) presents a wide 
cross-sectional regression analysis suggesting a negative link between growth and 
inflation; De Gregorio (1993), focusing on twelve Latin American countries, 
provides similar evidence. Smyth (1994) estimates the negative effect of inflation 
on growth for the US private sector'. Accordingly, (not to eliminate money from 
growth models), different theoretical explanations have been proposed. One can 
consider money as an argument of the production function, obtaining results that 
depend on the specification adopted. Alternatively, it is possible to embed the 
labour-leisure choice into the representative agent optimisation problem: again, the 
direction of the effect of money growth on capital is not obvious. The transaction 
role of money is explicitly taken into account in "cash-in-advance" modelS2. 
This chapter aims at showing that a negative relationship between capital 
accumulation and money growth is not incompatible with the common practice of 
including money among the arguments of the utility function. In section 2 we set 
up the problem, introducing an instantaneous utility function that allows for a 
I However, none of those papers is able to disentangle the role of inflation from the one of 
its variance. Hence, the negative effect on growth could be ascribed to this variable, which is 
sometimes considered a proxy of macroeconomic uncertainty. 
For references, see again, Orphanides and SolOw (1990). 
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constant elasticity of substitution between real money balances and consumption. 
We then show that in some portions of the parameters space the relation between 
capital accumulation and money growth is opposite to the one suggested by Tobin. 
Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of the results attainable by means of 
analytical techniques, while the subsequent one presents some numerical 
calculations. In section 5 we study a linear-in-capital growth model underlining its 
lack of transitional dynamics. We then resort again to numerical techniques to 
study a framework where the marginal productivity of capital is only 
asymptotically constant. Again, we are able to highlight situations where the Tobin 
effect prevails and cases where an increase in monetary growth reduces capital 
accumulation. Interestingly, we show that, in this endogenous growth model, the 
stock of capital is permanently altered by variations in the money growth rate. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Superneutrality in traditional growth models: a generalisation 
The presence of real money balances in the utility function is usually justified on 
the basis of the "liquidity services" they provide. In other words, it is assumed that 
money can be introduced into the utility function to stylise the holding of real 
balances caused by the desire to save on the time and the effort required by the 
exchange process. Feenstra (1986) demonstrated the equivalence between 
introducing money in the utility function and entering real balances into an explicit 
"liquidity costs" technology3. Therefore, within Sidrauski's approach, a degree of 
substitution between consumption and real balances can be ascribed to the 
3 More recently, Croushore, (1993), suggests the equivalence between the money-in-utility 
approach and shopping-time models. However, this method imply that 
labour time should be 
introduced among the arguments of the utility function. 
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(unknown) characteristics of the transaction technology. For example, the "cash in 
advance" constraint implies perfect complementarity between consumption and 
money and hence a Leontief indifference map. The inspection of this situation, due 
to Asako (1983), is interesting since it establishes the reversal of the Tobin effect 
for low intertemporal substitution elasticities. However, this extreme case does not 
gain support from most of the empirical studies on money demand, which usually 
suggest a negative relationship between real money balances and the nominal 
interest rates. Therefore, the introduction of a sub-utility function allowing for 
various degrees of substitution between real money balances and consumption 
seems a useful generalisation. 
The most obvious candidate for such an exercise is a time separable utility 
function allowing for a constant elasticity of substitution both between its 
arguments and over time4: 
0-0 
-Ot dt 
f 
3ST- 
where c(t) and m(t)5 stand for, respectively, consumption and real money balances 
Hartman (1987, p. 475) assumes a utility function with a degree of substitution between 
consumption and real money balances but which is logarithmic over time. His results about the 
effects of the money growth rate on capital accumulation crucially depend on the introduction of 
distortionary income taxation. Also Marini and van der Ploeg (1988, pp. 775-6) and van der 
Ploeg and Alogoskoufis (1994, section 7) couple an inftatemporal CES with a 
logarithmic 
intertemporal spefication in continuous time overlapping generations models. 
Vilheu (1992) 
developed, independently from the author, a model based on the same utility function. However 
his analysis turned out to be partly incorrect (see below). 
5 From now on, we take as understood the time indexes wbenever not confusing. 
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enjoyed by the representative agent at time r, e is the intertemporal preference 
rate, (3- is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances and 
S is the intertemporal substitution elasticity. It is assumed that M[O'CO), SIE (0,00)6 
and aE (0,1). When a is equal to one, this specification specialises to a Cobb 
Douglas in consumption and money, i. e. to the case analysed by Fischer (1979b) 
and Cohen (1985). 
Assuming constant population7, the intertemporal budget constraint may be 
expressed as follows: 
0 
0m 
+k+-=rk+w+ 
p (2) 
where k represents per capita capital and M money in per capita nominal terms; p 
is the general price level, r is the real interest rate, w the labour income, and r the 
lump sum transfer assigned to the representative individual by the Government8- 
The interest rate r, under perfect competition, is equal to the marginal productivity 
of capital, f (k), minus 3, the capital depreciation parameter. 
0 
The time derivative for any variable x is denoted by x. 
We introduce, as in Blanchard and Fischer, (1989, p. 189), the definition of 
wealth (h) which, in absence of public debt, is the sum of capital and real money 
With S=O, not only would the utility function degenerate, but also the detenninant of the 
Jacobian of the dynamical system resulting from this model would be zero. (See below. ) 
7 We implicitly introduce also the hypothesis of a zero growth rate for the representative 
family. 
8 Notice that the representative agent should consider T as independent from his real money 
holdings, otherwise money would be superneutral even on the transition path. (E. g. Fischer, 
(1979, p. 1434), and Asako, (1983, p. 1594)). 
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00 
balances9, and we recall that Mlp + (p1p) m, in order to express the 
intertemporal budget constraint as follows: 
A 
=rh + w+, r-c- im 
0 
where i, the nominal interest rate, is defined as: r+ p1p. 
To solve the consumer's problem, it is useful to consider the current values 
Hamiltonian. 
oac(a-')Ia + (r h+w+r-c 
The first order conditions are: 
Hc: ac-116[ac(O-I)IO + (3) 
Hm: (1-a)m-'lc[ac(cl-1Y6 +=iX 
Hh :! =(O-r)X (5) 
0# 4% Also the following transversality condition, lim e-vxA(t)h(t) = 0, must hold. 
1-+- 
Dividing (3) by (4) we get: 
m= 
c 
(6) 
This equation can be interpreted as a money demand function. 
It is convenient, as in Villieu (1992, pp. 78 ff. ) to frame the dynamical system 
in terms of consumption, capital and nominal interest rate. 
9 It is common, in this literature, to rule out public debt. Such a hypothesis is not crucial for 
the results we are discussing. 
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Differentiation with respect to time of equation (6) gives an expression which 
will be useful in what follows: 
00 
(7) 
We then recall that ýVm = a) - 
ýlp =w-i+ f(k)--3 = i* -i+ f(k)--&-O, 
where w is the money growth rate and asterisks denote steady-state values of the 
corresponding variables, to get: 
= j*j+; (k)_ö_Ø+cy (8) 
Exploiting again equation (6) to substitute out real money balances from 
equation (3), we obtain, collecting the terms in consumption: 
cr(S-1) S-0 
as('-') c-11s' [I +A-lil-als(a-') 
where Am(affl-a)^- this expression, upon differentiation and by use of (5), can be 
transformed into: 
(T. s 
i= +Aia-')c'9 
+ 
S(l+Aic'-1) 
[0+S-f (k)1 
c u-s 
Finally, by means of (8), we obtain our first differential equation: 
1+Aily-I 
Lr(k)-0-61 
S+aAia-l 
) 
0-i*) + (S-1) S+aAio-l 
From equations (8) and (10) we immediately get our second law of motion: 
S-a 
(k)--S-O) + 
Sa(I+A 
Lf (k)-o-61 (S+aAio'-I) ý S+aAio-l 
) 
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The long run solution of (11) allows us to visualise the superneutrality result: 
0 when c--O and i--i* this equation can be satisfied only iff (k*) = e+3, which implies 
that the growth rate of money does not affect the steady state level of output. This 
is the root of the 4riedmaniteý> prescription of the model. In fact, given the 
complete ineffectiveness of the monetary policy on output, in the long run it is 
optimal to osatiate>> the individuals with money - when the utility function 
permits, which here it does not - and hence to reduce M at a rate equal to e (See 
Friedman, (1969)). 
As for capital, the differential equation is simply: 
=f(k) -c- 3k 
which can be derived from the intertemporal budget constraint (2). 
Linearization around the steady state of system (10-11-12) yields the 
relatively simple jacobian: 
LT, 
.I 
+Ai*(O-I) 
i* ýS+aAi*FaT)) 
i= a-S 
S+aAi* 
S I)f '(7c 
I+Ai*(Car-]) S-a 
ý+arAl*O-P) S+aAi*7, ff--, )] 
0 0 
Notice that, in the steady state, consumption is equal to output, net of 
depreciation, and that the level of capital is such that its marginal productivity 
matches the intertemporal preference rate plus the capital depreciation parameter. 
Moreover, the nominal interest rate is equal to the intertemporal preference plus 
the rate of money growth. Hence, there is a one to one relation between i* and co, a 
fact that will be exploited later. 
Two jumping variables are present in this model: consumption and nominal 
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interest rate; being capital the unique predetermined quantity. Hence, to grant 
saddlepath stability, we need to prove that there is only one negative eigenvalue. 
This can be done fairly easily, as: 
Det(J) -I 
+A iSi *c *f R) S+aAi* 
(1 
(11-1)) 
The sign of the determinant implies that there are either one or three negative 
eigenvalues. Since 
Trace(.. o =0+ i* >0 S+aAi* 
(I 
I (cr-)])) 
the negative eigenvalue is unique and the explicit solution for the linearised 
differential equation for capital is k(t) = k* + fk(O)-k*je'7* t where ? 1* is the stable 
eigenvalue of J. Therefore, the effect of the money growth rate on the capital level 
is given by: 
dk(t) 
- 
d9n * [k(t)-k*jt dco dco 
(13) 
When k(t) <k* and tE (O, oo) 10, we are in presence of the Tobin effect on the 
transition path if d-In*/da)<O. Therefore, it is necessary to check the sign of the 
effect on the negative eigenvalue of an increase in the money growth rate. The 
standard procedure, suggested by Fischer (1979b, p. 1437), exploits the total 
differential of the characteristic equation, evaluated at Tl*: - 
a14 (17 * 
-, CO) dco + 
d, 4(II *, (0) di7 =0 dco oh 
where, 407*, (o)= 
10 For t approaching infinity, we have lim ik(t)-k*jt = 0. t--O- 
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(]+Ai*(17- k*)c* S-1)(6-S, * 
*, F -TI *f, 
(j (I = (, n*2-qn*+Sfl(k )c 1ý S+aAi*("-') ) -n*l 0 
Total differentiation of. 4(ij*, cq) gives: 
dn* (d, 4(Tj*, W)1dw) 
dw Pj4(n*, cq)/dn) 
(15) 
Since il* is the unique negative eigenvalue, d,. 4(Ij*, a))1d-Irj<O, and our problem 
reduces to the evaluation of If it is negative, we are in presence of 
the Tobin effect, otherwise dij*1dco>O and an increase in the money growth rate 
reduces capital accumulation (equation 13). 
Differentiating (14) with respect to o) and substituting the resulting expression 
back into (14) itself we get: 
d, 4 01 W) 
da) (S-1)((T-S) X(Sai*) 
where il*(Sai*) 
The sign of the term in the big square bracket in 0 6) is always positive. 
Hence, to sign we essentially need to study the sign of X0. The 
next section surveys the analytical results obtained in the literature under various 
assumptions about or and S, while section 4 is devoted to the study of situations 
where the use of numerical techniques is necessary. 
3. Analytical results 
When a--O or when dý: I, it is easy to sign U(ij*, w)ldco, since X(Sai*)>O. 
If consumption and real money balances are strict complements we have that 
sign 
(77*P )= 
sign(I-S), as shown by Asako (1983, p. 1596). Hence, the dco 
Tobin effect is present only if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds 
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one. 
When a= 1, we are in the situation studied by Fischer and Cohen; X0 
collapses to II(I-a) and the sign Of d-401*400CO is always negative. Hence, from 
(15), dil*ldw<O and the Tobin effect is estabilished. 
Finally, for cr> 1, sign 
(1) 10)) = sign((I-S)(S-a)) do) 
Hence, as discussed also by Villieu (1992, pp. 87-89), for a>S>1, d? j*1dw is 
positive and capital accumulation is reduced by an increase in the money growth 
rate. In other words, the "anti-Tobin" area is not limited to a zero measure set in 
the parameters space. As Sý>o>l or as o>1 but S<I, however, the traditional 
positive link between capital accumulation and money growth resists. 
So far, we have shown that the same specification for the utility function may 
generate different behaviours. Therefore, an intuitive explanation clarifying the 
role of the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution seems useful. 
It is possible to provide a detailed intuition building on the fact that 
sign( 1) = sign(I-S). 
2, (4t 
To demonstrate this property of the sequence for the nominal interest rate, we 
need to start from the explicit solution for the linearised equation that describes the 
interest rate behaviour. Since there is only one stable eigenvalue, it can be 
formulated as a linear transformation of the solution of the linearised equation for 
capital: 
i(t)-i*=Plk(t)-k*l 
The constant P is given by the ratio between the component of the relevant 
eigenvector associated to the interest rate and the component associated to capital. 
Calculations show that: 
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(I +A i k(O)-k*je'7*t ((]+Ai*(Iff-1))i*-il*(S+crAi*(Iff- 
It is immediate to note that sign[i(t)-i*] = siPO-S) when k(O)<k*. 
Likewise, for consumption we have: 
c(t)=c*+ (&i7*)[k(O)-k*JeTl*t 
Therefore: 
dc (t) aýn * [k(t)-k*j dco dco 
Time-differentiation of equation (18) gives: 
0 
C(t) C* 
c (t) c (t) 
Using (19) to substitute out ac(t)/ao) ftom the partial derivative with respect 
to the money growth rate of the last expression, we obtain an important 
intermediate result: 
0 d16 (t) /C (tv a-, n*(. C* ? l*c* 
)2 dco dwv CM CF4 
(20) 
Notice from equation (19) that the expression inside the big round brackets is 
negative, since c(t) <c*. Differentiate now the linearised version of equation (11) 
with respect to the money growth rate, considering as given the sequence for 
capital". Since di*1dco=l, we get: 
0 
S-a di(t) 4401401 
-) 
(I- 2ý*ý 
-) d (A) S+aAi*T-l d 
11 nis assumption is common in the literatwre: see Cohen (1985) and Villieu (1992). 
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(S- 
(S+ (TAi*a-1)2 
W+ (S- I)f '(k*) lk(t) -k*]) 
Exploiting equation (17) to substitute out (S-I)f'(k*)[k(t)-k*j from the right 
hand side of this expression, we obtain: 
S- a di (t) Cr(cr- ])A i*6-3(S- 
S+aAi*17-7) + ý(S+aA i*a-1) (I +A i*(a-1)) (21) 
Equate equations (20) and (21) to get: 
dn *(S+ crA i*a-I cr((T- 1) il *A i C* 
do) S-a c (t) c j)2 
[k(t)-k*]) T2, 
Recall that, when o--O or d>-I, X(Sai*) is positive and that sign( d*7*/dcp) is 
rt M 
equal to sign((I-S)(S-a)). Hence, from the last expression, we see that sign . -1 ý da) 
= sign(I-S). 
We are now in the position of being able to provide an intuitive explanation 
for the results we surveyed. We start from equation (7), which is reproduced for 
convenience. 
00 
ai (7) 
This expression makes explicit the fact that, for a given interest rate, the 
representative agent would like to expand consumption and the use of real 
balances at the same rate, a consequence of the homoteticity of the utility function. 
However, since the time profile of the nominal interest rate is affected by changes 
in co, the higher the substitution possibilities, the more rapid is consumption 
growth for a given increasing sequence of the interest rate. In fact, with a high a, a 
growing interest rate shifts expenditure towards consumption. 
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With these remarks in mind, we now discuss the three cases briefly surveyed 
at the beginning of this section. 
We see from equation (7) that, in the situation studied by Asako((T---0)12: 
0 
dlý (t) /c (t)i diA (t) Im (t)i (di(t) 
d(i) da) udo) 
) 
Since sign[i(t)-i*] = sign(l -S), were di(t)ldco equal to unity when S> 1, money 
would become, in comparison with the initial situation, less convenient in the short 
run than in the steady state. Hence, real balances would be tilted forward 
0 d[1h(t)1m(t)j 
>0 and so would be consumption. In equilibrium, current money is 
actually substituted with future money and the reduction in the current demand for 
real balances entails the undershooting of the interest rate highlighted in figure I a. 
Since in the steady state consumption is constant, an increase in its growth rate 
entails a reduction in its current level, which is the Tobin effect. 
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low, the nominal interest 
"overshoots" its long-run increase (figure 1b), real balances are anticipated, and 
this causes an increase in consumption. 
We now turn our attention to the classic intratemporal Cobb-Douglas case. 
Differentiate again equation (7) with respect to the money growth rate and 
d0 liml 
substitute out 
ft N 
using equation (10). One obtains, for a given sequence dco 
for capital: 
d[6 (t) /C (tv (t) 
d-w " S(I -a) +-a 
Fdco dco -F 
(22) 
0 12 Recall that nvm = j* -i +f(k)--34 and that we are considering capital as given. 
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I 
Figure Ia 
i( 
t 
Figure Ib 
Figure 1. Effects on the time profile for the norrýinal interest rate when S> I 
(figure I a) and when S<1 (figure I b). 
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The two addenda in (22) represent, respectively, the shift in the time profile 
of real money balances and the variation induced in consumption by the changes 
(dim all h (01M (01 in the nominal interest rate sequence. When S> 1, ( d(O -10 and dco is 
0 
positive: money is tilted forward, as in Asako's case, and the effect of the variation 
in the nominal interest rate, with (r-- I, is not strong enough to reverse the impact 
of the money growth rate on consumption. 
To understand why the effect of a variation in a) on the sequence of nominal 
interests is ow, consider that, if there were no underadjustment in this sequence, 
the representative agent would be willing to substitute current with future money. 
Since his elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high, a small reduction in the 
current nominal interest rate is enough to keep the money market balanced. 0 d1i N li (01 Therefore dw must be low. 
When S<I, the second addendum in equation (22), which is now positive, 
prevails This must happen since, with no overshooting in the sequence for interest 
rates, money would become more convenient in the short run than in the steady 
state. Hence, the representative agent becomes willing to substitute future with 
current money. However, inasmuch as its elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 
low, a high increase in the current nominal interest rate is required for equilibrium. 
Therefore, the Tobin effect is present both with high and with low elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution, even if for different reasons. 
Finally, we examine the more general case analysed by Villieu (a> 1). 
We manipulate equation (7) in the same way we have done in the previous 
case, although we now use the linearised version of equation (10). We obtain: 
0 
46MIC(Ol 6n) 
dw ý d(o 
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+ 
I+Ai*lff-I Yý! (t) a(a- 1) Ai* 0-2 (S- a) 
-i*+(S-I)f'(k*)[k(t)-k*]) (23) + S+aAi (S+aAi*a-92 
The first two addenda point out the usual effect on consumption of the 
variations in the time profile of real money balances and interest rate. However, in 
comparison with equation (22), a third element emerges, representing the effect on 
consumption of an increase in the long run interest rate. Notice that such term was 
naught with Cobb-Douglas preferences, which imply constant expenditure shares: 
in such case, the consumption profile is affected only by changes in the sequence 
for the interest rate, but not by variations in i*. By use of equation (17), we see 
that the sign of the term in curly brackets in equation (23) is equal to sign(S-1), 
which implies that the nominal interest rate sequence is increasingif S5113. This 
contributes to tilt forward real money balances and consumption. However, a> 1 
implies a tendency that hinders the previous one, causing an increase in the current 
level of consumption and hence a reduction in its growth rate: in fact, when 
substitution between consumption and money is easy, an increase in the interest 
rate shifts expenditure towards consumption14. Which of the two effects prevails 
depends on sign(a-S). 
As for the two first addenda in equation (23), we notice that they can be 
C-S t, 
- 
L) 
-1 when S> 1, money is tilted forward and this written as 
(1 
+A i dw 
generates a tendency towards a reduction in consumption. However, when a>S, 
the undershooting of the nominal interest rate is strong enough to reverse the 
former effect. 
13 The analysis of the case S< I is omitted, since it is similar to the one for S> 1, but it is less 
interesting. 
14 For a similar interpretation, see Villieu, (1995). 
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Notice that this effect and the former one go in the same direction when a> 1, 
but not when a< 1. Therefore, the analysis of the interval ae (Os 1) is much harder 
simply because the two effects go in opposite directions and the second one may 
prevail when Ai*0-2 is high, i. e. when j* is low. This is also the reason why the 
sign of X(S, cr, i*) can not be easily determined wben arci (0,1) 15. 
However, this case is relevant: a low but strictly positive elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and money fits, at the level of stylised facts, 
with most of the empirical contributions on the demand for money. In such 
studies, the estimated coefficients on interest rates are often low in absolute value 
but significant. For an example considering 27 countries, and among them the 
OECD ones but for Iceland, Luxembourg and Spain, see Fair (1987). At the 
theoretical level, if a< 1, the possibility of hyperinflation paths, highlighted by 
D- Obstfeld and Rogoff, (1983), is ruled out. 
The difficulty for the analytical characterisation of the sign of X(S, cr, i*) arises 
from the fact that one of the arguments of X(Sai*) is il*(Sai*). However, by 
inspecting (14) we notice that, if S=q, ij*(q) becomes independent of i* and equal 
to ( O-NrW 4j"(k*)c*a) 12. In this particular case, we show that X(ai*), for aE 
I), is negative when i* approaches 0. 
15 Villieu (1992, pp. 87-89) investigates the sign of X0 by inspecting the linearized 
dynamic behaviour of consumption and of the nominal interest rate. He concludes that 
Sign(d. 4(ij*, o))/dw) is equal to Sign((S-1)(cr-S)) also when a<I, and hence that X0 is always 
positive. However, in his proof, while computing dc(t)ld(o. 
d (C (t) /C (t)) 
and 
d(r(Olr(o) 
he dw do) 
introduces the hypothesis that the sequence for capital is given at its steady state level (Villieu, 
1992, pp. 87-88). This assmption induces a bias, as shown by 
Femminis, (1995), since, for a 
given initial condition, the caPital level is affected by 71* and 
hence by the variations of (o 
(equation 
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Reformulate X(dr, i *) as: 
X(a, i*)=]+ aA i*(a-1)(I-(a-1) *) 
Since lim =[+oq we have: i* ý0+ 
lim X(cri*) = [+ool 
, 
lim 
i* )%0+ *-ýo 
1+ CIO] 1) lim i* ý0+ 
This result is limited but relevant, since, by continuity, we argue that 
X(S, a, i*) is negative also for some Sky and for some i*>O. Since X(ci*) is 
positive for a sufficiently high i*, also X(S, a, i*) is greater than zero for some S: Aa. 
Therefore, to asses the quantitative importance of the portion of the parameters 
space where X(S, (T, i*) is negative we need to resort to numerical techniques. 
4. Numerical results 
Our computation strategy preliminarly requires the adoption of a specific form for 
the production function. Normalising per capita labour supply to one, the simplest 
choice is: 
OkY-3k 
where y is per capita output. 
(24) 
Therefore, the model contains eight parameters: S, a, 0, a, w, 0, y, 3. Notice, 
however, that the steady state values of consumption and of the second derivative 
of the production function always appear in equation (14) as a product. Since ? I*(. ) 
is the smallest root of that equation, the Cobb-Douglas specification (24) allows to 
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substitute (9+3)2 (r I) 
independent of 0. 
for c*f'(k*) into (14), and X(. ) is 
Moreover, the value of X(. ) does not prove to be very sensitive to a; therefore, 
choosing a=0.7, and setting the rate of intertemporal preference, 0, to 0.03 and 
the capital income share, y, to 0.3, we can focus on S, cy and a). 
Assuming away capital depreciation and choosing a situation close to the 
friedmanite one, with i*=0.001, we plot X(Sq, 0.001) for SEf 0.5,2 ý, and we 
obtain figure 2. When S=0.5, X(. ) is negative for cTE[O. 000051,0.931707]; when 
S=2, it is negative for aE[O. 000021,0.971452]. 
X(. ) 
s3. gua 
-50 
-100 
-150 
-200 
-250 
Figure 2. X(S, cy, i*) is plotted as a function of CF, for i*=0.001, when S=0.5 (dashed line) 
and when S=2 (continuous line). 
In general, simulations show that the lower i*, the 
larger the interval with 
negative 
It is notable that, if we accept the policy prescription provided 
by the model, 
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choosing a nominal interest rate not far from naught, sign(d, 4(rj*, cq)/dcp) is 
opposite to sign((S-1)(a-S)). It is natural to investigate situations with more 
realistic nominal interest rates. We increased i* by step of 0.001 starting from 
0.001 and we first obtained a strictly positive surface, considering X(. ) a function 
A 
of S and a, for A (0,100) and aE [0, I], with i=0.066. This proved to be the 
<<critical value>> for our parameter set, since a fijfther increase in i* always 
produced strictly positive surfaces, i. e. Ai=minji*: X(Sai*)>O I SE(0,100), or= 
[O, 1]}. 
Table 1: Critical values of the nominal interest rate. 
Parameters values: P---0.03, )=0.3 
&0.0 &0.1 
a A I a A I 
0.1 0.054 0.1 0.111 
0.2 0.056 0.2 0.120 
0.3 0.058 0.3 0.126 
0.4 0.060 0.4 0.132 
0.5 0.062 0.5 0.139 
0.6 0.064 0.6 0.145 
0.7 0.066 0.7 0.155 
0.8 0.070 0.8 0.168 
0.9 0.076 0.9 0.192 
Note: S varies from 0.1 to 100 by steps of 1; a varies from 0 to I 
by steps of 0.05. 
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X(. )=O, i*=0.05 
- -------------- - ------------ 
X(. )=O, i*=o. io 
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0 20 40 so 80 10( 
Figure 3. Contours of X(S, c;, i*) at an height equal to zero, for i*c- 10.05,0.10,0.15). 
sigma 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 0.4 0.6 
k, (. )=O, i*=0.02 
"(. )=O, i*=0.04 
=0, i*=O. 06 
S 
S 
Figure 4. Contours of X(S, cr, i*) at an height equal to zero, for i*c- (0.02,0.04,0.06). 
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Therefore, for i*>t X(-) is positive and sign(d, 4(rj*, o))/doj) is always equal to 
Sign((S-1)((T-S)). Hence, as a<S<l ý11*/j ,a daPO; however, for i*<Yi', the effect on 
the negative eigenvalue may be reversed. At the level of intuitive description we 
ascribe this behaviour to the effect highlighted above through equation (23). 
Table I shows the critical values, i, for parameter a varying from 0.1 to 0.9 
by steps of 0.1 and for 8 c- f 0.0,0.1 ). 
Figure 3 and 4 provide some evidence about the speed of shrinking of the area 
where X0 is negative, when i* is increased. In figure 3, we draw the contour plots 
of XO at a height of zero for i*r: f 0.05,0.10,0.15 1, for a--0.7 and in the case of 
10% capital depreciation. Figure 4 draws the contours for i*EfO. 02,0.04,0.061, 
focusing on the area where S, cre(0,1], which is possibly the most interesting from 
the perspective of stylised facts. Again, we set a--0.7 and & 10% 
In conclusion, we have extended the Sidrauski-Fischer model, considering an 
instantaneous utility function that can encompass various degrees of substitution 
between consumption and real money balances. 
In this versionof the model, variations in the rate of money growth change 
the time profile of the nominal interest rate along the transition path to a steady 
state. The effects of such alterations are deeper that those highlighted in the 
existing literature, since they do not only shift expenditure over time, but they also 
affect its allocation between consumption and real money balances. It turned out 
that the areas in the parameters space providing an anti-Tobin effect have relevant 
dimensions. This result is potentially important in helping to reconcile Sidrauski- 
type models with most of the empirical literature. However, the nominal interest 
rate becomes a key variable to determine in which portions of the parameter space 
the anti-Tobin effect occurs. In fact, the econometric estimates of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution suggest a value below unity and m[0,1] seems 
97 
consistent, at least at the level of stylised facts, with the existing empirical 
literature on the demand for money. 
5. Endogenous growth, linear-in-capital technology and super-neutrality 
It seems natural, at this stage, to investigate the role of the money growth rate in 
the light of some recent developments in the theory of growth. Since our 
specification for the utility function is rather complex, a simple formulation for the 
production side of the economy is desirable. Hence, we focus on linear-in-capital 
technologies, that, since Rebelo (1991), have been considered a useful 
simplification to incorporate into endogenous growth models the finiteness of 
agents' lives (e. g. Saint-Paul (1992) and van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis, (1994)), Cý 
politico-economic equilibria (e. g. Bertola, (1993)) and financial repression or debt 
monetisation problems (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992a, b)). 
We will briefly analyse a model of this type, showing how the concept of 
"marshallian externality" is crucial to get a linear-in-capital technology and then 
paying attention to the effects of money growth. 
We assume that economic system is perfectly competitive and that every 
single firm has at its disposal a production function of the type: 
EKýYf Lil-If 
where Yj is the i-th firm output and Ki and Li are the productive factors used by 
it; 
V is a parameter, yfe (0,1). It is briefly necessary to pay some attention to E. Each 
firm regards it as an exogenous parameter, while it is actually affected 
by the 
economic system average level of capital (Km). Therefore, this quantity gives rise 
to a positive externality on firms. 16 
16 it is the difference between the private marginal productivity and the social one which 
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It is usually assinned that E= EKmP, with op = I-V/ in order to allow the 
economic system the possibility of steady growth. 
If we introduce the hypothesis that every firm is equal and if we normalise 
properly the labour supply, which is assumed to be rigid, it is easy to obtain the 
aggregate production function: 
Y= eK (25) 
Notice that the capital rental rate, 
ýKEKI Vf- ILiI-v= WE (26) 
is equal to the share V of the social marginal productivity of capital, due to the 
extemal effect. 
The consumer's intertemporal. problem is not substantially affected by the new 
formulation on the supply side; along the lines established in section 2 we can 
easily obtain the following equation of motion for aggregate per capita 
consump on: 
0 
c 
-8 -"- 
os 
+ S(r c +Aiff-1) I 
To close the model we get, differentiating equation (6): 
0 
(0+ 7r 
(9') 
where r is the inflation rate at time t. Moreover, exploiting the definition of 
nominal interest, we get: 
generates the inefficient growth result typical of this class of models. 
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0 
7r 
r+ 7r 
and hence: 
0 
7r c 
(0 +7r (27) r+7r a 
The system composed of equation (9') and (27) can now be reformulated as 
follows: 
0 
-i- + S(r- e) (28) +Ai, 7-1) r+7r 
l+Aia-1 
7r-- (r + Ir) 
1 li, 
-, 
[S(r-0) + 7r- 0)1 (29) 72A A) 
Equation (29) can be solved separately and it is unstable around equilibrium. 
This allows us to conclude that the inflation rate must jump directly to its 
equilibrium level in response to whatever modification in the parameters affecting 
it17. The level implied by (29) is X 0) - S(r-O). Moreover, using this result and 
substituting (26) into (28), we get: 
0 
S(Vie - 
(30) 
This equation can be solved together with the dynamic- equation for capital, 
obtained from (25), and expressed in per capita terms: 
k-c 
k 5-t'-k 
(31) 
17 In Appendix I we extend this result to a wider class of time separable utility functions . 
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Hence, we obtain the growth rate and the equilibrium ratio between 
consumption and capital. In this framework, like in Sidrauski's, money is 
superneutral: neither the consumption/capital ratio nor the growth rate are affected 
by the monetary policy variable. Moreover, it is easy to demonstrate that in system 
(30-31) there is no transitional dynamics. Therefore, this class of models lacks a 
source of non neutrality results deeply analysed in the traditional growth 
framework. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the nominal interest rate 
0 immediately jumps to its steady state value, hence if(t)li(t), which played an 
important role in the analysis of sections 2-4, in this model is always naught (but 
for in the instant of the jump). 
Danthine et al. (1987, pp. 488-9 in particular) confirm this strong 
superneutrality result. These authors, without realising that they were using a 
structure that will have become, in a few years, a basic one in endogenous, growth 
models, showed that, with intratemporal Cobb-Douglas preferences and a linear 
technology, money is superneutral even in the presence of stochastic shocks. 
A specification with a non-linear production function 
The result obtained in the previous section suggests that, in order to study 
transitional dynamics effects in endogenous growth models, it is necessary to 
consider more general production or preference structures. Therefore, to verify the 
possibility of the Tobin effect (and of its reversal) we discuss a case where the 
production function is linear only in the long run. The alternative approach, based 
on non-homogeneous preferences, would have been feasible. 18 
It has not been possible to obtain an explicit solution for such a model. Hence, 
18 Recently non homothetic preferences have been used e. g. 
by Azariadis and Drazen, 
(1990), and by Rebelo, (1992), to build models which exhibit no-growth 
traps. 
101 
to work out this problem, we use a numerical routine, based on specific functional 
forms for the utility and the production functions. Maintaining equation (1) as for 
preferences, we choose to describe the available technology as'9: 
(k+oký - 
Hence, with 0 positive and yE(0,1), we consider an economic system where 
the marginal productivity of capital decreases as the accumulation process goes on, 
approaching the lower bound E (see Jones and Manuelli, (1990), for the discussion 
of a similar production function). If such a value is sufficiently high, the growth 
process keeps on indefinitely. In our exercises, we choose an asymptotic growth 
rate equal to 2.5% and we adjust the long run marginal productivity of capital 
according to this value, i. e. E=0+0.0251S. Moreover, we assign r-0.3 and we 
normalise 0 to unity; as in section 4 we choose 0--0.03 and a--0.7. 
Some details about the shooting procedure are supplied in Appendix 2. We 
based our simulation on the hypothesis that the effects due to the non linearity 
peter out almost completely during the first seven hundred periods. 
The first simulations have been carried out for the case of a high degree of 
substitution between consumption and real money balances ((T--2). We examined 
two situations: one where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below the 
logarithmic benchmark (S=0.66) and one where it is above it (S=1.5); we 
considered three possibilities for the nominal money growth rate: the "friedmanite" 
rate plus 0.0001, ten and twenty per cent. This corresponds to long run inflation 
rates of -4.2778%, 5.7221%, 15.7221% (rounded to the fourth 
decimal) in the case 
of low intertemporal substitution and of -2.1566%, 7.8433%, 17.8433% when 
19 At the micro level, a production function compatible with the aggregate one used in the 
1-7 
main text is: e(Ký-fLil-yK 
'--Y+OK. yLi 
MI 
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1.5. 
Table 2: Percentage variations in the capital level when a= 2 
S--0.66 S=1.5 
A B c D E F 
10 3.8799 4.043 
1 
0.1570 -0.3552 -0.391 -0.0360 
20 6.9069 7.1971 0.2715 -0.6292 
21 
-0.6918 -0.0630 
50 13.1915 13.7468 0.4906 -1.1847 -1.2998 -0.1164 
100 18.6826 19.4719 0.6651 -1.6469 -1.8038 -0.1596 
200 22.0951 23.0310 0.7665 -1.9204 -2.1015 -0.1847 
500 22.8251 23.7924 0.7875 -1.9775 -2.1637 -0.1899 
Oý 22.8288 1 23.7963 1 0.787q -1-97781 -2.164Q -0.190d 
Our results concerning the impact of the money growth rate on capital 
accumulation are summarised in Table 2. Column A shows the percentage increase 
in the capital level when the nominal money growth rate is increased from the 
lowest rate to the intermediate one; column B considers an increase in CO from - 
4.2778% to 15.7221%, while column C provides the effect of a change of the 
money growth rate from 5.722 1% to 15.722 1 %. 
When S=0.66 the Tobin effect is significant: we read in column Aa relevant 
increase in the capital level. A finiher 10% increase in (o entails a much weaker 
additional effect. 
We checked that the nominal interest rates "overadjusts" with respect to the 
increase in the money growth rate, as in the basic Fischer-Cohen model analysed 
in section 3. Hence, the intuitive explanation for such a 
behaviour is the same we 
developed above: expenditure is tilted forward and the 
increase in the nominal 
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interest rate reduces both real money balances and consumption. 
It is important to remark that the Tobin effect exhibited by this exercise 
concerns levels and it does not involves growth rates, as in van der Ploeg and 
Alogoskoufis (1994, p. 782). 
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1.5, our results are summarised 
in columns D, E, FIO. We notice an Anti-Tobin effect, as suggested by our 
previous analysis. In this case expenditure is tilted forward, but the substitution 
effect is strong enough to imply an increase in consumption. 
As for the real money balances hold by the representative agent, we found 
that they are sharply reduced by increments in the money growth rate. This seems 
to imply that the optimal money growth rate cannot be significantly different from 
the one that allows the representative consumer's satiation. 
The second set of simulations has been carried out for the same parameters 
values, but for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money 
balances, which has been set equal to 0.5. Again, we considered two situations: 
one where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below the logarithmic 
benchmark (S=0.66) and one where it is above it (S= 1.5). 
Table 3 shows that, when S=0.66, we find a Tobin effect of very modest 
moment when (o is increased ftom 4.2778% to 5.7221%; a further 10% increase 
in the money growth rate entails an (even weaker) Anti-Tobin effect. For S=1.5, 
the opposite happens: we notice, first, a reduction in the capital level that is almost 
completely neutralised when a) increases from 7.8433% to 17.8433%. These 
20 Columns D, E, F coffenpond to A, B, C, respectively: column D shows the percentage 
increase in the capital level when the nominal money growth rate is 
increased from -2.1566% to 
7.8433%; column E considers an increase in w from -2.1566% to 
17.8433%, and column F 
provides the additional effect of a change from 7.9433% to 
17.9433%. 
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effects are consistent with our analysis of section 4. 
Table 3: Percentage variations in the capital level when a= 0.5 
S. ---0.66 S=1.5 
A B c D E F 
1ý 0.0052 0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0245 -0.0128 0.0117 j 
0.0089, 0.0040 -0.004ý -0.0421 -0.0217 0.0204 
5ý 0.0157 0.0069 -0.0088 -0.0751 -0.0374 0.0377 
lod 0.0209 , 0.0091 -0.0119, -0.1001 -0.0485 0.0517 
20d 0.0240 0.0103 -0.0137 -0.1141 -0.0544 0.0598 
50d 0.0246 0.0106 -0.0140 -0.1169 -0.0555 0.0615 1 
70d 0.0246 , 0.0106 , -0.0140, -0.1169, -0.0555, 0.0615, 
Therefore, by means of these exercises, we obtain two results. First, we show 
that, even with infinitely lived representative agents, money is not superneutral in 
an endogenous growth model where the technology is not linear-in-capital. It is 
worth to notice that the stock of capital, and therefore production, is permanently 
altered by variations in the money growth rate. Hence, a temporary change in this 
policy variable forever affects the production possibilities of the economic system. 
Therefore, we provide an example of the hysteresis effect that characterises 
endogenous growth models. Second, we confirm that the sign of the relation 
between capital accumulation and money growth depends not only on the form of 
the utility function, but also on the specific values attributed to its parameters and 
on the level of the money growth rate. 
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7. Concluding comments 
We have generalised the treatment of preferences over consumption and real 
money balances in the traditional Sidrauski-Fischer-Cohen growth model. Framing 
it in terms of capital, consumption and interest rates, we have detected non-zero 
measure sets in the parameters space where the anti-Tobin prevails. 
The reduction in the accumulation of capital takes place in two cases. 
When the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is higher than the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the latter exceeds unity, expenditure is 
tilted forward, as in the standard Sidrauski-Fischer-Cohen model, but the 
substitution effect between real money balances and consumption is strong enough 
to reduce capital accumulation. 
When cr< I the analysis is more complex and numerical techniques are 
required. If we consider the case, symmetric to the previous one, when a<S<I, we 
notice that the anti-Tobin effect is present only if the long run nominal interest rate 
is sufficiently high. However, for low interest rates, the relation between capital 
accumulation and money growth rate is negative also for other parameters sets, 
that, again, must be computed numerically. At the level of intuitive description we 
ascribe this behaviour to the effect exerted by the long-run interest rate on the 
consumption profile. 
We have considered also endogenous growth models. Since the combination 
of a linear-in-capital technology with hornothetic preferences implies the absence 
of a transition path, we studied numerically a case where the production function 
is asymptotically linear. Our experiments corroborate the previous results, with an 
important qualification consisting in the fact that temporary variations in the 
money growth rate have permanent effects on the income level, in coherence with 
the hysteresis effects which characterise this class of models. 
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Hence, our attempt to recond ee practice of inserting money into the utility 
function with the negative relation between output and money growth that is 
suggested by many recent empirical contributions has yielded some fruit. 
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Appendix 1: Extension of the non-transition result 
In section 5 we showed that the endogenous growth model with linear in capital 
technology and preferences given by (1) lacks transitional dynamics. In this 
appendix we aim to extend this result to the following more general one: 
Proposition: if an economic system displays i) linear in capital aggregate 
production function; H) time separable preferences; W) instantaneous utility 
homogeneous of degree il with positive but decreasing first derivatives and iv) 
strict concavity for the instantaneous utility, then it lacks transitional dynamics and 
its growth rate is always equal to (r-e)/(I-rd. 
Proof To prove our proposition, we first show which are the restriction on the 
degree of homogeneity implied by the hypotheses on preferences and then we 
maximise the representative consumer's lifetime utility in the face of these 
qualifications. 
Define ffr) =c(, r)lm (r) and transform the instantaneous utility as follows: 4(c, m) 
W, 1*7 = U69W (where we omit the time indexes). Therefore we get 
VC'M)=UjffiMn-1 and fý, (cm) = [IIUW - Ujffiflm'l-'. Hence, the hypothesis 
according to which the marginal utilities of consumption and real money balances 
are positive, implies 17*0. Moreover, if i7e (-o, *, O), the assumption on the first 
derivatives requires that U(I)<O, and, if ijE (O, o, *), that U(I)>O. Finally, notice that 
'ý C (C' M) = UO M 
n-2 and hence that Uff(j)<0. 
The strict concavity hypothesis implies that the Hessian matrix, 
Ufj 0 (n - 1) Uf 09 - Uff 09f 
mn-2 
-l)UO-Uff(fif rj(tj-l)U(fi-2(tj-l)Uf(fif+Uff(fi 
has positive determinant and negative trace. Some algebraical derivations show 
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that: 
det[A j=m2ij-4[(n_lyn(. q_l) U69 U_ (77_ I) U 2jp, ff (fi A 
only if i1<1 and if2l: 
UO 
+ Tj >0 (A2) Uff (fi UO 
The negativity constraint on the trace of (Al) does not imply any further 
restriction, as: 
-2[(j tr[A I] =m ?I ffog + ? j(ij-l)U(1)-2(ij-l)UAf+Uoj'] < 
-2 mq [uo +A(l -17) U0 + uoflj 
M71-2 IUIOI + fl(I - n) U,, ffi + UO n U69luoll <0 
Therefore, the representative consumer's problem can be set out in the 
following way: 
00 
maxf Uff, r)) m( r) 11 e0 (r- - t) 
t 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint: 
21 Notice that the conditions obtained in the text are necessary and sufficient to grant the 
concavity for the hessian matrix of the hamiltonian associated with the representative constuner's 
intertemPoral optimization problem. This matrix must be negative semi-definite to avoid 
vioMon of the sufficient conditions for optimality. (Beavis and Dobbs, (1990, pp. 334-335 e 
348-349)). 
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0 
a(t)= ra(t)+w(t)-[f(t)+i(t)]m(t)+x(t) 
Omitting the time indexes, we express the first order conditions as follows: 
ufogm, 7= Am (A3) 
nu(om"-, = X(f+i) 
0 
A= (&r)A (A5) 
The transversality condition is not affected by our formulation of the 
problem. 
Differentiate the ratio between (M) and (M), 
n U69 
UO 
to get a dynamic equation, 
n ujffl I= ujo Y+ 1) + Ufjo f (f+ o 
q 
which can be made explicit for i: 
77UO9 
U02 
(A6) 
Consider now the total differential of (M) and equate it to (A5) to obtain: 
0 
Uf 
(A7) 
0 
Recall the identity m= co - 7r and substitute it into (A7) to get, 
by use of (A6): 
m 
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0 
7r + (r- + 17) (7r- (0)) (A8) uff 09 Uf69) 
which corresponds to equation (29) in section 5. It is immediate to remark that, if 
(A2) is verified, (A8) is unstable around equilibrium. Therefore, the concavity 
condition grants -the absence of transitional dynamics, as the unique acceptable 
value for inflation is: 
r-O 7r = a) - 
Hence, we immediately get, by means of (A7), that also the 
consumption/money ratio does not vary over time; the system and the real money 
balances growth rates are equal and given by: 9 
This proof can obviously be extended to the class of homothetic instantaneous 
utility functions, which are monotonic transformation of A(c(r), m(r)). 
Hence, we showed that the strong superneutrality result is section 5 does not 
depend on the specification of preferences over consumption and real money 
balances but only on the homotheticity of the instantaneous utility function. 
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Appendix 2: Numerical routines 
To generate figure 2 we built the following Mathematica routine: 
Clear[a, b, d, gm, i, F, s, g, f, h, x] 
a=0.7; b=0.03; i=. 00 I; d=O; gm=0.3; 
F=(b+d-d*gm)*(b+d)*(gm-l)/gm 
f[s-, g-] := x/. FindRoot[(xA2-b*x+s*F)*((i+(a/(I-a))Ag*iAg)/(s+g*(a/(I- 
a))Ag*iA(g-1))- 
x)-(x*F*(s-l)*(g-s))/(s+g*(a/(I-a))Ag*iA(g_l))ýo, f X, _I, _Ioo, o I, 
MaxIterations->40, WorldngPrecision->20] 
h[s-, g-] : =I+g*(a/(I-a))Ag*iA(g_l)*(J_((g_l)*f[S, g])/i) 
Plot[ {h[. 5, g], h[2, g] 191g, 0,2), AxesLabel-> I "sigma", fix(. ) 11), 
PlotStyle->j Dashing[ f . 
04,04) ]9111] 
To generate figure 3 and 4 we built Mathematica routines similar to the 
following one: 
Clear[a, b, d, i, gm, F, s, g, f, h, x] 
a--0.7; b=0.03; d=O; i=. 02; gm=0.3; 
F=(b+d-d*gm)*(b+d)*(gm-l)/gm 
tls-, g-] := x/. FindRoot[(xA2-b*x+s*F)*((i+(a/(I-a))Ag*iAg)/(S+g* 
(a/(I-a))Ag*iA(g-1))- x)-(x*F*(s-l)*(g-s))/(s+g*(a/(I-a))"g*iA(9-1)) 
ý0, I x, - I, - 100,0 1, MaxIterations->40, 
WorldngPrecision->20] 
h[s_, g_] : =I+g*(a/(I-a))Ag*iA(g_ 1)*(l _((g_ 1) *flS, g])/i) 
i=. 05; 
ContourPlot[h[s, g], f s, O, 100 1, f g, O, I J, AspectRatio->. 5, Contours-> f01, 
ContourShading->False, ContourSmoothing->True] 
i=. 10; 
ContourPlot[h[s, g], Is, 0,1001, lg, O, I 1, AspectRatio->. 5, Contours-> 10 1, 
ContourShading->False, ContourSmoothing->True] 
i=. 15; 
ContourPlot[h[s, g], f s, O, 100 1, f g, O, I J, AspectRatio->. 5, Contours->j 0 1, 
ContourShading->False, ContourSmoothing->True] 
Show[%, %%%, %%%%%] 
where, for convenience, b=p, d=S, i=i*, gm=y, s=S, 9=G. 
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Results in tables 2 and 3 have been obtained using routines of the following 
type: 
Clear[a, g, S, te, r, w, A] 
Clear[c, i, k] 
a--. 7; g=2; S=0.66; te=. 03; 
gr =. 025; rr = te+gr/S 
b=rr; d=. 3; 
wmin =-rr(I-S)-S*te 
w=wmin+. 0001; 
A=(a/(I-a))^g; 
sol=NDSolve[{c'[t]ýc[t]/(S+g*A*i[t]"(g-1))((Sg+g*S(I+A*i[t]"(gl))) 
(rr+b*d*k[t]"(d-l)-te)+(S-g)(w+te-i[t])), 
i'[t]= =i[t]*(I+A*i[t]"\(g-1))/(S+g*A*i[t]^(g-1))((S-1)(rr+b*d*k[t]/(d-l)-te)- 
(w+te-i[t])), 
k'[t]= = rr*(k[t]+b/rr*k[t]A (d-1))-c[t], k[500]= =1000000, 
c[500]= =(rr(I-S)+S*te)*k[500], i[500]= =w+rr(I-S)+S*tel, 
{c, i, kI, It, 0,7001, AccuracyGoal->IO, PrecisionGoal->10, WorkingPrecision->20] 
Plot(Evaluate[k[t]/. sol], f t, 0,700 I] 
Plot[Evaluate[c[t]/. sol], Jt, 0,7001] 
Plot[Evaluate[i[t]/. sol], f t, 0,700)] 
k[O]/. sol 
C[O]/. sol 
i[O]/. sol 
k[700]/. sol 
c[700]/. sol 
i[700]/. sol 
. te=&, gr = growth rate rr=Fb=O&d=y. where, for convenience, g=(7. 
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Chapter IV 
On the Optimality of Risk-Sharing 
in a Stochastic Endogenous Growth Model 
1. Introduction 
During the last few years, several contributions suggested that the precautionary 
motive increases savings: Caballero (1990), Weil (1993) and Van der Ploeg (1993) 
provide various examples based on alternative specifications for the utility 
functions. In endogenous growth models, built in the spirit of Romer (1986) or 
Rebelo (1991), precautionary savings have far reaching consequences. Since we 
observe a "change in the magnitude of the effects", an increase in savings affects 
not only the level of income but also its growth rate, which may consequently be 
lowered by a reduction in uncertainty. Therefore, if growth is suboptimal, being 
based on positive spillover effects, the political stance favourable to financial 
liberalisation, which, during the post war period, has led to a remarkable lowering 
of institutional and legal barriers to international capital movements, might prove 
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questionable. 
However, insofar we deal with risk averse individuals, a reduction of the 
growth rate caused by a decrease in uncertainty does not necessarily imply harmful 
consequences. Thus, a deep analysis of the effects of uncertainty on growth and 
welfare is necessary in appreciating the role of financial openness. 
Devereux and Smith (1994), in an infinite horizon representative agent 
framework, establish a situation where the lowering of the growth rate due to a 
reduction of aggregate uncertainty is welfare lessening. However, their findings, 
which are discussed in the second section, depend on the particular stochastic 
structure they introduce. 
This chapter widens Devereux and Smith's result in a framework where 
technological uncertainty is modelled by means of geometric brownian motions 
(as in Obstfeld, (1994)) and the presence of non traded labour income is 
encompassed by means of contingent claim analysis (section 3). We will consider 
a single country model; however it is possible, and in principle easy, to show that 
the international risk pooling, if different countries share the same technology, is 
equivalent to a reduction in technological uncertaintyl, 2. The effects of an 
additional distributive shock are considered in section 4, where it is shown that a 
positive correlation of the capital income share with the technological disturbance 
reduces the parameters set where the perverse effect occurs. Hence, a distributive 
IA recent model that can be very useful to check this statement is Ghosh and Pesenti (1994, 
section 2 in particular). 
2 if countries face different technological opportunities, international financial integration, 
channeling savings to projects with high risk and high return, may well promote growth. For 
references concerning recent developments in this stream of literature, see Devereux and 
Smith 
(1994, p. 548). 
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shock proves important in re-establishing the traditional welfare-augmenting effect 
of international risk-sharing. 
2. A second-best result 
Devereux and Smith (1994) consider a discrete time endogenous growth model 
with C. R. R. A. preferences, where the linearity of the technology in the 
accumulable factor (capital) is ascribed to a positive marshallian externality, as in 
Romer (1986). 
In a first specification of the model, production is deterministic but each 
country enjoys a stochastic endowment, i. e. Yt=OKta(MtLd'-a + Et, where Yt is 
output, Kt capital, Mt human capital and Lt labour. Devereux and Smith assume 
that the stock of human capital, due to the effect of the positive externality, is 
always equal to the stock of physical capital. Moreover, they notice that the 
distribution of the random disturbance must grow in proportion to output, 
otherwise the effect of the shock would become negligible over time. Accordingly, 
proportionality of the shock to the economy wide capital stock is assumed, i. e. 
et = ytKt, yt i. i. d. Notice that the representative consumer does not realise the 
relation between the distribution of the random shock and total capital. 
Secondly, Devereux and Smith consider a model with a production function 
affected by a multiplicative (Hicks neutral) technology shock: Yt=OtKta(MtLd ]-all 
Ot i. i. d. In this case we are in presence of a random return on capital. 
In the stochastic endowment case, Devereux and Smith show that the growth 
rate is lessened by a reduction in aggregate uncertainty (by a transition from 
financial market autarchy to international integration) and that welfare may also be 
harmed3. This result is obtained because we are in presence of three distortions: 
Ile parameter set for this to be true must be computed numerically. 
For an example, see 
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the positive externality implies a suboptimal growth rate, uncertainty is not 
diversified away as much as possible and the representative agent misperceives the 
relation between the random disturbance and the accumulable factor. Hence, the 
possible negative impact on welfare of financial integration is a typical second best 
result. 
However, this outcome is significantly affected by the presence of 
multiplicative technological shocks. In this case, Devereux and Smith find that an 
increase in the variance of the shock always damages welfare and that it enhances 
the growth rate only if the risk aversion index is higher than one (1994, pp. 545- 
46). The economic intuition for this result is straightforward: with multiplicative 
shocks the private return on capital is stochastic and it covaries positively with 
future consumption. Therefore, growth is riskier, in the sense that an increase in 
the standard deviation of the disturbance enhances the variance of consumption. 
Hence, Devereux and Smith's results are determined by the fact that, in the case of 
technological shock, the private return on capital reflects part of the shock so that 
the externality is less marked than in the case of endowment risk. Therefore, their 
conclusions are deeply related to the hypothesis conceming the misperception of 
the link between the random shock and capital. 
3. An infinite-horizon representative agent model 
3.1 The basic set-up 
We now consider a closed economy populated by identical, infinitely lived, 
individuals who maximise the intertemporal objective: 
Devereux and Smith, (1994, pp. 540-44). 
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040 
Ut = Et 
f 
I-R &-P 
O-OdT 
\, t 
where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on time t information, Ct is 
time t consumption, p is the instantaneous rate of time preference and RE [0,00) 
represents both the risk aversion index and the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
intertemporal. substitution4. 
The representative firm produces a (gross) output flow dYj by means of the 
stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function: 
dYi = PKi^fLi I-Ykl-Y (dt + (7,, dz (1) 
where, respectively, Ki and Li are the stock of physical capital and the labour 
managed by the i-th firm; k is the average stock of capital, 0 the inverse of the 
capital/output ratio and dz a standard Wiener process. Notice that, by assumption, 
YE (0,1). 
Competition forces firms to have the same capitalAabour ratio; hence it is 
immediate to get the aggregate production function, wbere the inelastically 
supplied labour is normalised to one: 
dY = PK (dt + adz) 
Hence, dz actually is an aggregate shock, affecting all firms, rather than an 
idiosyncratic one. Despite the simplicity of this formulation, notice that the 
We built also a version of the model using the theoretical framework introduced 
by 
Epstein and Zin (1989) to distinguish risk aversion from the elasticity of 
intertemporal 
substitution. However, our result are not significantly affected 
by this distinction (see below). 
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Dý 
Romer-type production function (1), explicitly providing a productive role for 
labour, implies a divergence between the gross capital income share determined by 
the market, and the actual marginal productivity of capital. Therefore the growth 
rate, from the point of view of a representative agent, is inefficiently low. 
In comparison with the standard linear-in-capital technology, the production 
function (1) has far-reaching consequences, since it implies the existence of an 
asset, the claim on future stochastic labour income (human wealth), which is 
assumed to be non traded, due to an obvious moral-hazard problem. The set of 
available assets, inclusive of the non-traded one, is composed by non-risky bonds 
(B), physical capital (K) and human wealth (H); the stochastic processes for these 
assets are: 
dB =r Bdt (2) 
dK = (yp - 3)Kdt + ypKazdz 
Hdt + HerHd - dS 
(3) dH = igH ZH 
where r and is the safe instantaneous interest rate and 3 is the capital depreciation 
rate. 
Notice that not only the implicit discount factor on human wealth, but also the 
stochastic process dzHand the standard deviation crHare unknowns and must be 
endogenously determined. On the contrary, the characteristics of the wage process 
dS = jisdt + asdzs are entirely known; in fact, from (1), us = 
(1-Y)PK; 
asdzs = (I-y)PKqdz and qs, ý ý-- (1-y)PKOrz2. 
(where, in general, (Ty=(7iqjpy 
and Py is the correlation coefficient between variables i andj). 
Using the finance 
jargon, we say that the wage process is spanned by the technological 
disturbance. 
Defining financial (tradable) wealth as the sum of bonds and capital 
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(F=B+K), we now assume that the state variables F and H are the unique 
arguments of the indirect utility function J(. ); consequently we set up the optimal 
portfolio-consumption choice using the following Bellman equation: 
maxCK I-R + Jt(F,, [V + JFýFH) [rF + (YP -3- r)K +, 4s - C] 
H- gsl + 
H) 
[nt2 ß2 Orz2 K2 + (y, 2+2, yß K +JH (F, H) [jgH 2 1 
JHpýF, H) Iz KH +aHsH - yp qszK - a, 2 
YflaH, 
sY 
(aH2 H2 + as2 - 2allsffi 21 
The associated first order conditions, characterising optimal consumption and 
portfolio choice, are: 
C-R =j F 
(, Yp - 
3- r) J FF o2p2 (Tz2 
K+ yp as) + JHF allz H- yp (Ts) F+j 
(where we let as understood the arguments of the indirect utility function) 
Hence 
ji-IIR (4a) 
j 
K* =_ 
F- y r) i ( 
_. m 
i 
2H - qv, 
(TH 
(4b) 
JFF 22 )0213 Or I 
JFF (T 2 z Cr 
2 
z 
The second addendum in (4b) explicits, the "state-variable" hedge component 
of the demand for capital, while the third one represents the "income-hedge" 
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effect. 
3.2 Human wealth evaluation 
Before guessing a solution for the Bellman equation, it is convenient to "price" 
human wealth. This evaluation does not entail particular problems, thanks to our 
assumption according to which the wage process is spanned. We choose to use the 
contingent claim analysis, since it allows for some intuitive insight concerning the 
value of the non-traded asset. (For recent examples of this approach, see Merton, 
(1992), and Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, (1992), sect. 4 in particular)5. 
To price human wealth we notice that the unique productive factor varying 
over time is capital. Hence, we guess that the value of the non-traded asset 
depends only on time and on capital itself, i. e. 
H= H(K, t) (5) 
Using Ito's lemma we get the total differential for H- 
dH = Htdt +H dK +IH (dK) K2m 
However, using (3) we may write 
i p2 a, 2 K2+ Ht (6a) pHH - ps = HK[(p - 8)K - C] +Hz 2 KX 
5 One could also consider human wealth as if it were freely traded, as suggested by 
Svensson and Werner, (1993). In this way, one can detennine the shadow return at which the 
claim would be willingly held. In their fiamework, the shadow return 
is defined as the return at 
which an individual would purchase the claim if it would 
be available on the market, and it might 
differ through heterogeneous agents. 
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and 
Ha. dzL, = (Tsdz +H KPK(Tzdz (6b) 
An important consequence of this relation is that H, as suggested by intuition, 
is spanned by the technological shock, i. e. dzH= dz; the standard deviation for 
human wealth is given by qH H= as + HKPKq, 
We now build the "hedge portfolio", i. e. we determine the quantity of capital 
Kh which minimises the variance of the return of the sum of the non-traded asset 
and itself 
MinKh [Va r (dH + dKh)] =m inKh [Va r ((aH H+ yp a, Kh) dz)] = 
minKh [a 2 H2 + y2 p2 a, 2 Kh2 + 2ypaH Hzý, HKhj 
Solving for Kh we get: 
'gHz 
Kn 
yp(3z2 
(7) 
With a positive covariance between K and H the optimal hedge is negative, 
since protection against risk on a non-traded claim on income implies a short 
position in correlated assets. 
It is now important to remark that the spanning of H by the aggregate shock 
implies that the variance of the return of the portfolio composed of H itself and Kh 
is zero. Substituting (7) into Var(dH + dKh) and using the expressions for qHH 
and as obtained above, we get: 
2 2 21CF 2)H =0 Var (dH + dKh) -=-- (aH - allz z 
This result allow us to price human wealth through a simple no-arbitrage 
assumption. In fact, since the hedge portfolio replicates the characteristics of a 
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tradable one, the return on which has zero variance, its value must be equal to 
what can be obtained investing the same amount of wealth at the riskless rate, i. e.: 
HAH+ (7p - 6)Kh =r (H + Kh) (8) 
Substituting Kh into the last relation and recalling AHH from (6a) we get: 
(yp r) 
CHZ 
2H+ rH = Ht + HK [(#- 3)K - C] +1H22+ As (9) z yp(T, 2 
KK z 82(y H 
Finally, specializing (5) into a linear relation between human wealth and 
capital, i. e. H=W, we get, from (6b): 
+ bpa, 2K 
Using this last result and the hypothesis of linearity for relation (5), we 
obtain, from (9): 
0+ bpj K+ rH = (l-, y) PK +b 3- 
7)K 
yo 
(p 
-k 
c 
This equation may be solved to get a (partial) solution for H- 
0- 7) (r + 05) 
- 45 - r(l- y) - yg 
(10) 
where use has been made of the relation b= HIX- g is the expected growth rate, 
i. e. g= (P -3- CIK) = E(dK)IK. Notice that equation (10) corroborates our guess 
about the linearity of the relation between H and K. However, up to now, H 
depends also on endogenous variables: the riskless rate and the expected growth 
rate, whose determination requires the computation of the maximum value 
function. 
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3.3 Solution of the model 
At this stage, it seems natural to proceed using a tentative solution of the form: 
J(F, H) =D 
F)I-R 
I-R 
To verify the correctness of our guess, it is necessary to compute D, 
substituting the first order conditions (4a) and (4b) into the Bellman equation. 
-I)IR 
(H + F)1-R (H + F)I-R F)-R O= D(R I-R --pD I-R - +D(H+ x 
(H+F), 
-11R 2H]+AHH-D (H+F)l 
z 
2 ý7R ypa72 
(H+F)-('+R) +F 2 p2 2 yo- 
8- r LL E+ CFHZ 
-RD 2 (TZ 
[Vp2cr 
2R y2 p2 a4 zz 
H+F (H+F) 2H2 +2 
4ý-; 
-H HaHz + CrH 
y3p3a 4R o2 p2 CT 22 zzýA 
(TZ 
We notice, from equations (7-8), that: 
- rH- r) yp 2 
r. " +gHH =0 
Therefore, the first order terms in curly brackets in the Bellman equation 
(yo r)2 I IR become: r+ D- (H + F), while the second order ones, 
thanks to 
RjP2q, 2 
the spannng assumption, reduces to 
(yp -3- r)2 (H + F)2 
R272p2az'2 
Hence: 
127 
D -11R + 
R-1 (, yp-8_r)2 
RR 
(r 
+ 2Ry2p2 CIZ 
Therefore our guess is actually correct and consumption is a linear function of 
the sum of financial and non traded wealth; D-"R is the marginal and average 
propensity to consume out of total wealth. K*, determined by equation (4b), 
becomes, by means of equation (6b): 
K*=_ yß-S-r _ +F ___gm -8-r 
yß y 
R, )o2ß2 2(H yß(y 2 F)-L- K --LH alz Z Rr2ß2 (TZ 2 
(17 -r 'Y 7 
In a representative agent closed economy model, it seems natural to impose 
that, in equilibrium, the net aggregate quantity of riskless bonds must be zero. 
Hence K*= F and we may simplify equation (12), obtaining the "forcing" riskless 
rate: 
z yp - 
Ryfl2ar 2 
Using this relation into the definition for D-11R we get: 
D-IIR R+ ['yp -R P2(T 2 (y- 0.5)] RR 
Equation (11) implies that, for a given riskless rate, the precautionary motive 
is strong enough to cause a reduction in the propensity to consume out of wealth if 
the risk aversion index is higher than unity (from equation (11), dD-"Rldcr, <O if 
R>1)6; however, in our general equilibrium framework, an increase in (7,, also 
induces a "portfolio balance" effect: the representative agent is willing to purchase 
6 This is a standard result: in an early paper Merton neatly interpret this outcome in terms of 
income and (1-licksian) substitution effect. (See Merton, (1990, ch. 4)). 
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more of the risk-free asset, whose quantity is held fixed. Hence, the forcing rate 
diminishes, (equation (13)), so that, being y lower than 0.5, the propensity to 
consume, for R> 1, is actmlly raised7. 
The determination of the expected growth rate requires more calculation. 
Starting from the definition for g D-11R + 
LI 
and using (10) and 
(ýLK H) 
we get: 
(I -y) (P-R p2 or 2 (0-3- g) = D-11R 
(]+ 
yfl-3+R(J-, y)p2 
z 
27g) (TZ 
Hence, using (14) and rearranging: 
'yß-Ö+(1-y)Rß2 CFZ 2- 
P-+ 
-3-Rß2 Uz 2 (, y- 0.5)] RR1 rij 
and finally: 
9p+ p2a 2 I+R 
) 
R2 (15) 
We notice that the variance of the technological shock, for realistic parameter 
values, positively affects the expected growth rate. More precisely, since R must 
be non negative, we are in presence of such an effect if y, the capital income share, 
is lower than 0.5; a sufficient condition which seems to be supported by the data. 
If we compare this result with the one in Devereux and Smith (1994, p. 545), we 
7 Notice that JWE(dFF9, being equal to [yp-3+Rp2aZ2(1-, y)]W(I-R), increases when az2 is 
raised. The term JWg12 E(dW)2, representing the loss in welfare due to the impact of 
technological uncertainty on a concave indirect utility function, boils down to -Rp2 az2 W(I -R)12. 
Therefore the effect of technological uncertainty on consumption depends on y being higher or 
lower thm 0.5. 
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notice the widening of the parameters set where an increase in technological 
variability has a positive influence on the expected growth rate. 
When R>I, equation (15) seems at odds with equation (14); however this 
apparent contradiction can be explained reformulating the H-valuation expression 
(10) using equations (13-14): 
(I - y) (p -R P2 a, 
2) (p - Rp2a, 
2) 
H= 
P- 
+ 'yp- 3-R P2qz2 
D-IIR K 
RR[ 
(Y- 
2)] 
An increase in aggregate uncertainty lowers the numerator of H and it 
increases the denominator when R>1, if r<0.5. Therefore, under this parametric 
restriction, the evaluation of the stochastic income stream is always diminished by 
an increase in (7,; this reduction in human wealth more than compensate the 
increase in the propensity to consume outlined above and explains why the effect 
of uncertainty on the growth rate is always positive. 
3.4 Uncertainty and welfare 
To appreciate the effects of an increase in the standard deviation of the 
technological shock on the maximum value function, 
J(F, H) _ 
D(F+ I-R 
I- R 
we define, for convenience, 
-R 
p+(R-y)_p + (I-R) p2a, 2+R-, y 
I-R 
R2 K' 
I- R1 jp+ (R Rp2az2 R 2)1 
-y) 
_p p2(7 2 z 
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p+(R-1) 
I 
yp -3-R 02az2 
(y 
- I)] 
and we compute: 
al(F, H) KI-R 'R(I- R) n-R [- p2q, (]+ R- 2y)] R(I- R) nl-R Rp2q, (2r])' 
I-R 
, 
d2 
-R R2 P2 a, n-R 
-p+p[(, y-1)2-, y(R-, y)j + 3(R-1) - P2Rqz2 
2y) 
d2 
I(2 
(]+ R-2, y) 
I 
The first factor is always positive, so the sign of aI(FH)1dqz depends only on 
the expression contained in the big square bracketS8. This is a function of five 
parameters (p, P, y, 3, R) and of the standard deviation of the technological 
disturbance, and it is therefore hard to interpret. Our strategy consists in setting p 
to 0.03,3 to 0.05 and az to 0.03 (results are not very sensitive to this last figure), 
and in performing some numerical computationO. 
In an endogenous growth model the choice of an appropriate capital/output 
ratio (i. e. 1/0) entails some problems. On the one hand, the accumulable factor 
should represents a "broad measure of capital", possibly including some 
8 It is immediate to notice that dJ(FlVlda, 
2 may be positive for some values of the 
parameters. For example, with logaridimic preferences, we may compute 
("2 -1 
-n 2 T47- 
z =0 
2d 
which is positive for I /P < (I - y) (I - 2, y)lp. 
9 Using recursive preferences i la Epstein and Zin (1989) we obtained: 
I-RREfl2a, n-R O+p[(, y- 1)2- y(R-y)j+S(R-j)-p26aZ2ýO 
-2y), 
dcrz - d2 
1- 
2 jl+R-27) 
where e is the risk aversion index. lie parmeters set where 
the sip of this derivative differs 
from the one of the expression in the main text is negligible. 
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infrastructure, usually publicly provided, and technological knowledge, at least 
partly incorporated in "human capital". However, buildings and industrial estates 
do not seem relevant in generating a positive externality and should be deducted. 
Figure la lets P vary from 0.25 to 0.5 and plots the highest possible value for the 
risk aversion index which allows for a positive dJ(FH)1d(T, with a 2% average 
growth rate. This is held constant by adjusting y. The highest admissible value for 
the risk aversion index varies from about 1.25 (when P---0.25 and yis about 0.385) 
to about 3 (when ft--0.5 and yis about 0.26). Figure lb plots the associated gross 
capital income share'O. 
Obviously, the choice of a "realistic" value for R is not straightforward, given 
the wide set of available estimates. However it is not difficult to find results falling 
well into the above range. For example, in a recent contribution, Beaudry and van 
Wincoop (1992), using regional US consumption data, find that one is a rather 
precise point estimates for IIR (the standard error is 0.3). 
Hence, it seems that, within the class of linear in capital aggregate 
endogenous growth models, the parameter set which entails welfare lowering due 
to an decrease in uncertainty (due to a transition from financial autarchy to 
international integration) is not void of empirical relevance. 
10 Devereux and Smith (1994, p. 544) set JJ--3-85, IftO. 
3,6-1, R=2 and p=0.1. However, 
since they do not specify the lenght of the time 
interval in their discrete time model, a precise 
comparison is not possible. Obstfeld (1994, pp. 
1318-19) in his numerical exercises sets R=2; az 
Ef0.1; 0.02) and 
&0. 
Rmaz 
Figure La 
gamma 
Figure Lb 
beta 
beta 
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Rmar is defined as the highest possible value for the risk aversion index which is 
compatible with a non negative welfare variation induced by an increase in uncertainty 
and with a 2% expected growth rate. 
Figure La plots Rmax against P while figure Lb plots the gross capital income share 
associated with Rmar. 
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This model exhibit a striking difference with the one proposed by Devereux and 
Smith. We showed that the welfare reduction effect of a decrease in uncertainty is 
possible with Hicks-neutral technology shocks. Our results is to be ascribed to the 
chosen stochastic structure, which is the continuous time counterpart of a random 
walk and not of a purely time-independent sequence of shocks. The impact of or, 
on the expected growth rate is much higher in this model, due to the effects of Ito's 
lemma, which implies first order effects for standard deviations". Regarding our 
choice, we believe that the use of a geometric brownian motion for dY can be 
questioned on the ground of the absence of serial correlation, but not because it 
implies a "cumulative" component. 
4. Distributional shocks 
Many of the pitfalls of the above framework are attributable to its nature of 
representative agent equilibrium model and hence cannot be easily removed. 
However, its iffealism can be loosed in at least one aspect. Up to now, we 
considered a situation where factors' shares of income are perfectly correlated, 
while the counterciclical movement of the labour's share is a widely accepted 
stylised fact. We deal with this phenomenon as if it were due to an exogenous 
source of randomness12, however we think that this model should 
be considered as 
a "reduced form" for a more complex framework where the 
distributional shock is 
endogenously determined by staggered labour contracts, union activity, 
taxes or 
government's transfer schemes. 
II Taking the limit for the time interval going to zero in Devereux and 
Smith's discrete 
model, one may verify that the variance of the random 
disturbance turns out not to have effects 
on the expected growth rate. 
12 For a recent exemple of a similar approach, see 
Ghosh and Pesenti (1994, pp. 19-22). 
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We let the expected utility and the production function be unchanged, but we 
suggest that the capital yield is given by: 
dK = Qp- 3) Kdt + yoKazdz + KqDdzD 
This equation implies that the drift of the wage process is unaffected, but also, 
more interestingly, that asdzs (I - y) fiKazdz-KaDdZD and 
asz = (]-'y)pKaz2- KaDz. Hence, there is no longer perfect correlation between 
capital's and labour's shares of income, since they are different linear combinations 
of dz and dzD. From the perspective of stylised facts, it seem natural to assume 
(TDz>O. For example, Cardia and Ambler in a recent paper (1993, Table 2) report 
that, for the US, the ratio between the standard deviation of the wage share of 
income and the one of output is 0.475, while the ratio between the standard 
deviation of the profit share and the one of output is 4. 
It is important to remark that, in this case, human wealth is not spanned by the 
available financial assets, hence it is no longer possible to build a "replicating 
portfolio" with a deterministic return, as we did in section 3.2. To solve the model, 
we need to proceed, as in Svensson and Werner (1993), as if H were tradable and 
interpret the resulting pHas a "shadow" price. However, to avoid the complete 
discussion of a three asset model, we will price human wealth through a C. A. P. M. 
relation. 
Also in this case the set of assets is completed by (2) and the Bellman 
equation for the optimal consumption-portfolio choice is as follows: 
0 -_'ý MaXCK 
CI-R 
+JF(rF+ (yo- 3-r)K+A, - Q +JH 
(AHH- As) + 
I- R 
1 
jFF[(, y2 p2 a2+ (yD 2+2 yp aDz) K2 +2+ +2z (Ts 2 (YO a, s+ (TD s) 
K] + 
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j 
HFI(YP(THZ+ ýYDHXH+ (THsH- (YPCTZS + aDS)K- aS2] 
I 2H2 + (TS2 ýJHH (a -2aHsH) H 
The associated first order conditions becomes: 
C-R 
j [(y2 ß2 cy, 2+ cr 2+2 yß (TDz) K+ (yß crm + erDs)] (e - 05 - JF D FF 
+ JHF[('Yp allz + CFDH) H- (, ypazs + aDs)] 
To price human wealth we specialise again equation (5) into the linear 
relation H=bK, hence dH = bdK, or: 
dH = b[(P- 8)K - Cldt + bpKa ,, 
dz (16) 
Equating this expression with equation (3), we can work out the stochastic 
characteristics of the human wealth process: 
allHdZH = (I- y) PKazdz - KaDdzD+ bpKazdz (17a) 
and also: 
allzH = (I - 'y) PKCFz2 - K(TDz + PHaz2 
(17b) 
aDHH = (I- y) PKaDz - KaD2 + PHaDz (17c) 
Since His no longer spanned by financial assets, we asswne that any portfolio 
P must be priced by an equilibrium relation similar to equation 
(8): 
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pp -r2 (Aw- r) w 
where W is total wealth (in our case K+H). Equation (18) is a typical TAPM" 
relation. (See Merton, (1990, ch. 11), for a particularly neat exposition of a 
general equilibrium model of asset market. ) 
To solve our problem it proved useful to build a portfolio composed of 
human wealth and of the quantity of capital which solves the problem: 
Minjv [Var (dH + dK)j 
Hdz + yßKP adz + KP erDdzL, )] MinK9 [Var (cr 
z Miniq ga 2 H2 + y2p2Kp2a, 2+ Kp2ar 
2+2, yPKPHaHz + 2KPHqDH HD 
2, ypKP2(ynz)] 
i. e. 
KP 
'AYHz 
y2p2 2+a2+2, yp (ri D CTDZ 
Using equations (17b-17c) we obtain: 
2 _Ka 
2+ 2,7 +(1 - y) PK( D K(T KP 
zD )02 
p2 (y, 2+a2+2 Yp aDz 
Moreover, it is interesting to notice that: 
p (yp Cr 2+ al)z) 
K-KP : -- f_ 
(K+M 
-jý2p2 a, 2+ (7 2+2 yp aDz zD 
Some manipulations give 
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a= pw 
'I 
-'Y, ) 02 a, 2K -Ba, ßloriýIH-+ KP 
H+KP 
ß2a. 2( 
, K+H) + (yß2 or, 
2 + ßcyl), 
,) 
(KP - K) 
H+KP 
(T, 2a 2- Cr 2K Since aw 19PW z Dz (H+K 2= 02az2 we get T i) aw2 ýa 
2(jp2ar, 2+a2+ 2yp zz CrDZ) 
and we transform equation (18) into: 
PHH+ (70"' 3AT (1-, 2a 2- a2 ) D 
--ADZ - 
(H+K) + (yp- 8)K 
H+KP r 2 
z 
(14 
ý2 
or , 2+ar 2+2y z pan)) n 
ýH+ kP- -r H+K 
Multipling both sides by H+KP, grouping terms and rearranging we obtain, 
by means of (19): 
(, yp(T 2+qDd2 z- [gHH+ (yo- 3)K - r(H+K)j D 2(y2p2a2+(T 2+2yp(3Dz) 
(ýz 
z 
flýy, 2(-f 
Z2+ z jp a, aDz) (K+H) 
zz 
ýa2(y2p213-2+a 2+2ypaDj D 
(20) 
Finally, equating again equations (16) and (3) to substitute out pHH and then 
simplifying gives: 
PCT ' (r ++ CrDZ (P- r) 
H= ZK 
( 
Paz2[yp- r -y (g - r)] - qDz(g - r)) 
(10') 
As in section 3.2, we end up with a function which is still relating human 
wealth to two endogenous variables, r and g, and we need to solve our 
intertemporal problem. In the Appendix we obtain, respectively, the following 
expressions for the riskless rate, the expected growth rate, the propensity to 
consume and for human wealth: 
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70 -3- Rfi(ypaz2 + qDz) 
9+ p2a, 2 L+R 
DZ R 2R 
D-1IR = 
P- + ('yß -8- Rß[ßcrz2 (y - 0.5) + crDzlj 
OR ffy - 1) pCr, 2+ (yr). 71 
(I- Y, 9 (P - Rp2a, 2) + 
RpqDý, 
K 
Dzj 
K 
D-IIR g- Rp[(, y - 1) Pqz2 +a 
We may now notice several interesting details. An increase in qD., reduces the 
riskless rate, which is consistent with intuition, since capital becomes a riskier 
asset. Such an increase lowers the propensity to consume, for R>I: in this case the 
"precautionary saving" motive overturns the "portfolio adjustment" one. The value 
of H, for a given expected growth rate, is positively related to crD,,: intuition 
suggests that, since this asset becomes safer, it is more valued. The total effect of 
the covariance on the growth rate proves to be always negative. 
Finally, we analyse again the effects of an increase in the standard deviation 
of the technological shock on welfare, starting ftom our maximum value function: 
D(F+ I-R 
I-R 
KI-R 
I- R 
p+ (R - y) P +(]-R) + 06Dz - P2ý7z2 
I-R 
R 
1 lp 
+ (R-1) 
[yp 
-3- Rp 
(Pcrz2 (r- I+ 
aDzp 
2) 
As before, we define: 
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p+ (R -ygp +(]-R)3 
DZ- 
P2 az' R+ 
( 
(I- R) 'YP -3- PR 
(pa, 
2 (, y- 
1 1z 
2)+aDZ 
We now compute the consequence on welfare of an increase in the standard 
deviation of the distributional process: 
dj(F, H -R ßCT KI-R , pj 
R(l- R) nZ R(l- R) n1 -R (-ßR cr, p r. +- dcrD 1Rd d2 
Rpn-R 
-az)pDz (Rp(y-1) + R2p[q, 2 p(l-, y) KI-R d2 z- tyýzp 
Since the factor in the big round brackets is always positive, for reasonable 
parameters values we have Sign[dJ(FH)IdcrD] =- Sign[pD_, ], hence, in such case, 
dJ(F, H) Id qD< 0. Therefore, insofar pDz>O, the endogenous part of aDshould be 
reduced. 
The effect of an increase in or, on welfare may be writted as: 
aj (F, H) 
- der, 
-R[a pnz-oa I-R[fla KI-R(f (I-R)pn D z(]+R-2, y)] 
R2(]-R)pn ý(2y-l)+aDPDZI 
I-R ýd d2 
I-RR 
y d2 
)aDPDZ(RP(7-1)+R2p[(I_ 
)paz2-aDz)j) + 
PRaz 
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X[-p+p[('y-')2-'y(R-'y)j+3(R-])-Rp2az2(y2 I+R-2y)-RpaDz(2y-R)l 
The meaning of this expression may be grasped more easily if we reformulate 
it as follows: 
al(F, H) dJ dj 
+ 
I-R Rpn-R )R2p2az(yDz 
(R-2y) d2 daz aZ d (3D d az aD 
With respect to the case with no distributive shocks we have two further 
addenda; insofar PD? O' the first is negative for reasonable parameter values while 
the third is positive if R>2y. To appreciate their quantitative effect under this 
parametric restriction, we run several numerical computation, from which is clear 
that the higher pD,, and qD, the more negative the sum of the two terms. As an 
example consider figure 2, where p=0.03, &0.05, the capital/output ratio is 3, y is 
one third, and qz=0.03. For pDz, we choose a rather low value, 0.2. However, from 
figure 2a it is clear that the region where an increase in cr, augments welfare, 
whose first derivative is on the vertical axis, has been sharply reduced: the 
continuous line is the value of Wffildq, in absence of distributional shocks, 
while the dotted line represents the case crD=0.02. 
Therefore a distributive disturbance, positively correlated with the 
technological one, may reverse the "perverse" result outlined in section 3.4. 
dJ 
0.000 
-0.000 
-0.00 
-0.001 
Figure 2. a 
9 
0.1 
0. c 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Figure 2. b 
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R 
R 
Figure La plots the derivative of J(, Ffp with respect to az as a function of R when pzD is 
zero (continuous line) and when it is 0.2 (dashed line). Figure 2. b plots the associated 
expected growth rate. 
0.5 1.5 
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5. Concluding remarks 
We have built a continuous time endogenous growth model where the production 
function allows for a positive externality in the spirit of Romer (1986) and non 
accumulable inputs (labour) play a productive role. This assumption entails two 
main consequences: the divergence of the gross capital income share ftom the 
marginal productivity of capital and the presence of an asset, the claim on future 
labour income, which has been assumed to be non-traded, due to a moral hazard 
problem. 
In this framework, a reduction in technological uncertainty, possibly due to 
international risk sharing, may be welfare damaging since it lowers savings while 
the expected growth rate is suboptimal. 
The inclusion in the model of non-traded labour income is performed by 
means of contingent claim analysis and it delivers two important results. If the 
capital income share is lower than one half, the expected growth rate is always 
reduced by an increase in technological uncertainty. In the existing literature, this 
effect is present only if the elasticity of intrtemporal substitution is higher than 
unity. To grasp the intuition for this result, notice that, in the present model, for 
R<l, an increase in the standard deviation of the technological process induces a 
reduction in the propensity to consume. 
What is more important, we have shown, in contrast to Devereux and Smith 
(1994), that we may have welfare damaging risk pooling in presence of (Hicks- 
neutral) technological risk. Moreover, numerical calculations show that the 
parameters set where risk sharing reduces welfare is relevant. This striking 
difference in results is to be ascribed to the chosen stochastic structure: the impact 
of a, on the expected growth rate is much higher in our model, due to Ito's lemma, 
which implies first order effects for standard deviations. The choice of using a 
geometric brownian motion to model the variability of the output process, 
in our 
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opinion, can be questioned on the ground of the absence of serial correlation, but 
not because it implies a "cumulative" component. 
To move a step towards "reality", we have considered the possibility of a 
distributive disturbance. If it increases the correlation between output and the 
capital income share, the portion of the parameters space where the "perverse" 
effect on welfare takes place is sharply reduced: in this case, the riskless rate 
diminishes, since capital becomes a riskier asset, and the propensity to consume is 
reduced for R> 1. 
Therefore, the more apart an economic environment is to perfect competition 
(the higher is the distributive disturbance), the less likely is the occurrence of our 
"perverse" result and the traditional welfare-augmenting effect of international 
risk-sharing is more likely to hold. 
To move further towards "reality" we should consider, for example, the 
effects of distortionary taxation and of imperfectly competitive markets. 
Moreover, the role of publicly provided infrastructures should be modelled 
explicitly and the accumulation of human capital is to be microfounded. Intuition 
suggest that the first three factors reinforce our result, since they tend to increase 
the difference between the optimal growth rate and the market one, while the 
fourth should operate in the opposite direction. Significant extensions of our 
model, however, prove to be difficult, since the inclusion of a second state variable 
(either public or human capital) hinders the attainment of an explicit solution, 
making welfare comparison very difficult even in our representative agent 
framework. 
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Appendix: Details of the solution in presence of a distributive shock 
As in section 3.3, we use the guess J(F+H) =D 
(F + H)I-R 
; accordingly the first I- R 
order conditions become: 
D-IIR (F+ H) 
(yA-i5-r)(F+H) + R(yo(THz+(YDH)H 
R (y2 p2 (T z2+, Cr D2+2, yo aDz) 
(Al) 
These expressions and the aggregate constraint B=O are exploited to compute 
D from: 
H)l-R (F + H)l-R 0= D(R-1) IR 
(F ±, 
- pD -+D (F + H)-R E(dK+dI-1) 1- R 1- R 
R 
4)-(]+R 2D (F + I- 
)E (dK+dH)2 (A2) 
We first notice that equation (Al), using equations (17b- 17c) yields: 
z R (, yp2 ý37 
2+ per ý) (K+H) = (yp (F + II) 
Hence, when B=O, we obtain the forcing rate: 
vR-8- Rp(, ypaz2 + (TD) (A3) it, 
Notice that the riskless rate turns out to be reduced by a positive covariance 
between the technological and the distributive shocks, and that this effect is 
stronger the higher is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitutionof 
the individual. 
From equation (20), using (A3), we immediately get: 
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A, qH + (yo- 6)K - r(H+K) 6- r) 
azl 
(K+IV ý, ypa 2 Z, 
+ CFDZ) 
R p2 Cr 2 z 
which enables us to obtain, togheter with the equilibrium riskless rate: 
E (dK+dII) = r(K+H) + Rp2a 2 z K+H)-C 
««z [Y 2j(K + IV - D-JIR (K + IV 
ß-3-ßR(Yß(7z2 + CrDz) + Rß2Cr Z 
since 
E(dK+dH)2=(, ýafl2 2+a 2+2ypaDz)K2+aH2H2+2(, ypaHz+aDH) KH az D 
p2 az 2 (K+H)2 we can compute D-IIR from (A2): 
D-11R - 
p- 
- (yß- 3- Rß[ßcrý, 2 (y- 0.5) + (TDj) (A4) RR 
The explicit expression for the riskless rate gives, ftom (10'), a formulation 
for the value of the claim on income where the expected growth rate is the unique 
endogenous variable, i. e. 
, ý? [(y- I)pCr 2+ 6r)zl zK 
Rp[(, y - I)Paz2 + OrDzj 
This expression is of great help in computing g. Starting, as in section 3.3, 
from its definition, we immediately get: 
D-IIR 
(I 
+ 
(I - y) (p - RA2 a, 
2) + Rflorn, 
yp- 3-g- Rp[(y - ])Paz2 + qDJ) 
Hence, using (M) and rearranging: 
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Vß- 3-g -R ß[(y - 1)ßcrz2 + crDz 1) = 
P- 
- ('yß- 8-Rß [ß arz2 (y - 0.5) + crDz/) RR 
and finally: 
P+ p2a, 2 ýL+R R2 DZ 
The final expression for human wealth becomes: 
(I- y) (p -R p2 C, 
2) + RpaDý, 
('yp- 3-R P[p a, 2 (y - 0.5) + aDJ) 
(p - Rp2 (3. 
ý) + Roa z ýDZ 
D-11R 
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Chapter V 
Monetary Uncertainty Relevance 
and Perpetual Youth 
in a Stochastic Endogenous Growth Model 
1. Introduction 
Several contributions consider the role of monetary uncertainty in continuous time 
Sidrauski-type frameworks. This approach is appealing because, building on 
Merton's seminal papers, it is possible to consider how volatile money growth 
affects portfolio choice and investment. Gertler and Grinols (1982) develop a 
linear-in-capital growth model where the government's revenue is distributed to 
the representative agent in proportion to wealth. In that paper, they uncover a 
positive effect of the average money growth rate on investment and a negative 
impact of money volatility. In Stulz's model, (1986), money growth takes place 
through lump-sum transfers, which are fully capitalised by agents; in this case 
investment, and hence the expected growth rate of the economy, are completely 
independent of the monetary policy parameters. More recently, Grinols and 
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Turnovsky, (1993), restate Gertler and Grinols' (1982) results in a more widely 
specified endogenous, growth framework where transfers are again distortionary. 
None of the existing contributions encompasses the case of finite lives, 
despite the fact that the results concerning the relations between a positive 
probability of death and the Tobin effect are well established (e. g. Marini and van 
der Ploeg, (1988), and van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis, (1994)). Hence, it seems 
natural to investigate a Blanchard-type model to disclose the role of an "ongoing" 
monetary policy volatility in such an overlapping generations framework. 
Moreover, the present chapter extends the existing literature on stochastic 
models, by abandoning, within the intertemporal C. R-R. A. utility function class, 
the hypothesis of a unitary degree of relative risk aversion. 
To solve a dynamic portfolio problem in the presence of overlapping 
generations, it is necessary to pass through several steps. After a quick set-up of 
the model (section 2.1), we consider the behaviour of an individual, representative 
of the cohort born at time s, and we set up her dynamic consumption-portfolio 
choice. In order to determine the excess return for the risky assets, it is useful to 
guess at this stage not only a functional form for the individual's maximum value 
function but also that it is not explicitly related to age. We then proceed (section 
2.3) to determine the characteristics of the endogenous stochastic processes by 
exploiting the constancy of portfolio shares that characterises the model at the 
aggregate level. This analysis allows us to show that the nominal interest rate 
is 
affected by both the risk aversion index and by the covariance 
between the 
technological disturbance and the nominal money process. Hence, an 
"insurance" 
role for monetary policy emerges. In section 2.4 we move 
back to the individual 
behaviour and we determine her portfolio shares, that turn out to 
depend on the 
level of her individual wealth. Eventually, we are able to solve 
the model, verify 
that the maximum value function is actually age 
independent and determine 
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consumption and real money demand (section 2.5). At this stage a "second order" 
Tobin effect emerges, in the sense that both the money supply volatility and the 
covariance between the output process and the monetary one affect growth. 
Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of the policy implications of the model. 
In particular, we will devote some attention to the possibility of evaluating some 
alternative central bank operating procedures. 
2. The model 
2.1 The basic set-up 
We consider a closed economy populated by individuals who differ only in their 
date of birth, se(-*ý, fl, and who face the same instantaneous probability of death, 
p, governed by a Poisson process. The representative individual of generation s 
maximises the intertemporal objective: 
(C, r. s"x Mrs 
I-a)l-R 
'r. U -P( -t)]eP(T-t) dr 
t's 
f 
Et I-R 
t 
where p is the instantaneous rate of time preference and Re [0, oo) represents both 
the relative risk aversion index and the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on time t information; 
,s 
are time t consumption and real money balances. Their values depend cT, s and mr 
on the realizations of still unspecified stochastic processes. 
Introducing the hypothesis of constancy for the probability of death, we 
reformulate our objective as follows: 
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coo 
=UEf 
(CT. So, Mrs 
I-ce)]-R 
C(P+P) (T-t)dr t's I-R 
t 
The representative firm produces an output flow dYj by means of a stochastic 
Cobb-Douglas production function specified in the tradition of Romer (1986): 
dYi = PKiYLil-Ykl-Y(dt + azdz) (2) 
where Ki is the stock of physical capital and Li the labour managed by the i-th 
firm; k is the average stock of capital, 0 the inverse of the capital/output ratio and 
dz a standard Wiener process. Hence, a primary source of risk is technological 
uncertainty. Notice that, from now on, we drop the time indices whenever not 
confusing. 
Competition forces firms to have the same capital/labour ratio; hence it is 
immediate to get the aggregate production function, where the inelastically 
supplied labour is normalised to one: 
dY = PK (dt + crdz) 
Despite the simplicity of this formulation, the Romer-type production 
function (2), explicitly providing a Productive role for labour, implies the 
existence of an asset, the claim on future stochastic labour income (human 
wealth), which is assumed to be non traded, due to an obvious moral-hazard 
problem. 
The dynamic of the nominal money stock, A is determined by a monetary 
authority. It is assumed that M follows a lognormal diffusion process: 
dM= limAf dt +M Cdzm 
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where gm and am are positive and constant over time. As it is common in this 
literature, we refer to a situation where the monetary authority is not able or 
willing to choose a deterministic path for the growth rate of the money stock. 
However, we will discuss the possibility that the central bank affects either cy, or 
the covariance between the monetary policy process and the technological one (or 
both). 
Since we imagine that there is no government expenditure nor debt, the public 
revenue implied by (3) is distributed to agents. As in Stulz, we accept the 
hypothesis of fully capitalised lump-sum transfers. 
2.2 Individual choice problem 
The consumption-portfolio decision is made more complex by the presence of 
human capital. However, a reward for non-accumulable production factors seems 
logically necessary on the ground of the considerations developed by Jones and 
Manuelli (1992): had we abstracted from human wealth, the newly born individual 
would have no income and could not take part in economic activity' . 
From the production function, we may write the return process for capital, 
which, at the individual level is: 
dKt, s = (yp + p) Ktsdt + yflKts (Tdz 
(4) 
Notice that we introduce the hypothesis of a Blanchard-Yaari actuarially fair 
insurance mechanism, represented by the presence of p, and that we abstract from 
I Actually, in this fiwnework a positive value for capitalized mnsfers is sufficient to allow 
the youngest cohort of people to "enter" into the economic system. 
However, the introduction of 
labour income aflows for a companson with a specification of the model where seignorage 
is 
used to finance public expenditure. 
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capital depreciation. 
The human wealth processiS2: 
dHt, S = gHHts dt + allHt, s dzH- do) (5) 
where not only the implicit discount factor on human wealth, but also the 
stochastic process dzH and the standard deviation qH are unknowns and must be 
endogenously determined. On the other hand, the characteristics of the wage 
process da) = lic, )dt + ao)dza) are entirely known; in fact, ftom (2), 40) = (I- ))PK; 
(TO)dzco = (I - ýPKcrzdz and (70)z = (I - ))PKqz2. (where, in general, qy=qiqjpij and 
py is the correlation coefficient between variables i and j). In the finance jargon, 
we say that the wage process is spanned by the technological disturbance. 
We assume that the stochastic process for the price of money in terms of 
goods, qt, is a geometric brownian motion3, dqt = llqqtdt + aqqtdzq, and we 
compute the process for real money balances mtsý-Mts qt4: 
mts d dmt, s (Aq + p) mts 
dt + 6q zq (6) 
Notice that equation (6) implies that real money balances may be insured. As 
for the capitalised value of future lump-sum transfers (vts) we postulate the 
More precisely, equation (5) describes the evolution of human wealth of an 
individual 
born at s, contingent on that individual still being alive at t. 
A similar remark applies also for 
equation (7) that concerns the value of future transfers. 
3 As it is common in this literature, in equilibrium, it will turn out that 
this hypothesis is 
verified. 
4 Notice that the terms qdM + dqdM, representing the current 
flow of transfer to the 
individual, have been Omitted. See Stulz, (1986, p. 338), Gertler and 
Grinols, (1982, p. 242) and 
Grinols and Tumovsky, (1993, p. 6). 
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following process: 
dvt,, - pv vts dt + av vts dzV - drt, s 
Since transfers are paid to living people, the premium p is absent from 
equation (7); however, the capitalised value of transfers is insured, although in a 
way which is different from the one postulated for capital and money. In fact, the 
individual signs a contract with an insurance company, according to which he will 
be paid the transfers proportional to the value vt'sq irrespective of the fact that the 
individual might have bought part of these assets from people who are now dead. 
In the event of her death, the insurance company gets hold of vts: the Poisson 
process for death and the law of large numbers ensure that insurance companies 
balance their budgets. Notice that 4q, ji, crq, av and the characteristics of the 
processes dzq and dz, must be endogenously determined. 
Finally, it is convenient to introduce a nominal bond (B), which yields a 
nonstochastic nominal return r (hence, dB = rBdt). At the individual level, in real 
terms, we have: 
dbt, s = (r + pq + p) 
bts dt + aq bts dzq (8) 
Defining total wealth for the generation-s representative individual as Wt,, = 
=Kt, s + mts + vts + 
bts + Hts, we now assume that Wt. s is, apart 
from time, the 
sole arguments of the indirect utility function J(. ). Moreover, we 
follow Svensson 
and Werner, (1993), and we consider human wealth as 
if it were tradable in order 
to compute the implicit price at which agents would 
be willing to keep their 
amount of non traded asset. Consequently, we set up 
the optimal portfolio- 
consumption choice using the following Bellman equation: 
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(ct. so, mtsi-a) 
I-R 
0= max (CM, KHV] I-R (P +P) J+JwE (dWt, ) + 
J-A2ZE 
(dWts2) 
(9) 
where, using (4-8) and the wealth constraint: 
dWt, s = ((r +p+ gq) Wts + (, yp -r- liq) Kts -r mts + (11v -, 4q -r- p) vts+ 
(AH-r-p-Aq)Hts-c )dt+6qWtsd dýq) Kt t's zq + (ypcrz dz - 6q s+ 
ad dýq) Ht, s+ (a, dz, - CT d (H 
ZH - Crq q 
ýq) Vts 
and: 
(10) 
2W 2+(, )(2p2ar, 2+(y, 2-2ypazq)Kt 2+ (OrH2+aq2-2aqH)Hts2 E(dWt, s2) : -- (7q t's zq 's 
(er 2+or 2-2crvq)vt, 2+2 (yßarzq-crq2)WtsKts + 2(O7Hq-07q2)WtsHts vqs 
2 (C7v q- CFq 
2) Wt, sv t, s+2 
QP (YzH- YP (Yzq - (yHq + (Tq 
2 )KtsHts+ 
2 (70(yzv-'YP(Yzq- ýTvq + (yq2)Ktsvts +2 ((THv- 6Hq- (Yvq + (Tq 2 )Htsvts (11) 
The first order conditions associated to (9) are: 
I-R ot 
(ct'sol mt's Ct. s 
Jw (12a) 
I-R 
(ct'sol mt's MLS 
rJw 
(12b) 
q2 
2 
Aq) _j ww [(, y2p2(3z, 
2 +a-2, ypazq) Kts + (Yflcyzq - clq ) Wts 
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2 + Cy 7 )H YPCFzq - CFvq + CFq2)vt,. l (12c) zq Hq 
+ (q ts + (70(6 
(AH - gq r- p) Jw Jww [(crhr2 + or, 2- 2crHq) Ht. s + (erH - or, 
2 qqq) Wts 
(Ypa 2 
ZU- Yfla a2 q)K zq - Hq +a Hv - CrHq - CVvq + (Tq )vt, s] 12d) t, s 
+ 
(, Uv-gq-r-p)jw=-j [((y, 2+(72 2 ww vq- 2ý7vq) Vts + (6vq - (7q ) Wts 
+(Ypa -Y zq-a 
2 
zv 
fla 
vq +a 
2 
q)K (12e) t, s + (aHv avq + (yq ) Htsl 
Equation (12a) states that the marginal utility of consumption must be equal 
to the marginal utility of wealth, while equations (12a-b) imply that the ratio 
between the marginal utility of money balances and the one of consumption 
should equal the nominal interest rate, two familiar results. Our simple 
specification for the instantaneous utility allows us to write the following money 
demand function: 
mt's = 
CLS O-a) 
ra 
while consumption may be expressed as: 
I 
(Jw R 
ct's ýa 
, 
(]-R)(1- 
R 
(a r) 
(13) 
(14) 
The role of equations (12c-e) is to determine the excess returns of the risky 
assest K, H and v. Notice, however, that in this set-up the real value of nominal 
bonds is not risk-free since it is affected by movements in the price of money: 
it 
actually has the same risk characteristics that real money balances 
have. 
At this stage it is convenient to guess a functional 
form for the individuals' 
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maximum value function: 
D(Wt. )I-R 
J(wt, s.. t) -, ý I-R - ý-(P 
+ P)t 
Notice that we rule out a direct age dependency of the maximum value 
function. The linearity in wealth which characterises the ratio JWIJww when we 
adopt the functional form (9'), will make tractable the problern of aggregating the 
individual risk premia equations (12c-e). 
2.3 The role of aggregate variables 
To determine the distinguishing features of the stochastic processes dzH, dzq and 
dz, it is necessary to resort to aggregate variables5: 
dK 
kc) dt + Pa, dz K 
(15) 
dH 9 07K 9 OK dz dt +a ZH H AH- (1 -7 Hd FZ 
dm 
mum+ 
Aq + (Ymq) dt + (Tm dzm + 6q dzq 
dv 
= 
11 dt + crv dzv - am dzm 
1! 
v 
(MV 
- (Am + amq) v)v 
The absence of an explicit relation between time and 
individual first order 
conditions (12a-e) and the constancy. of the demographic structure allow us 
to 
5 Coherence of individual variables with economywide ones can 
be checked applying 
Blanchard's aggregation nde. (See Blanchard, (1985, p. 
228)) 
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posit that, the portfolio allocation, at the aggregate level, does not change over 
time. The constancy of portfolio shares implies, in its turn, that all the assets must 
grow at the same stochastic rate6. Hence, we equate the random parts of equations 
(15) and (16); (15) and (17); (17) and (18), to express the endogenous processes in 
terms of the exogenous ones, obtaining: 
ad az dz H ZH + (1- 7) 
d-) 
(7, dzq -: -- Paz dz - am dzm q 
dz, = Pa, dz + 
2i) am dzm 
(V 
Using the results in Table I to substitute out the endogenous stochastic 
components we get from equation (12c): 
z (yo -rW=R f(fl2 (, y- 1)2 a, 
2+ qm2 + 20(y- 1) azm) K 
+pa2 M) W+ (#2 (, y 2- fl(, y - 1) ý3- z zm ZAf 
p2 (I- "o 2 2K (T, 2+ CrM2 + ýK H+ Hz 
(P 
(1- 1) H+ azml 
lp (y - 1) azm + amll 
(2vi +1 ) vi 
Grinols and Turnovsky (1993, p. 16) and 
Turnovsky (1993, p. 962) develop similar 
argument to propose the same type of solution. 
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C4 
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Similarly, from the excess return equation for human wealth: 
(pH - liq -r- p) W=R2 (1- 02-HL2- a .2 ý2 
+ qm2 + 20 (1- y) 
K 
azm) H 
I(p 
H 
+(p2(1-, y)Ka2+p(y -P(l 'y 
ýK- Cr 2 z zm m W+ H (YzMH 
z zm+ a 
(-p2 
(I- y) 2; 
E 
(y, 2+p (I- y) 
E 
(T, 2+p(, y-l) azm)K HHm 
zm + Cy 
2) + 1) V] mv 
Finally, from the individual first order condition (12e): 
mv v zm m 
(, 4v - Aq -r -p) W=R[a2(!! +I vt + 
2)(2vi +I) W+ 
(M (M 
zm+ 
2F 
mv) +1 K+ - Y) :Ea, v ar - 1) azm + crml) FV 
(00 
H 
Simplifying where possible and exploiting the aggregate wealth constraint, 
W=K+H+m+v, we obtain, respectively: 
(yp -rR (P2 
(y - 1) (Tz2 +0 (Tzýd 
(I 2c) 
:E cy, 2+p (12d') (, 4H-Aq-r-p) =R(p2 (1 - 7) Hz CFZM) 
M+ V) (12e') 
alzm v 
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Notice from (12c') that the non stochastic part of the real interest rate, 
)O-R[p2()LI)qz2 + P(Yzm], is reduced by increments in the covariance between the 
monetary policy process and the technological disturbance'. This must be so 
because an increase in (7, ,. mreduces the covariance 
between the return on capital 
and that on real bonds. Hence bonds become more useful in hedging against risk 
on real capital, consequently the real interest rate is reduced. 
Equating again equations (17-18) and using the drift components, we get: 
m Jf 
2ý- 
= Pv - (A + 
pa, 
-a 
2) Aq = Mv - (Am + C7mq) 
( 
V+ 
V) 
zm -V+v 
Substituting (19) into (12c'-e) we reach an important intermediate result: we 
express the nominal rate, the (implicit) discount factor on human wealth and the 
return on capitalised transfers as functions of exogenous parameters and of ratios 
of wealth components, that are still to be determined endogenously. 
r= 
(i i 
-V+v 
) 
[pm - crm2 + P(Tzm (I - R)] -p (20a) 
(K 
j7 AH = yp+p +R 
[(1- 
7) P, cz, 7i +1)1 (20b) 
= yp+p+R (20c) 
((1- 
7) fl, azl +0 azm 
m 
PV V) 
The covariance between the returns on the discounted flow of lump sum 
transfers and capital, being equal to -Ap2az2 + PazxAtWv)], is increased by the 
covariance between the monetary policy process and the technological 
7 If a, M <P 
(1--h az, 2, r+juq might even be higher than the non stochastic component of 
the 
z 
return on capital. 
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disturbance: consequently an increase in am reduces the "hedging" capabilities of 
v and raises p,. As for the nominal interest rate, notice that it is linearly influenced 
by the term (p. + P(Tz&f - CFm2)(m+v)1v. However, the covariance azm affects r 
because it improves the hedging capabilities of bonds against technological risk 
both directly (the term Rpam) and indirectly, through its effect on v (the term 
Rpcrzu(nVv)). When R>1, such a risk aversion effect dominates, and the nominal 
interest rate is reduced by increments in the covariance between the technological 
disturbance and the monetary policy process, as shown by equation (20a). 
2.4 Individual portfolio composition 
We now examine the individual level again and we substitute equations (19) and 
(20a-c) into the first order conditions (12c-e)8: 
rp2 (, y - 1) a, 
2+W- rp2 (I - y) 
2 or, 2+ arM2 -2 p(l - y) azul Kt, s z t's z 
mWs [p2 (, y -(3.2 z 
2+ (20 - yo) arzm t, 
K 
p2 (I- y)2 or, 2+ P(J- y) (T. L+2+ p(, y-]) azm) Ht, s z Ht zm Ht m 
mv zivf + 
2) 
t's V+t 
VI) 
KL_ 
+ or 
(p2 
(1 - 7) Ht zm 
) 
Wt's 
'Me subscript t is used to help identify aggregate 
variables 
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K2K 
=(p2(1-, y)2 1-2a, 
t2 
+ aM2 + 2p (I- y) Ht Hz azm) Ht, s 
K 
z 
(p2 
Lar, 2 
zm 
Kj- 
-a 
2)W 0 Ht zu Ht m t's 
9K +a p2 (I- y)2 2+ p(l yI or 2+ #('y-1) azxf Kts H Ht Zm m 
K L CF zm+ Or 
2 
, xf 
) 
ýý 
Ht 
+V )Vts 
v+m 
aM "' ' "'t W2 z t's m 
mv (--I- +- 
-v-l +2 Vts zu m) s 
) 
Wt 
vt V t . 
(ß(, y - 1) er. +2. or. zm m) Kts + zm+ or 
2 Kt ML+ V) Hts 
(-MLV-+ýtv 
Ht vt 
Through some manipulations and exploiting the definitions of aggregate and 
individual wealth we may reformulate these expressions in terms of deviations 
between individual and average variables9: 
#(I- Y) (W zxf t's - 
Wd 
m 
2+ 
(Kt. 
s - Kt + Ht. s - 
Ht + Vt 
+ mf (Vt. s- vd zu Vt 
p2 y) 2 or, 2+ fl(, y z 
(Kt. 
s-K, Ht.. s Ht 
1 
9 "Me demographic structure of Blanchard's model implies that aggregate variables formally 
coincide with average ones. 
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((y 
2 Kt 
m+ Ht azw Wt. rwd 
K, 
a+a 2)(Kt. s - Kt + Ht. s - Ht + 
V' + mt = 
(p 
(1 - Y) Ht Zm m vt (vt. s-vd)+ 
(p2 
(I y) 2 
Kt 2+ p(l 
s 
Kt 
a, zm H- Kt. s (21b) Ht t. Ht 
am' (wt s- 
Wd = CFM2 
(Kt. 
s - Kt + Ht. s - Ht + 
mt + Vt 
(vts -vd) Vt 
K fl('Y - 1) azm 
(Kt. 
s_I Ht. s Ht (21 
The demand for real money balances is given by equations (13-14), hence the 
remaining unknowns are Kts, Hts, vts and bts. However, we may notice that the 
difference between equation (21c) and equation (21a) is equal to the difference 
between equation (21b) and equation (21c) multiplied by the ratio KlHt. This 
linear dependence is not surprising: in the model there are two Wiener processes 
(dz and dz, ), which are able to determine the demand functions for only two 
assets. Hence, there is a degree of indeterminacy in the optimum portfolio. At this 
stage it seems natural to assume Hts=Ht, forcing people to hold their entire 
amount of the non tradable asset. 
The system composed by equations (2 1 a)-(2 I b) reduces to: 
n +v 2 L---L v 
zt a 
2+am2-2P(I-y) azu](Kts-Kd+ [fl(I - Y) Cyzm- m rvts) 11, 
zA, r (y 
2 (22a) 
w7 (wr Wt. 
166 
1) azm + am2j (Kt - Kt, + aM2 Lt-, ýýL (vt - vt, qm2 (Wt - Wt, (22b) 
+t v) 
We immediately notice that the vector coefficient for vrvt. s in system (22a-b) 
is a multiple of the vector coefficient for Wt- Wt's; hence we get that the desired 
Vt capital, Kt. s, is equal to Kt and that v,. 
*= vr (Wt- Wts). Substitution into the S Mt + Vt 
individual-s wealth constraint yields also an expression for the real value of bonds 
holdings: bt. *: --mt-mts- 
(ý-tiTi LM 
t 
Wt- Wts). Hence, the optimal investment strategy S 
for an agent is to hold the mean capital stock and to finance this investment by 
selling his transfers and issuing bonds, when his wealth is less than average. 
To grasp some intuition for these portfolio choices, consider the monetary 
wealth of an individual born at time s, i. e. m +v *+bt. s*, and compute its t's LS 
variance. Calculations shows that it turns out to be: [V t +Mt-(Wt- Wt'S)]2P2(3z2. 
Hence, the choice of v* and bt. * is effective in insulating the individual from t. s S 
monetary randomness; moreover, if we add such a portfolio to Kt and Ht, we 
obtain an individual wealth allocation whose variance cannot be reduced further, 
being W 2p2 or 2. t's z 
Had we dropped the hypothesis of non-traded human wealth, we could have 
worked out an alternative optimal portfolio with the same variance. 
2.5 Wealth shares and the Tobin effect 
To solve the model, we still need to determine the constant of the maximum value 
function and the wealth shares. We start with the computation of 
D and we use our 
guess (9') to simPlify the first order conditions 
(13-14); we substitute them back 
into the Bellman equation (9), and we get: 
(D)(R-1) IR W (I-R) a- a)(]-R) IR DW 
(1-R) 
,fc, 
F, IT+ 
Oc 
r6 0=-P 
+P I-R ra-) I-R 
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DWts-R E (dWt, ) +2D PPts ("R) E(dWt,, 2) 
In the Appendix, we compute: 
E (dWts) = (r +p+ pq) Wts + Rpazxf Wt's -r mts - ct's 
E (dWts2) = p2 Crz2 W2 t's 
Hence, we determine D and therefore, via equations (13-14) the consumption 
function and the demand for real money balances: 
a (I- a)(1-R) IR (R-1) IR I lp Iz 
-Y D-IIR r)aR 
+p- (I-R) 'yp +p-R p2 a, 2( -ý') 
I 
p+ p- (I-R)[yp+p-Rp2or2 (, y- 0, 
ct's Wts R 
,z (23a) 
p+p- (I-R)[yp +p -R p2(7 
2 (, y- 0. 
mt's =r WtS (23b) 
Equation (23a) shows that the presence of a monetary policy shocks does not 
affect the propensity to consume out of wealth; hence monetary policy variability 
may affect real variables only by altering the evaluation of wealth. This result is 
ensured by the fact that the computed portfolio allocation implied that the variance 
of wealth is unaffected by the monetary policy parameters. Equation (23b) is the 
stochastic version of a familiar result. Notice that D is actually age independent, 
hence our guess is correct and the aggregate versions of equations (23a-b) can be 
immediately obtained. 
This is very useful, since most of the results obtained so far depend on the 
values of aggregate wealth components. Hence, exploiting the consumption 
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function and the demand for real balances, we may set up a system of non-linear 
equations to determine wealth shares and therefore to obtain a complete solution 
of the model. 
Let 01 =KýVt; 02 =HlWt; ej =m lWpý e4 = vlWt and define, for convenience: 
p+p- (I-R)[, yo +p-R p2 a, 2 (y - 0.5)] Do =R ýz 
Equating the non stochastic parts of equations (15)-(16), using (20b) to 
substitute out AH, and the aggregate version of (23a) to express consumption, we 
get the first equation of our system: 
(e g -d p2(y I 1± 
e 
0- 1) e (24a) P-ýýea =, Yp +p +z e2 e2 e, 
The second equation of the system is obtained from (16) and (18), exploiting 
our formulafion for gH, pq, p, and for amq: 
e 
- 
[11 - CF 
2+ par, j ((I 
- 1) 02 cFz2 -e-L - flazm m -ea +L 
(24b) 
e2 4m zm 04 192 
From the aggregate version of the demand for real money balances (23b), 
using the definition of the nominal interest rate, we get: 
('I'M 
- qM2 + 
Pazm (I- R)] 04 - P) 
03 = (I - a) Do 
(24c) 
while the fourth equation is given simply 
by the aggregate wealth constraint: 
4. ei =1 
(24d) 
Collecting terms, we may conveniently reformulate as 
follows the first two 
equations of the system: 
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( eL Do 00- 1) 1+ 02 
) 
(I -R fla, 2) =p+ 
(Xel 
(24a) 
OL 
(I -R Paz2) = 
OL 
(pm -a2+ Pazm(l - R)) (24b') 02 04 m 
System (24a'-b'-c-d) is highly nonlinear and some further manipulations are 
needed. Let: 
D, = pm - qm2 + Pazm (I- R) 
D2 = P(I- 0 (1- R Paz2) 
Substituting 01102 D2 from the (24b') into (24a') we may express the capital to 
wealth ratio as a function of parameters and of the ratio beween the value of real 
money and the one of future transfers: 
ei =D 
aD0 
2 -P + DI e3104 
(24b') may be reformulated as: 
D201 
02 =. D, 03104 
As D2>0, also 02 must be positive. Hence, we will restrict our attention to the 
solution where DI 193le4 ý"O - 
We now substitute 
aDt) (D2 +D 103104) el e2 D, 03104 P2 -P+D, 83104) 
into (24d) to get: 
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ODO (D2 + D, O"le 
D, 03104 P2 -P+D, 031e4) 
+ 03 + 04 (25) 
Notice that equation (24c) and (25) now form a non linear system of two 
equations and two unknowns. 
For convenience, let 03104 = y. Equation (24c) and (25) become, respectively: 
04 - (D 
(I- q)DO 
I(y + 1) -P)Y 
aDo (D2 + D, y) 
.+ _(Y 
+ 1) (1- q)Do 
Dly P2 -P + Dly) (DI (y + 1) -p)y 
(26) 
This expression has only one meaningful solution'O. In fact, yD, must be non- 
negative to ensue positivity of the ratio between human and total wealth; 
moreover, notice that D, (y + 1) -p is the nominal interest rate (equation (20a)). 
Hence, this expression can not be negative. Let u= yDI to get, from equation (26): 
Do + ap +0 
(' 
D2 +u -p DI +u -p) 
(26') 
The left-hand side of (26') is increasing in u, while the right-hand side is 
decreasing. When DI-p>O, both of the two asymptotes for the right hand side have 
negative abscissa and the equilibrium value for u is shown in figure Ia. When 
DI-p<O, there is an asymptote with positive abscissa and the unique equilibrium 
value with u, r>0 lies to its right. (See figure lb). 
10 Notice that, if p=0, -ti = 
20- 
and 01= 
aDn aD7 ; 03 = 
(]- a)Dn 
and 
04 DI D2+DO' v2 - D2+DO Do + DI 
(I- a)DL_ Tle ratio of monetary to non monetary wealth is 
(1-a)la, the result guessed by 04 -2 -(Do + DI) * 
Stulz, (1986, p. 339). 
l. h.: s., r. h. s. 
0. 
0.1 
0. 
0.0 
Figure La 
I. h. s., r. h. s. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
-0.: 
Figure Lb 
U 
U 
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Figure I plots the left-hand side (dashed line) and the right-hand side (continuous line) 
of (26'). Figure La considers the case DI-p>O, when both of the two asymptote for the 
r. h. s. have negative abscissa; when DI-p<O, there is an asymptote with positive 
abscissa and the unique equilibrium value with u, r>0 lies at its right. (Figure I b) 
U-Ub 0.1 0.15 1 0.2 
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The Tobin effect is present if an increase in the nominal interest rate fosters a 
reduction in consumption for a given level of capital, therefore accelerating 
growth. In our framework, such a contraction in the aggregate consumption to 
capital ratio may take place only if 19, increases"; for this to happen, since 19, may 
be written as D 
CDO 
-a reduction in u is necessary (and sufficient). Therefore, 2 -P + U' 
we need to compute dWdD,. Some algebraic manipulations allow us to write: 
du 
.. 
(1-a)p(D2+u-p)2D0 
<0 t? Dl (D2 +U-p)2(DI+U-p)2 +pDO[a(DI+U-p)2 + (1 - a) (D 2+U-P)21 
lfp=O, we are back to Stulz's model and duldD, = 0, as expected. Notice also 
that drIdD I =duldD I+ I >0, since, from the expression above, duldD, >- 1. Hence, 
an increase in the nominal interest rate always goes together with a reduction in 
the consumption to capital ratio: the Tobin effect is established. An expansion in 
the expected nominal money growth rate, Am, increasing DI, depresses 
consumption. If a2 increases, on the contrary, the effect on aggregate M 
consumption is positive. The role of the covariance between the monetary policy 
process and the technological disturbance is less definite. In general, its increase is 
detrimental for growth if (I-R)ozu is negative. In fact, when R>l, the nominal 
interest rate is reduced by increments in the covariance between the technological 
disturbance and the monetary policy process. (See equation (20a)). 
3. Policy implications and conclusion 
Our framework, despite the hypothesis of non distortionary taxes and transfers, 
delivers a strong monetary uncertainty relevance result. 
The finiteness of agents' 
II From equation (23a), we may f0muLge aggregate consumption 
as: ct =a DOKý01. 
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lifetime implies that consumption and growth are affected by the nominal interest 
rate, which, depends on the stochastic characteristic of the monetary disturbance. 
In its turn, the impact of monetary uncertainty on the nominal interest rate cannot 
be ascribed to a pure "convexity" effect unrelated to agents preferences. Even if 
we relate the definition of "monetary uncertainty" to the inverse of the nominal 
money stock, as in Rankin (1994, p. 129), monetary randomness, for R01, 
matters. Let L=11M; we immediately get, through Ito's lemma, that pL=gm - am2 
and that aLdzL = am, &m. Hence, the nominal interest rate becomes 
r=(m+v)1v[pL+P(TzL (I- R)] -p and the insurance effect entailed by the covariance 
between the technological disturbance and the monetary policy process still affects 
the nominal interest rate. Obviously, the existing literature failed to highlight this 
effect in consequence of the use of logarithmic preferences. 
Notice that the covariance effect allows the government to raise the expected 
seignorage, i. e. m(pm-Crm2+pCF, ým), without altering the nominal interest rate. Since 
r= (M+V)1V[AArqm2+PcTzm (I- R)] - p, if the correlation between the technological 
disturbance and the monetary policy process is positive, this goal may be attained 
increasing cFm or pzm (if possible) in order to let the term RPqZM to offset the 
expansion in (ptrqm2+Pqzm). If, on the contrary, pzm is negative, the expected 
seignorage may be increased without augmenting the nominal interest if the 
correlation coefficient may be set closer to zero, or if a. may be reduced. In a 
better specified model the seignorage coming from our insurance effect might 
be 
used to finance public expenditure or the service of government 
debt instead of 
being handed back to consumers12. 
12 For the "insurance effect" to be present in a model where taxes are 
levied on wealth (and 
therefore distortionary, as in Grinols and Turnovsky, 
(1993, p. 7) and Tumovsky, (1993, p. 957)) 
it is necessary to include also stochastic government 
trMSfers. 
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In this model, the impact of the interest rate on welfare is twofold: an increase 
in r reduces the demand for real money balances (equation 23b) and hence utility, 
but it reduces consumption and speeds up growth. This second effect is welfare 
enhancing, since the externality characterising the production function (2) entails a 
sub-optimal growth rate13. 
Hence, if we assume that it is optimal to reduce the nominal interest rate, as it 
would be with infinitely-lived individuals (see e. g. Fischer, (1979)), we may try to 
assess the effectiveness of some alternative central banking operating procedures 
in keeping low the nominal interest rate, for a given gm. In our framework, 
nominal money targeting implies that the monetary authority should try to reduce 
am as much as possible, while inflation targeting can be translated into the 
minimisation of the variance of prices. 
If we suppose that the central bank may influence only the correlation 
between the technological process and the monetary one, under nominal money 
targeting no action is taken, while under inflation targeting pm is maximised and 
therefore set equal to one. If the risk aversion index is above unity, under the first 
procedure, r is higher while the expected seignorage is lower. 
If we suppose, on the other hand, that pzm is exogenous but the standard 
deviation of nominal money is entirely under control, nominal money targeting 
leads to an interest rate equal to ym. Inflation targeting implies that a. should be 
set to ficr, and to zero 
,, 
if the correlation between the two disturbances is positive 
,, 
p,, 
otherwise. In this case, if pzw>O and R>l, calculations show again that the nominal 
interest rate is always higher under nominal money targeting while the expected 
seignorage is the same. If the two stochastic processes are 
independent or 
13 it is easy to compute, by means of numerical methods, the optimal 
interest rate, that is 
positive but very close to zero. 
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correlated, the two central banIdng procedures leads to the same results. 
If both p, .m and arm may 
be freely chosen, the nominal interest rate is again 
equal to A. under nominal money targeting, while it becomes JIxrRP2a, 2 under 
inflation targeting. Hence, this second procedure is always to be preferred, if the 
monetary authority aims at reducing r14. 
In conclusion, we showed that monetary policy uncertainty, when preferences 
are of the C. R. R. A type, affect the nominal interest rate also through an "insurance 
effect" which depends on the degree of risk-aversion and on the covariance 
between the technological process and the monetary policy disturbance. Hence, 
with finite lives, monetary uncertainty, through a Tobin-effect involving the 
nominal interest rate, affects consumption and growth. 
However, even with infinite lives, our "insurance effect" may be important, 
since it allows for a reduction of the nominal interest rate, given the expected 
seignorage. In particular, at the level of central banks operating procedures, this 
framework suggests that inflation targeting provides a performance that is better 
than the one of nominal money targeting. 
14 This is the case studied by Canzoneri and Dellas (1995, sec. H in particular). Their 
framework is a cash-in-advance endowment economy and they show that money targeting 
is 
effective, as opposed to nominal interest rate targeting, 
in reducing r if R>l. However, when 
capital accumulation is taken into account and agents rationally operate 
portfolio choices, results 
should be different. Intuition suggests that, while 
in an endowment economy monetary policy 
directly affects the marginal utility of consumption, when 
capital accumulation plays an 
important role monetary policy influences the marginal 
utility of future consumption and 
portfoho effects may dominate. 
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Appendix: Characterisation of the individual wealth process 
To obtain E(dWt, ) we start from (10) and we substitute out equations (12c'-e') to 
get: 
E(dWt, j = (r+p+Aq)Wts+R(p2(, y_ I) a, 2+pazm)Kts+R mt+vt + z 
(PCFZM 
vt t's 
R2 (1 y )K, az 2+py zm s- rmt, s -c dt 
(P 
Ht t, t, s 
Hence, substituting the wealth shares computed in section 2.4, we obtain: 
E(dWt, d = (r +p+ pq) Wt's + Rocrzm Wt's -r mt's - cts 
'S 
rom (11) we substitute out variances and covariances To simplify E(dWt 2) f 
of the endogenous processes to get: 
t, )2 E (dW 
(P2 (Tz2 + qm2 -2 P(Tzm Ws2+ [p2 
(, y 2 a, 2+ qM2 +2 qý, aKt, s2 t, z 
2 (p2 
(I y) 2 -L2- az2 + qM2 +2 P(l - Af) s2+ M2 Vt's 2H (TZM t, v H 
2 
2 ([p2 (, y 2 1) azm + Pazm - (7m I Wts Kts z 
Z, w 
+ per 2+ zm- a ýK a m Wt's Ht. s 
m +(Par -ar2) 
(ivi 
+1 
) 
WtS vtS 
z" 
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z+a - 
p2 (1-, y)2 
K 
or, 2 2+ -7) :E -1)) azu tsKts H ýj 
(P(l 
9H+ P(y 
zu + Cr 
2 
m +1 Kts v+ zm +or 
2 (m 
t's ) :La, m +1 
) 
Ht, s vt, s 
(2v (P 
(1-1 H 
Exploiting again the assumption concerning the impossibility to trade human 
capital (Hts = Ht) and the fact that Kt. * = Kt, by algebric manipulations, we get: S 
t's) 
2 E (dW 
(p2 (y, 2+ (TM2 - 2pazm) WtS2 +a2( zm 
K+H)2+2(pazm-am2)Wts(K+M+ 
m +I vtls 
(M 
Cr 2 
(11 
+1) vts (K+H). m ým - am2) +1 v 
+2 mv 2(v2+ 2(pa ý-v Wt, s t, sv 
Using also the definition of vt. s*g we get the 
final result: 
t, )2= 
p2 (yZ2 Wt, S2 E (dW 
t, )2 is not affected 
by aggregate variables. implying that E (dW 
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